Chapter Nine

Deterrence in Practice

The examination of the nuclear strategies of the seven nuclear weapon states shows that the reasons behind the acquiring of nuclear arsenals, and the practical objectives for their employment, vary not only from country to country but also from one time to another. Inevitably deterrence theory, as examined in the first part of this book, has tended to concentrate on the question of the design and utility of nuclear deterrence between the superpowers. Yet even between these two, theory and practice do not always seem to be in step. A number of factors seem to be important in the original decision to produce nuclear weapons. Certainly, in the cases examined, each country had a good scientific and technological base on which to carry out the development. Other countries with equivalent capabilities have not developed nuclear weapons, and it is useful to tabulate the factors which may have prompted the decision in the first seven to do so.

Table 1 gives a simplified breakdown of the objectives of each of the seven countries, as they emerge from this examination.

World power status is, or was, of importance to the first five nuclear powers, who are also the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. While the possession of nuclear weapons does confer such status, they are certainly now a requirement. National security objectives are common to all nuclear states. It appears that countries seeking ideological leadership in the world see a need to be nuclear armed. It might be possible to add India to this category, on the grounds that it was wishing to maintain the leadership of the non-aligned states. However, as there is no evidence to support this, it has not been added. Only slightly different is the concept of local area leadership. France certainly looked upon nuclear weapons as a counter to German conventional dominance. Alliance obligations can be viewed as an extension of national security for those countries within alliances. The second decision centre or - more unkindly - the nuclear trigger, is a role for the lesser nuclear powers within alliances. It could in a somewhat different sense be applied to lesser nuclear powers, perhaps India and Israel, if they wished to be able to involve the superpowers and thus gain their assistance. Although Israel may have used this tactic to gain arms from the United States, it has not been included. The procurement of nuclear weapons to offset conventional weaknesses, or save on manpower, is a tendency among the Western countries. It can reduce the expense of keeping large standing conventional forces, justify expansion of nuclear arsenals, but inevitably turns into a nuclear war-fighting force. The development of nuclear weapons to generate internal prestige may be a factor. However, the long development time necessary means that it is unlikely to be the major objective; it may just affect the timing of the programme. As the practical use of nuclear weapons in the present world becomes more difficult to justify, the objective of keeping a deterrent force as an insurance policy against an unknown future is developing force as a justification. Britain and France openly hold this view, and India must be keeping its option open on these grounds. There seems to be evidence to suggest that scientific and military pressures underlie the decision to go nuclear in all cases - except possibly that of China. The weapons are scientifically interesting and militarily powerful. The combination tends to put pressure on the political decision makers to continue weapon development. Finally, as a variation on the general question of national security, the decision may be taken as a reaction to a perceived nuclear threat from another nation. Thus, initially, the Allies believed that Germany was well on the way to developing an atomic bomb. Although the table points to America as the threat perceived by the USSR, this may only be valid for the development of thermonuclear weapons.

The short summaries of current postures are designed to do no more than indicate the differences between the nations- The postures and future trends that have been considered are relevant when the factors affecting future stability are examined in the final part of this book. It has been shown that the United States and the Soviet Union have large nuclear arsenals, and an ability to use nuclear weapons at all levels of conflict. Britain and France maintain small, but nevertheless effective, nuclear forces which will insure their security against the uncertain future. China has the potential for much greater development, but as yet, probably for economic reasons, remains a lesser nuclear power. India has in effect reverted to the position of a near nuclear weapon power. Only Israel appears to have both the capability and the likely need to use nuclear weapons, in a way which might ensure survival.

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