The use of organisms in warfare has a long, if inglorious, history. In 1346 the Mongols used plague corpses to infect the defenders in the siege of Caffa. The disease spread rapidly in the confined town, and the inhabitants were overcome. The British used smallpox patients' blankets as a gift to American Indians in 1763, and produced the desired effect of the spread of the disease among the tribes. The use of the anthrax organism was considered by the Allies in World War 2. Tests were carried out in 1941 and 1942 on Gruinard Island off Scotland. The organism was so potent and hardy that it was only in 1988 that the Island was declared safe for unprotected humans.(1)

Biological warfare (BW) has been waged with limited success on a few isolated occasions. While it potentially offers great killing power for small investment, the results have been unpredictable and unreliable. We are now moving into an age where developments in biotechnology offer the prospect of designing organisms for specific tasks, and this has significant military implications. An organism feeds on specific substances as nutrients, converts them to other substances, and multiplies under the right conditions. For thousands of years the ability of the yeast organism to feed on fruit sugar and convert it to ethanol has been used to the benefit of the winemaker - and wine drinker. Alcohol can also be used as a fuel, and yeast offers the prospect of strategic independence from oil suppliers. In the First World War starch was fermented with a bacterium to produce acetone and butanol which were needed for the munitions industry. Organisms can help nations at war both as offensive weapons and also as new sources of supply of strategic materials.

To see why biological warfare is becoming a more threatening possibility, it is first necessary to look at the current state of biotechnology, and then the future possibilities. Mankind had used genetic engineering of a sort for thousands of years in producing crops of a singular strain, and selectively breeding animals for particular qualities. It was not until 1953 that the method by which such genetic qualities are passed on to successive generations was discovered. Francis Crick and James Watson explained how genetic information was stored and replicated through the double helix structure of the DNA molecule. Nucleic acids, of which DNA (Deoxyribonucleic Acid) is one,are found in all living organisms, and play the key role in the transmission of hereditary characteristics. It took another two decades for this research to develop into successful genetic engineering: manipulating genetic codes to provide specialised organisms. The process involves the insertion of genetic information into an organism, which is usually a bacterium, to give it new capabilities. Subsequent research has developed methods for designing and arranging the building blocks of DNA into a required structure. Whereas the early synthesis of human insulin required genetic material from human cells, it can now be entirely artificially constructed.(2) The mapping of the human genome is a project which is absorbing worldwide research effort, and will have many consequences for preventative medicine.

Biotechnology is a young science, but already the potential is vast. On first consideration it might appear that, for the military, the biological warfare possibilities are the most serious aspects to examine. If the scientist can design the organism to have specified characteristics, surely this offers an efficient method of killing the enemy? Before accepting this hypothesis, it is worthwhile considering why biological warfare has been so limited in the past, and what new qualities agents would need to make it more successful in the future. An unclassified US military manual (3),although 40 years old, gives an excellent insight into the requirements of BW agents. BW differs from other combat methods by being entirely anti -personnel. Indeed it sets out to achieve what the popular press claimed for the Neutron Bomb: killing people not property. That killing can be achieved by disease, either through micro-organisms directly or indirectly from vectors such as insects; by toxins produced by organisms; or by yet more indirect method of killing livestock or crops.

The essential requirements of BW agents are: consistency in effect, ease of production, stability in store, ease of dissemination and stability after dissemination. Depending on its particular role it will need a number of other qualities: short incubation period, appropriate persistence, difficult to detect, difficult to take counter-measures, yet easy to take self protection measures. Anthrax as we have seen has long persistence and stability, but this becomes a disadvantage to friendly troops if the area remains dangerously contaminated for forty years. It has a relatively short incubation period (between 1 and 7 days), but this is a long time in any modern war. It would be unfortunate if a ceasefire were agreed after 3 days' fighting, and the next day one side began to have 25% deaths from anthrax. Indeed the question of time from delivery to causing incapacity is crucial. It is possible to imagine a BW agent which is slow to act, but is also rapidly spread by cross-infection, being used in an undeclared war. The problem would be that the forces delivering the weapon would in due course be at risk from it. The annual spread of influenza around the world is an example of how all mankind is vulnerable to highly infectious diseases. The state wishing to use such a weapon could take protective measures for its own population, but these would difficult to hide, and could be taken as evidence of hostile action. Such a weapon is more likely to appeal to terrorist organisations. Looking to the future it is possible that viruses could be tailored to attack particular ethnic groups by using the differences in gene frequencies among the target population.(4). Also possible would be the weapons which would attack the genetic material of the target, rather than producing disease or poisoning by producing toxins. These genetic weapons would again have only long term effects, and have no place on the tactical battlefield. Indeed given total freedom to design a battlefield bacteriological weapon, it is difficult to see what tactical advantages it offers over chemical weapons. Incubation and incapacitating periods would be reduced to a minimum, but are unlikely to come down to the few seconds for CW agents, or the near instantaneous effect of conventional weaponry. The Ebola virus is an example of a rapidly acting killer, which as a result can be isloated and then burns itself out. Even so the timescale remains measured in days. The spreading of disease can become a problem to friendly forces, and the long term effects may be unpredictable. The protective measures taken against chemical weapons will also be effective against BW agents. The only significant advantage would be in the psychological effects. It might be that soldiers and civil populations under attack from disease would suffer greater stress than those vulnerable to more traditional killing systems. The international horror of biological warfare can also reduce the incentive to develop capabilities in this field. As there are few gains to be made from the use of such weapons in combat, military leaders should endorse moves towards arms control in this area.

If BW is of limited use, even with genetically engineered agents, can it be discounted? Unfortunately the strategic, covert, long-term use of micro-organisms is a real threat. If an agent can be tailored to kill a particular population group, undeclared war could be waged most effectively. The spread of the HTLV-III AIDS virus gives an example of how a long term agent can spread exponentially. In the case of AIDS the discrimination is caused by methods of infection. The ethnic weapons suggest that targeting might be much more selective. Alternatively, economic war might be waged by targeting the main food crop of a particular nation with a particular virus.

These possibilities offer a possible form of warfare for terrorist groups as well as unethical states. The use of the nerve agent Sarin, by a Japanese cult movement as a weapon of terror in 1995, serves as a reminder of the potential dangers from irrational terrorist action. There is also an increasing concern that new resistant strains of viruses will spread even without intervention from malevolent agents. The combination of rapid world-wide travel and misuse of anti-biotics has left countries more vulnerable to epidemics, which may be widespread and fatal. This is a security problem which may require military measures to control.

The prospects are not entirely negative however. As the technology to design destructive agents increases, so also does the ability to manufacture vaccines and other protective measures. The difficulty should not be under-rated, and the case of AIDS again illustrates the time it takes. Nevertheless, genetic engineering will provide protective vaccines and toxoids. It will provide protection in other ways as well. The characteristic of an organism to feed on a given nutrient, and convert it to another substance, can be used to make very senstive and selective sensors. These biosensors will be engineered to act as rapid and cheap chemical agent detectors. The protective measures against chemical and biological agents are of no use unless they are deployed in time. The biosensors will be able to detect such small concentrations in such rapid time that effective protective measures can be taken.

It is conceivable that these micro-organism sensors could be developed to detect other militarily significant emissions. If we think of the biosensor as feeding on a few specified molecules, and amplifying its output through a cascade of suitable organisms then it becomes an extremely sensitive "nose". Could this sniffer detect gases from a submerged submarine, or smell out hidden troops, or tell a missile whether it was about to strike a friendly or enemy

aircraft? None of this is any more unlikely than the ability of a dog to find drugs or explosives on the basis of a few molecules of escaping vapour.

The developments in biotechnology will for the most part be driven by the needs of the civilian sector. In the medical sphere this will be in the prevention and cure of disease, and hence have a direct benefit to the military requirement both for protection, and also for rapid healing of casualties. In the industrial field, the early work on production of fuel from sugar by fermentation points to the prospect of new fuel sources. Genetic engineering offers the prospect of designing a yeast that feeds on cellulose to produce alcohol. It would then be able to make fuel directly from all plant material. This would make a nation independent of oil supplies. When the military first started worrying about the finite nature of oil following the 1973 crisis, schemes for using hydrogen instead of oil abounded. The difficulty was the high energy requirements to extract hydrogen by electrolysis from water. It may prove to be possible to extract hydrogen molecules from water by growing a genetically engineered algae or bacteria.

Microbes are already being used in industrial processes to concentrate minerals, clean up pollutants and to synthesise plastics. The techniques for extraction of metals from low grade ores using microbes may offer cheap methods for obtaining weapon grade uranium. The Stanrock Uranium Mine in Canada use bacteria to leach uranium oxide from rock without mining the ore. The required mineral accumulates in pools where it can be readily collected.(5). It is possible to conceive of the military use of a microbe which would be designed to eat strategic material. If a rapidly breeding bacteria which decomposed stainless steel, or plastic, or protective clothing were used on an enemy and its equipment, the results could be catastrophic. However, if the organism were long lived and rapid breeding, it would soon become a threat to both sides in a conflict. If it were not, then it is likely that conventional forms of attack would be more effective. It seems that whenever biological offensive methods are considered, the same problems in usage arise.

Biotechnology is also moving towards electronics and photonics in

the realm of computing. The limit on component density in conventional silicon chip type technology is within sight as we explore in the next chapter. Photonics offer one method of increasing chip density and computing speeds and power. The brain shows that organisms can achieve very much higher packing densities. While the possibility of producing artificial brains is beyond the timescale considered here, biochips are possible in the relatively near term.

The ability to design protein molecules which are organised in predetermined three dimensional structures gives the prospect of growing circuits. Semiconductor molecules would be included in the protein framework. The biochip could then be self reproducing, regenerative, and of high capacity. Militarily the added advantage could be resistance to electromagnetic pulse effects, as well as very compact size for given capacity.

It is clear from the wide range of possible developments in biotechnology that it is an area of research which merits considerable effort. Many of the developments will be achieved by commercial pressures. However, while civil techniques will be usable by the military, there will be a need for considerable defence investment. In particular the use of biosensors is likely to be of greatly increased importance. In the longer term the biochip may be an important advance in computer technology. As to biological offensive warfare there is little to suggest that genetic engineering offers a war-winning weapon. The threat of covert use of biological agents must be countered. This will be partly a question verification of treaty obligations, partly of intelligence, and partly defensive measure research: a field for civil and military co-operation.

NOTES ON CHAPTER 11

1. For account of historic uses of Biological Warfare see Biological and Toxin Weapons Today edited by E Geissler, Sipri 1986, pp7-13. 'The Birth of the US Biological-Warfare Program' by B.J.Bernstein in Scientific American June 1987 pp94-99 reviews the work done in the US during World War 2.

2. Biotechnology: A New Industrial Revolution by S Prentis (Orbis, London 1985) pp36-65.

3. Guide to Germ Warfare TM3-216/AFM 355-6 ( Departments of the Army and the Air Force, Washington 1956)

4. Geissler ibid pp14-15

5. Prentis ibid p178.