Chapter 2

War at sea has a long and well documented history. Given that three-quarters of the Earth's surface is ocean, that until recently international trade has depended almost exclusively on sea transport, and that nation states have grown up around points of access to the oceans, it is scarcely surprising that control of the sea routes has assumed such strategic significance. This century has seen naval conflict extend from the two dimensional operations of surface fleets into a theatre which encompasses the space and air above the oceans, as well as the deeps beneath the surface of the sea. Technical developments have radically changed the character and method of naval warfare. To judge the elements of naval power most relevant to the future, it is worth examining those innovations which have so dramatically changed the war at sea over the past two centuries.

Since the time of the Phoenicians, naval warfare had consisted of combat between warships intent on the sinking or capture of their adversaries. In the nineteenth century the nature of the warship was revolutionised by the development of steam power. Sea power could be applied rapidly where and when it was required. It was no longer dependent on the vagaries of the wind, or, in more ancient times, the strength of the oarsmen. The transition from sail to steam for fighting ships was not instantly recognised as a significant advance in the art of maritime warfare. Dating the invention of the steam powered ship from William Symington's steamboat, the Charlotte Dundas, in 1802, it would be another 55 years before the British Navy finally abandoned its last sail warship. Innovation was not to be rushed in those days. It is interesting to compare it with military adoption of aircraft a century later, following the first heavier than air flying machine in 1903. If progress had been as slow, then balloons would be in use for offensive operations concurrently with supersonic fighter-bombers. The vulnerabilities of the paddle steamer to gunfire with its engine above the water line continued until the introduction of the screw propellor. Despite the idea dating from Archimedes, it was 1839 before the first major screw-driven warship was built (named after the venerable Greek himself). The move to steam power was not without penalties. While the wind might not be reliable, it was at least universally available, and provided free of charge. Steam power needed fuel to generate it. Ships were tied to supply lines and coaling stations, and combat radius became limited by refuelling requirements. Technology could provide ships with power on demand at the price of range limitation. The price had to be paid. The advantage gained by being able to ignore the winds far outweighed the logistic penalty. Steam power had an absolute advantage over sail, and that meant that sail warships would always be beaten in a battle against a powered warship.

In any form of fight the outcome depends on a combination of how well the fighter can defend himself against the blows of his enemy, as well as on how hard he can deliver blows. Speed and manoeuvrability were crtical in both regards for warships. When under attack, powered ships could cut and run. When attacking, they could position themselves rapidly to gain the most advantageous position. Technology was also offering improvements to the defence in the form of protective materials for building ships. Iron offered much better resilience to attack than wood. As the armour plating became more efficient, naval guns were developed to have more penetrating power. In the second half of the last century there was a continual race between firepower and armour for ships. In two decades the thickness of the iron protection increased from 4.5 inches to 24 inches (1), and new manufacturing processes made the armour even stronger. The technical developments were driving the increasingly rapid replacement rate for warships, each needing better armour and better guns than its predecessor. Sea power more than ever before became a reflection of a nation's industrial capability.

The critical change in the nature of sea power from sail to steam had taken the first half of the century to incorporate into the world's navies; the incremental changes to armour and firepower were introduced with increasing rapidity. Two new devices for sinking ships affected the conduct of operations in the second half of the nineteenth century: the mine and the torpedo. Mines could be used to defend home ports, to deny access, and to provide offensive firepower across expected enemy shipping routes. Primitive torpedoes saw service in the American Civil War, and were developed over the years that followed to have compressed air motors, depth control and gyroscopic steering. The significance of the torpedo was in its ability to provide a threat to capital ships from small launch platforms. The torpedo boat was a relatively inexpensive way to provide potentially devastating firepower. But such boats were themselves vulnerable to specially designed destroyers, which were built to protect the warships. The torpedo boat in turn could best be protected by hiding it under the sea, and the submarine provided the answer. From a practical demonstration by Bourgeous and Brun in 1863, France, Britain and the USA were all fielding torpedo equipped submarines by the turn of the century.

By the start of the twentieth century, naval warfare had been transformed from the meeting of ships at close quarters for a cannon fight, a battering engagement or a boarding. The advent of more powerful and accurate guns, torpedoes from boats and submarines, and mines had made naval engagements far more complex. The warship was becoming more heavily armoured and carrying more firepower, which made it both more expensive and more attractive as a target. It needed to be protected by destroyers and mine clearance systems. While the nature of maritime warfare was changing because of technological innovation, scientific advances were being made in many fields which could have military applications: the internal combustion engine, wireless telegraphy, and electricity in particular.

How did the world's naval powers respond to the opportunities for technological advantage? The British set the pace for bigger and bigger warships with the Dreadnought and subsequent giants. Smaller numbers of larger ships were forecast to be more cost effective (2). Thickness of armour and size and number of guns (with rotating turrets and centralised fire control) were maximised to produce very expensive capital ships. Designers looking for cheaper ways to combat these warships traded armour for speed and manouevrability in the cruisers. The French produced more submarines than the other powers, but depended on petrol-engine propulsion.

In the event, World War 1 had a number of surprises for maritime operations. The super battleships met rarely in combat, and spent much of the war ensuring that they were in safe havens. In the major engagement at Jutland, the heavy armour proved its worth in such set piece battles, and the cruisers suffered severely. This victory for the British fleet gave no critical strategic advantage, as control of the surface of the sea was no longer the only consideration. The day of the submarine had arrived. At the beginning of the war Germany had only 10 diesel powered U- boats and another 18 petrol engined (3). Yet in the opening days it was able to force the Royal Navy to move from Scapa Flow because of the threat. More importantly, the success of the submarine against merchant shipping could have been a war-winning capability. The U-boats were so successful that had it not been for inhibitions on production and operations after American protests to the Kaiser, they might have deprived Britain of the resources with which to continue the war. The crucial importance of containing the submarine threat led to much effort being devoted to anti- submarine warfare technology. The hydrophone, depth charge, anti-submarine destroyer, aircraft spotting, and mines all contributed to the solution. With the benefit of hindsight, the historian can point to a more effective possible scheme for defence equipment development in the early 1900s. The power of the submarine was not foreseen, or to some extent even realised very rapidly once the war had started. The naval arms race for more surface warships made ever more valuable targets which needed more and more protection; while at the same time the ships built were not to be of critical import to the outcome of the war that was to take place. Devoting the resources to submarines and torpedoes could have crucially affected the outcome. Developing anti-submarine warfare techniques before the war in anticipation of the threat could have paid great dividends. It is debateable whether there was sufficient time for aircraft to be developed for more effective maritime use given the limitations in range, communications, navigation equipment and weapons at that time.

The inter-war period was a pause, although the lessons learned in the recent major conflict could have been exploited in a time of rapid scientific advance. In general there was remarkably little progress other than incremental improvements to weapon systems. It was a difficult time for resources for military equipment. Germany was constrained by the terms of the Versailles peace treaty, Russia was reeling under the post-Revolution chaos, and the US and Europe were increasingly disarmament minded. Artificial constraints on naval ship tonnage negotiated at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921 ensured that money for naval modernisation remained scarce.

The new key element in any future naval conflict would be air power. In the United States, General Billy Mitchell tried to convince the many doubters of the future importance of aircraft in maritime battles, and was eventually court-martialled for his pains. His flamboyant demonstrations of attacks on surface vessels showed just how vulnerable ships had become to aerial bombardment. While fellow airmen shared his views on the potential, his naval colleagues were not convinced(4). It would be 1940 before the power of naval air power was fully realised with the sinking of the Konigsberg. The following year saw land based aair power sinking the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. It was left to the Japanese to develop the aircraft carrier as a powerful offensive weapon platform, which they used successfully against the Chinese before World War 2. Other nations put aircraft on to ships more for defensive purposes, or with the intention of ferrying them between theatres of operations. The carrier grew in significance rapidly from 1941. At Pearl Harbour, the Japanese destroyed 311 US aircraft, sank two battleships, and caused major damage to a further three for the loss of a total of 29 of their own aircraft. The lesson was well taken, and the US moved rapidly towards a carrier based strategy. By the middle of 1942, the US carrier forces were able to defeat the numerically larger Japanese forces at Midway. The crucial factor was the attaining of air superiority, and part of this came through the benefits of new reconnaissance capabilities which technology was providing (5).

For hundreds of years naval engagements had depended on visual sighting of enemy vessels. In modern times, reconnaissance by boats, balloons or aircraft, and the gathering of intelligence information could help to find the enemy; but for a successful attack, visual target acquisition remained necessary. While warships were large vessels and could be seen at line of sight ranges in good weather, they disappeared in poor visibility, in fog and at night. Submarines had to be spotted while they were on the surface, which would normally be under cover of darkness. An alternative, though somewhat alarming, method of submarine spotting was to back project the tell-tale line of bubbles from a launched torpedo. For observing the surface of the oceans, the development of radar from 1938 onwards dramatically changed the picture. Radar could make ships or submarines on the surface visible out to the line of sight horizon by day or night, and virtually regardless of the weather. Mounting radar in aircraft from 1941 onwards extended the radar horizon, so that ships and submarines could no longer depend on the cover of darkness to move or to surface. Ships' radars reduced the risk of surprise by the enemy from the air or from the sea. The technological advantage that the US had in having warning of the enemy through radar was a significant contribution to success at Midway. In many respects the maritime environment is ideal for radar use. Ships have high radar contrast against the uniform background of the sea. They also move relatively slowly and considerable information can be built up from comparatively few airborne radar sensors.

Radar could only help in the anti-submarine battle when the submarine was on the surface. The sea is opaque to electromagnetic radiation at radar frequencies. For detection beneath the sea, the passive hydrophone, which listened for the noise of passing submarines, was supplemented by a system analagous to radar: ASDIC (6). The use of reflected sound pulses to detect underwater targets had been under development since the end of World War 1. Indeed the progress made gave the British undue confidence in their ability to detect and destroy enemy submarines in any future conflict. Compared with radar in air, acoustic energy in water travels less predictable distances, suffers propagation anomalies and is not very discriminating. Nevertheless, the development of techniques for locating submerged submarines was a vital step forward in maritime warfare.

Both radar and ASDIC brought with them new vulnerabilities. Emitting a pulse of sound or radar energy gives information to the enemy. The outgoing pulse is necessarily much more intense than any reflected echo. The target will thus know that it is being subject to attention at greater ranges than the sensor operator can detect the return pulses. Using passive detection systems, the hunted can become the hunter, and the surveillance system can become a homing beacon for the attacker. As we shall see later, new capabilities are often limited by the vulnerabilities that they carry with them.

The experiences of World War 2 signalled the end of the battleship as the centrepiece of sea power. It would continue to have a role in coastal bombardment and in projecting naval presence, but the flexibility and offensive range of air delivered systems meant that its traditional role would be taken over by the aircraft carrier. The technical developments which were coming to fruition at the end of the war were to have profound effects on maritime operations. Atomic research had produced both nuclear weapons and nuclear power sources. Air-breathing missiles and ballistic rockets had been used as weapon delivery systems. The jet aircraft had entered service. In World War 2 these innovations had been directed towards land and air operations; after the war, they were absorbed into naval operations with dramatic effect.

For propulsion, steam power changed the nature of naval warfare in the last century. It carried with it a penalty in the form of the need for logistic support. Nuclear power offers the prospect of virtually limitless range and motive power, without the need for continual resupply of fuel. It could make navies independent of either overseas bases or their armadas of support vessels. In the days before global satellite reconnaissance, a nuclear power plant could allow ships the freedom to roam over the oceans and keep their location and intentions secret. As with so many technical advances, nuclear power also brought some penalties. The reactor, associated power conversion system and shielding are bulky, heavy and expensive. Indeed the cost/size penalty is so great that it has only proved practical to use nuclear power plants for the largest of the surface ships. Even for these modern Dreadnoughts, it can be argued that the advantages are not great. In modern naval warfare, surface ships do not operate independently. They have a flotilla of defensive ships, all of which in turn require support, and the freedom of action is therefore already constrained. In 1996, there were only 16 nuclear powered warships in the world (7 US aircraft carriers, 5 US and 4 Russian guided missile cruisers).(7). Technology was able to provide the answer to the sailor's dream of limitless power to give speed and range, and yet be independent of base support; but at a price which made it impractical.

Part of the lack of attraction for nuclear propulsion was as a result of the development of an efficient alternative. The jet engine had been developed in the context of a better power plant for aircraft to enable them to operate at higher speeds. The high power and good power to weight ratios of the engine made them attractive to naval engineers. Easier to maintain and requiring less manpower, they have subsequently become the general replacement for the petrol, diesel and coal plants of the past.

There was one aspect of sea power in which the advantages of nuclear power plants outweighed the cost and weight penalties. Submarines, when submerged, must operate with a power source which does not need oxygen in order to burn its fuel. It is easy to forget that the air is an essential part of the fuel of all the vehicles, boats and aircraft that operate around us. Oil-based fuels need oxygen to burn and produce power in an engine. Air is a commodity in short supply in a submerged submarine. Electric motors provided a ready answer to the problem, but had limitations. They needed batteries as their energy source, and the batteries needed regular recharging. To do this the submarine would have to come to near the surface, and run its diesel engine as a battery charger. Taking in air and exhausting burnt fuel, the submarine was vulnerable to detection and to attack, while at the same time not having the variety of defensive armament available to other surface vessels. Nuclear power can provide virtually unlimited motive power without the need to surface, and can also recirculate the air for the crew to breathe, and purify the sea water for drinking. The power allows the submarine to operate at high speed if necessary, and stay submerged as long as the crew's rations last. By transforming the survivability of the submarine, the nuclear power plant becomes a technological innovation worth paying for. There are currently 251 nuclear powered submarines operating around the world in five navies (8).

In the author's view, for the Cold War, the nuclear powered submarine assumed the mantle of the flagship of sea power: a title held only briefly by the aircraft carrier after it took it from the battleship. The nuclear power plant has caused the submarine to grow in size - the Soviet Typhoon class displaces 25,000 tons (9) - and in firepower. It is undetectable except when coming in for an attack, and has freedom to roam the oceans worldwide. There are those who would argue that it cannot replace the capital ship, on the grounds that its invisibility means that it cannot project power. This view carries less weight in the light of the experiences of the Falklands Conflict of 1982. The possibility of a nuclear powered submarine being in the area of the Falklands ahead of the Task Force, allowed the British Government to declare an exclusion zone at an early stage. The sinking of the Argentinian warship, General Belgrano, by a nuclear powered submarine caused the Argentinian Navy to seek safe refuge in mainland ports, and hence gave the British control of the sea. Notwithstanding this control, the Royal Navy had to expend considerable effort on guarding against the possibility of a submarine attack by one of Argentina's 3 submarines. The evidence of the critical importance of the submarine in two world wars has been confirmed in the 1980s by the Falklands Conflict. Submarines were already powerful, but the advent of nuclear power has given them flexibility and invulnerability. However as yet the submarine lacks the ability to control the airspace above the ocean. The nuclear powerplant all brings with it significant extra long term costs. It is likely that the number will continue to decline in the absence of superpower confrontation.

While technology had provided the power source which could allow submarines to operate with true freedom, the weapon systems of both surface and sub-surface vessels have also been completely transformed in the post-war era. Ship main armament had not increased in calibre, range or firepower significantly since the days of the Dreadnoughts. Improvements had come from measures to improve accuracy and control. The development of missile technolgy offered major increases in range of offensive weaponry with further improvements in accuracy, and the capability of increased destructive power. Each missile costs far more than each shell for a naval gun, but a ship armed only with guns must always be at risk to an adversary able to fire missiles at distances beyond gun range. The advent of the missile has therefore relegated the gun to the role of shore bombardment, close attack against a poorly defended enemy vessel, and terminal air defence using modern rapid fire systems.

For attacking other ships, cruise missiles have taken over the role of the guns. The biggest guns (the US 16" calibre) have a maximum range of 40 km over which distance they have an accuracy of around 550 metres , and can fire only two rounds per minute (10). A Tomahawk cruise missile can carry 1000lbs of high explosive a distance of 460 km and with its terminal radar guidance will hit the target. The land attack version operates out to 1300km with an accuracy of better than 10 metres (11). The range, explosive power and accuracy of these modern missile systems has changed the nature of naval warfare yet again. Given intelligence through airborne or satellite reconnaissance, or from other sources, a ship can be attacked from over the horizon. As always this progress carries with it a penalty. Each Tomahawk missile cost $M1.27 in 1982. The shorter ranged (110km/500lbs HE) Harpoon missile was estimated to cost $940,000 per round (12). Against these enormous costs must be set the effectiveness of the weapons. In 1968, the Israeli destroyer was sunk by Egyptian Styx missiles fired from coastal patrol boats. In 1982, the Royal Navy destroyer HMS Sheffield was destroyed by an air-launched version of the Exocet cruise missile. An Exocet costs about $250,000 (13), which is about one thousandth the cost of a modern destroyer.

The Gulf War of 1991 brought the power of cruise missiles on to the television screens of the general public. The precision navigation, using terrain matching techniques, could be shown by reporters watching missiles pass by their hotel rooms finding their way to specific buildings in Baghdad. Some 288 cruise missiles (14) were launched from surface ships and submarines.

The power of the missile makes it a key factor in modern naval warfare. While it is expensive, its targets are orders of magnitude more costly. The threat to surface ships can come from missiles launched from other ships, from aircraft, from land-based systems or from submarine launched missiles. Each new threat spawns research into countermeasures. Here again the missile has assumed a major role. To defend itself a ship can attempt to destroy the missile launch platform. Surface to air missiles engage attacking aircraft, surface to surface missiles attempt to beat potential attackers to the draw, anti-submarine rocket delivered depth charges and torpedoes defend against submarines. To prevent incoming missiles reaching their targets various defensive measures are taken. Some missiles use radar-homing, and the target ship can use electronic counter-measures to deceive the missile sensors. When infra-red homing is used decoy hot sources may be used to deflect the incoming weapon. Cruise missiles travel at similar speeds to aircraft, and missile and gun defences can also be used against them.

Nuclear powered submarines, missiles, radar, air power and maritime surveillance systems have all changed the face of naval warfare. Yet there was one development which complicated predictions of future maritime operations more than all the rest put together. In the immediate post war period, atomic weapons were so expensive, so difficult to construct, so large, and so critical to strategic plans that they seemed to have limited relevance to future sea battles. With the development of tactical nuclear weapons of small physical size and limited explosive yield, it became possible to give virtually every naval weapon a nuclear capability. A depth charge which uses a nuclear explosion offered a much greater prospect of destroying or disabling a submarine once its position has been roughly located. A nuclear warhead can be fitted to a torpedo. A nuclear missile launched from an aircraft, a land base, a surface ship or a submarine can destroy any ship once it has been located, identified and is within range. That range will be several hundred miles. Nuclear weapons thus gave naval firepower a very high probability of success in destroying their targets while at the same time giving naval weapon platforms much greater vulnerability when faced with a nuclear armed enemy.

Opinions vary as to the utility of such naval nuclear warfighting systems. The special constraints afforded to nuclear weapons, in the light of the dangers of escalation to strategic nuclear exchange, could operate in two differing ways. It could be argued that a maritime engagement allowed the use of nuclear weapons with no risk of collateral damage, and with relatively easy escalation control. In some future conflict, the political judgement could be that resolve could be signalled by the use of a nuclear torpedo. Even at the height of the Cold War there was a view that the release of nuclear weapons would be such a critical decision, and such a change in the nature of the conflict, that it would be unlikely to be made for a naval engagement, the outcome of which would not directly affect the overall advance of the enemy. The tactical maritime nuclear weapons were early casualties of the reductions in nuclear arsenals in the closing days of the Cold War. Given the willingness of nations to abandon these capabilities, it is clear that they were seen by politicians as having somewhat limited utility.

The most dramatic effect of nuclear weapons on naval operations has been the emergence of a new role of overwhelming importance. The bringing together of the nuclear powered submarine and the long range nuclear warhead missile has brought a new element to warfare. Nuclear weapons have not been used in anger since World War 2. The fear of nuclear retaliation has deterred nations from employing these weapons. A key element in this strategy of nuclear deterrence is the requirement for a military capability to inflict an unacceptable level of damage in retaliation on an enemy, regardless of any pre- emptive action the enemy might take. Nuclear powered submarines can remain hidden under the sea for months. Armed with ballistic missiles carrying multiple nuclear warheads, they can threaten retribution from anywhere in vast areas of the oceans. Undetectable and hence invulnerable they are the most credible part of a nuclear nation's nuclear forces. In addition, as the accuracy of such weapon systems increase, there is considerable advantage in replacing land-based nuclear systems with appropriately equipped submarines. Even in the post-Cold War era, the nuclear powers have kept their submarine-based nuclear missiles, and have invested in modernisation.

This rapid review of the major technical developments which have changed the nature of maritime warfare over the past two centuries has taken as given the need for sea power. Before the nuclear age, the importance of control of the sea was easily understood. Sea-going nations had provided navies for a number of purposes: to protect their trade routes; to secure overseas possessions; to deter other nations from war; and to secure their sea lines of communication in war. In the early years of the nuclear age, when nuclear bombs were scarce and air-delivered, the major naval powers could expect to have roles little changed from the last war in the next. Once nuclear weapons became plentiful, delivery systems accurate and varied, surveillance systems global, thermo-nuclear war scenarios notable for their brevity, the roles of navies became more difficult to predict.

If nuclear weapons were used extensively in a future war, and ports and harbours were included as targets, it could be argued that the protection of merchant shipping becomes an irrelevance. Sea power is exercised in slow time, and strategists suggested that a nuclear war, once started, looked like being over on the land before the further supplies, troops and equipment brought by sea could have an influence on the outcome. However, the very power of nuclear weapons has made their use in war less likely. The increasing use of coalitions of the williing to enforce international order has been the pattern of the 1990s. The Gulf War had both the restoration of the sovreignty of Kuwait and the protection of strategic energy resources as motives for participation. Operations at a distance require support by sea. The power of modern missile systems can mean that a militarily inferior state can threaten a major naval power. Protecting sea routes becomes more difficult both because of the diversity of threats and also the nature of the modern international system. Before the Gulf War, Western nations were concerned about the security of their oil supply route, and undertook international mine clearing operations in the Gulf. When merchant shipping is put at risk by third parties engaged in war, naval power is needed to protect them. During the Iran/Iraq war in 1988, this protection extended to the use of offensive naval operations to protect the passage of tankers. The Falklands Conflict of 1982 gave an example of the modern use of sea power to secure a nation's overseas possessions. Preparations for the Gulf War of 1992 required massive sea lift to position all the equipment and stores for the Allies. Sea power was used extensively by NATO and WEU for embargo operations as the Former Republic of Yugoslavia broke up.

Nations which have such commitments will need the balanced military forces necessary for such operations. However, as effective counter-measures become available to third world nations through new weapon systems, the retention of a large scale capability to intervene by sea will become increasingly expensive. The step change brought to Navies by technology seems at present to be in a state of suspension. The most powerful nuclear weapons systems are less useful, and the need for aircraft carriers and minesweepers is more the order of the day. In line with the supposed need for more readily deployable forces, amphibious units are in favour in many countries.

Looking for the lessons to be learned from the major technical changes to maritime capability, it is possible to draw out certain common factors. These are combat performance areas where a qualitative change results in a significant enhancement (or limitation) in naval power. The recurring areas, which are not mutually exclusive are: speed and manoeuvrability; firepower and accuracy; radius of action; detection and detectability; vulnerability and survivability; support requirements; and finally cost effectiveness. In examining the application of current technical advances to future maritime operations, it will be worth looking at the probable implications for these areas first. It may be that other factors, such as arms control, political constraints, manpower, training, communications, or fuel availability, become additional considerations. We examine these questions in the last part of this book.

The last point that can be extracted from the history of naval technology is the time that it has taken between the critical scientific advance and the widespread deployment of the resulting weapon systems. It took around 40 years between the building of the first steamboat, the first submarine and the flight of the first aircraft, and the subsequent deployment of effective forces of steam- powered warships, U-boats and aircraft carriers respectively. For guided weapon destroyers and nuclear submarines the timescale was nearer 20 years. There are no indications that the gestation period is shortening. Indeed since the advent of the nuclear submarine developments have been incremental in capability rather than revolutionary. While hovercraft, helicopters, and hydrofoils have produced novel opportunities, they have not changed the nature of maritime warfare in the sense that the previous examples have. An examination of the current areas of research will indicate which offer the greatest benefits in future naval warfare.