Chapter 1

The advances of technology in the twentieth century have been revolutionary in their impact on every nation. We can travel throughout the world in a matter of hours. We can communicate virtually instantaneously with anyone, wherever they may be. Complex machines are manufactured automatically, and made from materials which are unknown in nature. Behind all these tangible effects is the deeper understanding of the nature of matter which the physicists, chemists, biologists and mathematicians have given us through the fruits of pure science research. At the same time this technological progress has given us the nuclear warhead, the inter-continental ballistic missile, biological and chemical warfare agents, precision-guided munitions, supersonic jet bombers, nuclear-powered submarines, and an endless choice of killing systems for conducting war. The pace of technological innovation shows no signs of slackening. An optimist would hope that the future enhancements in both communications and wealth- producing capacity would offer the prospect of a future of global harmony, with no competition for resources, territory or power. At the same time, the remorseless progress in military scientific achievement offers an increasing range of more effective ways to wage war; and it does so to an ever greater number of nations, ethnic groupings, dissidents and terrorist organizations.

It is beyond the scope of this book to examine the global benefits that technology may provide tomorrow. It is to be hoped that global communication will improve understanding, that increasing productivity will raise living standards everywhere, and that renewable energy sources and new materials will reduce dependence on strategic resources. Such a rosy technological future should allow more harmonious international relations to develop, yet current trends point to a more pessimistic prospect being equally valid. The ability to threaten other nations' vital interests from great distances, the imbalance between rich and poor nations being worsened by a technology gap, the move towards ethnic based states and the divergence of political systems, all suggest that security and peace will need to be earned in the future, just as they have had to be in the past.

In subsequent chapters we examine how technology affects the maintenance of peace and security. Firstly, the key developments of the past are highlighted in each of the military specialisations. Then, the potential of each of the major areas of scientific interest is reviewed. Finally, the possibilities for future of warfare are explored. The influence of technology on warfare is not a new concern. As each development in weapon design has been made, some new response has been stimulated to act as a counter to the new capability. It is often suggested that today the nature of the problem is changing.

In the past, developments have for the most part been incremental in nature. The significant breakthroughs such as aircraft, submarine, machine gun, tank, missile and atomic bomb have taken years to come to fruition and full deployment. Now we are told that technology is leaping ahead in every research field: high energy physics, computing, nuclear physics, space, chemistry, materials, biotechnology, nanotechnology, mathematics and electronics. Not only are all these fields experiencing new discoveries at rates which appear exponential, but the rate of innovation in the military sphere is faster than the production and development cycle can cope with. On this basis new weapons become based on obsolete technology before they enter operational service.

There are those who advocate comprehensive military research into each and every new technological avenue of interest. It is argued that to ignore the possibilities may open a new vulnerability, given that potential adversaries may gain a decisive breakthrough in a critical research area. It is also said that technology will compensate for smaller armed forces, and ensure that casualties are few. Such a massive commitment could only be achieved at enormous cost in both financial and scientific resource terms. As is shown later in this volume, many of the most exciting research areas need vast investment over a long period with uncertain expectations of success. The research scientists are themselves a finite resource, and if used in one area are unavailable for other work in either the civil or military areas. For most nations, it will be necessary to allocate priorities on the best assessment of the balance of risk against the financial and resource burden. Limitations on money available for research, development and procurement of high technology military equipment mean that choices must be made as to which option to pursue. Yet these choices, by their very nature, have to be made on limited knowledge and dubious extrapolation. If a development is to be innovative and dependent on novel techniques, its costs, effectiveness and timescale for production can only be speculative. Yet the choices which are made on such a basis will have profound long term effects on the force structures of the nation, its economic strength, and ultimately on its security.

Some have described the end of the Cold War as a victory for Western superior technology. Certainly the United States invested a remarkable amount into its military research, and has produced some spectacular new weapons as was seen in the Gulf War of 1991. Those weapon systems were however developed as part of the military machine to counter the Soviet Union, when widescale war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact seemed an ever present possibility. The security concerns for NATO nations are now much more diffuse and, to an extent, less urgent and apocalyptic. There is no immediate threat to national survival, but there are continuing threats to national interests. The culture that has looked for technological solutions to security problems has not disappeared. The drive for total security with no risk to own forces premeates thinking in the United States. While science offers new hopes for the defenders of democracy, it also offers more dramatic weapons to the new small players on the international scene. The operations that NATO nations are likely to engage in are very different from the set piece high intensity conflict planned for over four decades. The current inventories are unlikely to be the optimum, and decisions are being made on new directions for armed forces.

What then in the optimum strategy for technology and military systems? It is not possible to ignore what technology can offer, and depend on resources devoted to more and more obsolete equipment. To do so would be to court disaster. Military capability depends both on quantity and quality of forces and weapons. While analysis of set piece battles brought early operational researchers to the view that quantity was of greater significance (that you needed four times the combat capability to match a doubling of enemy size), present day wargamers look for much better returns from technology. In theory, we could have produced a large squadron of World War 2 bombers for the price of a Tornado GR1 when it came into service. Yet not a single Lancaster would have survived to reach the target in a modern air defence environment. A stealth bomber can cost as much as a squadron of Tornados. But if all the resources are placed in just one aircraft, then however effective it may be, a single bullet may be sufficient to destroy the force. This was the basis of the concern over the road to absurdity, as each generation of new military equipment is more capable, but less numerous. If the trend were not broken, then a time would come when nations would be unable to afford more than a single aircraft for their defence.

The question is not one of whether technology can offer improvements in military capability - of that there is no doubt. The key issue is, with limited resources, how can the technologies which offer the greatest promise for military use be exploited, and hence increase national security. This is a difficult problem, and any analysis must depend on assumptions about the nature of the future security concerns, the prospects of technological progress in particular areas, the character of international relations, national and global economic prospects, and a host of unquantifiable social and political factors. Potential enemies must make similar decisions, and the technologies they opt for, will influence the effort needed on research for countermeasures. To make a rational allocation of priorities for research effort requires an assessment of the relative importance of differing military roles and equipment.

In the remainder of this volume, the research areas which offer most potential for influencing security are examined. Science is not partisan, and the products can be use for good or ill. The aim therefore is to highlight those areas which may bear fruit for whichever player decides to invest, and then to consider what countermeasures are available to others. The greatest difficulty in a time of such scientific plenty is to preserve a sense of perspective. Today's miracle weapon is tomorrow's dead end. The next three chapters attempt to give that sense of perspective by examining how science has affected maritime, land and air warfare in the past. The technological developments which have crucially affected the way war has been conducted over the past two centuries are described, and their common features sought. Space does not permit an examination of the many scientific novelties which came to naught, although there are many lessons for the military prophet in those disasters.

In the subsequent chapters the major areas of current scientific research, both pure and applied, are described. Many already have military applications, some have potential for weapons, others are perhaps given too much weight in the allocation of priorities for resources. Again some - the computer chip is one - have applications in nearly every form of military effort. Yet even then the cost benefits will vary with applications to different weapon types: making a tank shell 'intelligent' will have a different investment return from giving an offensive aircraft an all weather flying performance. We consider only those applications which current theory shows are possible, and have a reasonable chance of successful development given sufficient resources, and perhaps as long as two decades of development work.

In the concluding three chapters of the book, the application of these technologies to future warfare is explored. While different nations will have different needs, the aim is to produce a menu of technical opportunities from which an appropriate selection could be made. Hardware cannot be the whole story. How that military force would be used is also crucial. The debate on tactical doctrine in the light of new technologies is not yet finished. An often made accusation about the military is that they have always planned to fight the last war. The current discussions about tactical doctrine for equipment, which is still in the laboratory, leads one to fear that the pendulum may have swung too far the other way: we may be planning to fight the next war but two, with the equipment of the last one. It is vital that force structures and tactical doctrine are reviewed in the light of new capabilities. Such changes should not be implemented before the capability is deployed, and should also take into account the political realities.

In some cases the tactics may be constrained by the political limitations put on a new weapon system. However, if a new capability and doctrine can produce more security at less cost, then the proper assessment should influence the political constraints. There are difficulties with such assessments. Traditional combat-proven military techniques may be abandoned in a wave of enthusiasm for novel fighting tactics, which work well in computer simulations, war games, exercises and theoretical studies, yet have never undergone the acid test of battle. Indeed, the problem of lack of combat experience is all pervading for weapon designers and the military. The Vulcan nuclear bomber aircraft was so successful in its deterrent role, that it was some thirty years after its designers had worked at its specifications, that it was first used in anger. The conventional bombing in the Falklands Conflict of May 1982 was neither a role nor location which could possibly have been foreseen by the architects of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent force in the 1940s. It is also possible to focus on the glamorous new technology in a conflict, and forget the key role that older equipment had to play. The remorseless B52 missions in the Gulf War of 1992 were somewhat lower profile than the F117 attacks on Baghdad. Even the advertising sticker which says "Combat Proven" bears close analysis. How relevant was the war environment to future possible conflicts?

A recurring lesson of successive conflicts has been that wars never run according to plan for either side. Contingency plans, when they exist, must be changed or scrapped; equipment must be misemployed; and improvisation and initiative become more important than firepower and technical superiority. This leads to yet another caution in any approach to novel technologies. Do they improve the versatility of the military machine? New weapon systems can be designed to be more flexible in their applications, or they can become more specialised. Worst of all, weapons can be designed around a specific contingency or scenario, which today may appear likely, but in the future, or in the event of war, may come to seem tragically ridiculous.

The aim must be to invest in those areas of scientific research which offer the promise of enhanced security at an affordable price, and which leave sufficient flexibility to cope with the unforeseeable defence problems of the future. There are areas of technological advancement which carry the risk of decreasing security through a reduction in strategic stability, flexibility, cost effectiveness, political will, military forces, or public support. These are fruitful areas for arms control negotiations, as it can be in no state's interest to develop capabilities which reduce its security. In the West, the cornucopia of novel technologies has meant that we have increasingly sought a technical answer to every security concern. If we devote increasing resources to the expanding range of opportunities, we may find ourselves less and less able to afford the defence structure that we need for our security. This is the Technology Trap, and it has as its bait 'the neat solution'. Just like the cheese in a mousetrap, the apparently free benefit may carry a hidden and terminal cost.

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