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The day when two army corps can annihilate one another in one second, all civilised nations, it is to be hoped, will recoil from war and discharge their troops.ALFRED NOBEL in 1892 (1)
The scale of destruction possible with nuclear weapons must exceed the wildest speculations of Alfred Nobel, yet his hopes for the resulting disarmament have not been fulfilled. Theories for the effects of nuclear weapons on international relations have blossomed in the past 38 years; and central to much of this 'deterrent theory' is the horror which Nobel foresaw, when he was inaugurating the prize for peace, and wished that he could 'invent a machine of such frightful efficiency for wholesale destruction that wars should thereby become altogether impossible'.(2)
Deterrence theories have tried to do many things: to explain the rationale for a current national posture; to predict the actions and responses of states in peace, in crises, and in war; to suggest strategies for the furtherance of foreign policy objectives; and to suggest equipment procurement to improve force effectiveness, world stability or national survivability. The major weakness of deterrence theory is its lack of supporting experimental evidence. While much may, and has been, inferred from international events which involve nuclear weapon states, the evidence is rarely conclusive. Since 1945, the key issue of when nuclear weapons would be used in anger has, fortunately, never been put to the conclusive test. The nuclear strategists in this period have developed intricate theories against a backcloth of rapid but largely untested technological innovation. Their ideas are important, not solely because of their validity or otherwise, but also because of the influence that they may have had on the shaping of national strategies. That world peace may depend on a capability to exterminate, virtually instantaneously, a significant portion of mankind is bizarre; yet the possible results of a nuclear conflict make the need for maintaining peace, a matter of prime importance.
The first part of this book looks at the theoretical concepts of nuclear deterrence, and draws out the various schools of thought which have emerged in the short period of the nuclear age. That some theories contradict others, or result in quite opposite conclusions, is not surprising given the inevitable subjectivity of any analysis which depends on predicting human reactions to given circumstances. Having examined the theory, the practice in each of the nuclear weapon states is studied in the second part. We look at how and why nuclear weapons were obtained by each state, and the rationale for their possession today and for the future. Finally, having put the theory in the context, those factors which bear upon the stability of the system are considered.
The stability of the system must be the key area of concern for strategists and decision-makers alike. It is no part of my intention to provide Utopian solutions to the world's problems. The aim of this book is to highlight those areas which have an influence on future stability, are amenable to change, and for which there are incentives to implement the necessary changes. Through such examination, not only will the question of whether deterrence can last be answered, but options for improving its robustness will be offered.
As a serving officer in the Royal Air Force, I have had ample opportunity to think about the practicality of nuclear deterrence, particularly while flying Canberras in Germany and commanding a Vulcan strategic bomber squadron. The research for this book is drawn from a year spent at Magdalene College, Cambridge, working for an MPhil degree in International Relations. The help of Dr Philip Towle, at the University, was invaluable in bringing together my thoughts in this volume. Those thoughts, however, do remain entirely my own and do not necessarily reflect official opinion.
TIMOTHY GARDEN
Bracknell 1984
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