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The six countries examined previously have all demonstrated by the means of a test explosion their capability to produce atomic weapons. Israel has neither openly tested a nuclear device, nor claims to have a nuclear arsenal. Nevertheless, there is sufficient belief in the existence of an Israeli nuclear stockpile for it to have a credible nuclear deterrent strategy.
It has been said that Israel has always been a nuclear country.l Within a year of the establishment of the state in 1948, the first plans for the nuclear research programme had been made. The Israel Atomic Energy Commission was established in 1952 and was, significantly, placed within the Defence Ministry. No written terms of reference were produced for the Commission. Israeli scientists were sent abroad for training, an agreement was signed with France in 1953 for atomic cooperation, and another with the United States in 1954. A research reactor was purchased from the United States and became critical in 1960 at Nahal Soreq. This reactor was not a plutonium producer, and was unlikely to be used for weapon production purposes.
In 1957, Israel and France concluded a secret agreement which was to result in a large research reactor being built for the Defence Ministry at Dimona in the northern Negev. All the members of the Atomic Energy Commission resigned in 1957 and it has been suggested 2 that this was to indicate their opposition to the military uses of the proposed reactor. In late 1964, the Dimona reactor became critical, and started producing about 8 kg of plutonium per year: enough for between one and two fission weapons after reprocessing.3 It was suggested that the French-Israeli cooperation extended to the testing of a jointly designed atomic bomb at France's Sahara testing ground.4 There have also been improbable reports of a secret underground test in the Negev in 1963.5 Whether either of these reports is true does not effect the capability of Israel to produce nuclear weapons. Professor Van Cleave, looking at the need for tests, concluded:
For 'first generation' fssion bombs, testing by the Nth country would not be required for development ... By now, certainly, it can be confidently assumed that the basic design will work without testing, and work within a reasonable degree of predictability ... a test of a first-generation nuclear weapon by an Nth country has more political than technical significance.~.6
Having established a steady production system for plutonium fissile material, a reprocessing plant was necessary for rapid conversion to weapons' grade ore. The design of such a plant is distinctive, and there is thus agreement that Israel did not build one. The reason for this omission appears to be that Israel was successful in illegally acquiring a significant stock of enriched uranium. CIA reports have revealed that Israel obtained 'large quantities of enriched uranium by clandestine means'.7 The New York Times report of this reminded readers of the loss of highly enriched uranium from the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation in Apollo, Pennsylvania in 1965.
Keeping track of nuclear fuel is always difficult; however, of the 382 pounds missing, the investigating commission decided that at least 206 pounds could not be accounted for as 'lost in the pipes'. This is sufficient for about 14 bombs.8
If Israel did manage to obtain nuclear weapon material in 1965, it would explain why no plutonium reprocessing plant was built. With an assured uranium capability, it could use the slower, but politically uncontroversial, method of 'hot laboratory' plutonium separation gradually to increase its stockpile.9
Premier Eshkol in 1966, President Katzir in 1974 and Premier Rabin in 1975 have all stated that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.l° This somewhat cryptic posture is useful in increasing the uncertainty of Israel's potential enemies. A report 11 in 1976 of a CIA briefing claimed that the Israeli arsenal of 13 weapons was prepared for possible use at the start of the 1973 war. Defence Minister Moshe Dyan was quoted in the report as justifying the Israeli nuclear option as, 'Israel has no choice, with our manpower we cannot physically go on acquiring more and more tanks and more and more planes'. The readiness to use their nuclear weapons to fight, if they are in danger of being defeated, indicates that the 'no first use' policy is rhetoric.
Israel's seriousness in obtaining a credible nuclear capability can also be seen in the procurement of suitable delivery systems. Nuclear warheads could be fitted to Jericho, Lance and Harpoon missiles; nuclear bombs could be dropped by F-4E Phantoms, Kfir-C2s, F-lSs or even A-4 Skyhawks. Israel tried to purchase Pershing missiles from the United States in 1975, but withdrew the request when it provoked considerable controversy in Washington.12 Certainly Jericho, Lance and, had it been procured, Pershing, make more military sense in a nuclear role than in a conventional one.
There is little doubt that Israel is a nuclear weapon state. Initially it raced, by all possible methods, to provide itself with a last resort capability. This could be used if there was an imminent danger of being 'pushed into the sea' by its Arab enemies. It may now be developing a nuclear war-fighting capability~ to compensate for its numerical inferiority. Its ambiguous position does not appear to have deterred its °opponents from aggression. One Israeli strategist has suggested, 'To maximise the odds of security and peace, Israel must adopt a doctrine of explicit strategic nuclear deterrence'.13 An open declaration of nuclear capability might result in Soviet nuclear guarantees to the Arabs, or a reduction in support from the United States. Its strategy is therefore unlikely to change, and it will remain prepared to use nuclear weapons if the need
arises.
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