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India has a tradition of atomic energy research, which can rival that of the other nuclear powers. Homi J. Bhabha, the father of the Indian bomb, set up an institute of nuclear physics research in 1945. Three years later, the Indian Atomic Energy Commission was set up; but little was done until the formation of the Department of Atomic Energy in 1954. The first research reactor, APSARA, went critical in August 1956, and at the inauguration of the Atomic Energy Establishment the following January, Nehru said:
... No man can prophesy the future. But I should like to say on behalf of my Government - and I think I can say with some assurance on behalf of any future Government of India - that whatever might happen, whatever the circumstances, we shall never use this atomic energy for evil purposes. 1
Under Nehru a joint Canada-India reactor, CIRUS, was set up and became operational in 1960. With a second research reactor in 1961 and a plutonium plant completed in 1964, the Indians had a sound base for nuclear weapon production. Nehru's commitment for future governments was somewhat modified by his successor, Shastri. In November 1964, he told the Indian parliament that the policy was not rigid, but 'I have no doubt that we cannot at the moment think in terms of making atom bombs'.2 The reasons were more likely to be economic than technical. Some observers 3 maintain that India could have produced an atom bomb before China, had it wished so to do.
Indian public opinion was becoming more concerned about the dangers of a world divided into the nuclear 'haves' and 'have-nots'. The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, the Chinese nuclear test in 1964, and the war with Pakistan in 1965 produced a strong body of opinion favouring nuclear weapons for India.4 Just a week after the first Chinese test, the revered Bhabha broadcast on the subject of disarmament. He maintained that the United Nations would need a security force, armed with nuclear weapons, to police a disarmed world. He made the point that 'One must remember that it is not any object which is intrinsically good or bad, but the use which is made of it'.S He went on to explain that the attraction of atomic explosions for peaceful engineering purposes meant that the rapid spread of nuclear weapons was likely.
India was a leading opponent of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was viewed as a discriminatory arrangement, set up by the nuclear weapon states for their own benefit. They identified three major areas of unfairness. Firstly, the 'haves' would be free to improve their nuclear arsenals, both in quantity and quality. The 'have-nots' would be prohibited from military research. Secondly, the nuclear weapon states did not have to submit to safeguards, while the others would have to submit even when engaging in peaceful nuclear activities. Thirdly, all transfers of any nuclear technology were subject to safeguards for the non-nuclear weapon states, while no transfers of the nuclear weapon states were affected.6 The Indian representative at the NPT talks in 1967 remarked that the institution of such international controls was 'like an attempt to maintain law and order in a society by placing all its law-abiding citizens in custody, while leaving its law-breaking elements free to roam the streets'.7
Even after India finally rejected the NPT in 1967, there was no apparent urgency to complete the work on the atomic bomb. Indira Gandhi maintained that the option for Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs) was being retained. On 18 May 1974, an underground test explosion of a Hiroshima-sized device was successfully carried out. It was seen as a great boost to India's prestige. The stated purpose of the test was to continue research into PNEs, and the Indian literature of the time abounds with schemes for using PNEs in engineering projects, such as making harbours, hollowing out gas storage cavities, and extracting minerals and oil. All this despite the declining interest in America and Russia, and the emerging world scientific view that the disadvantages of nuclear explosives outweighed the advantages.8
There were other views as to the use of nuclear explosions. Writing just before the test, the Director of the Indian Institute of Defence Studies drew attention to the difference in treatment which Washington gave to India and China. Quoting one of President Nixon's aides as saying that 800 million Chinese armed with nuclear weapons could not be ignored, he speculated that 600 million Indians similarly armed might prompt a visit from a future American President to New Delhi.9 Another commentator writing at the time of the test was rather more specific about the role of the PNE:
It cannot be denied that India's PNE has military implications as well. It demonstrates India's capabilities in the nuclear field and is a step in the direction of establishing India as a centre of independent decision- making in the world.10
The reason that the Gandhi government decided to carry out the test should give some indication of the Indian nuclear strategy. One commentator 11 cites three different reasons for the decision: to divert attention from the growing domestic problems; to force China to become more accommodating; and as a signal to the superpowers that India could not be taken for granted. The decision to conduct the test must have been taken in late 1970 or early 1971.12 It is difficult to point to any one of the three suggested reasons as being of overwhelming significance at that time. Perhaps the decision was more an acquiescence to the requests of the scientists, given a feeling that there might be a measure of political kudos from a successful test.
Canada suspended all nuclear aid following the test explosion, and the United States took some mildly punitive action. Nevertheless, the Gandhi government kept the option of further tests open. No further tests were undertaken, and Prime Minister Desai has assumed a Nehru-like view of nuclear weapons while in office. The Indian External Affairs Minister stated at the United Nations on 30 September 1977 that, 'It is our solemn resolve that whatever the rest of the world may do, we will never use atomic energy for military purposes'.13 The following year, Desai went further and said, 'We do not want to have any atomic weapons under any conditions, and do not want even to have explosions of any kind'.l~ Even if these statements were true, the return of Mrs Gandhi to power on 14 January 1980 made them of little relevance. Since taking office, she has accelerated India's military modernisation programme and a successful satellite launch has been carried out.15 It would appear that the Gandhi government intends to keep open its nuclear option.
If India had been stockpiling nuclear weapons, it could have produced some tens of weapons from the available plutonium. It has a limited delivery capability with its Canberra bomber force, and perhaps the recently acquired Jaguar aircraft. It is developing its satellite and missile technology, but would require a considerable investment of time and money to develop a force with the range and numbers necessary to pose a deterrent threat to China. While it could use its current potential nuclear force against Pakistan, it has no need to. Nevertheless, the consensus view is that India is continuing to keep the nuclear option open.16 This suggests that it has opted for the 'insurance policy' approach to nuclear strategy. While denouncing nuclear weapons, India is prepared to devote hard-pressed resources to ensuring that it does not leave itself open to nuclear blackmail in the future.
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