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Until as recently as the early l9th century, China was accustomed to its traditional role as the Asian power. For 2,000 years, China had seen itself as the 'middle kingdom': the centre of culture, influence and power. The collapse of the Chinese empire, the intervention of the European powers and the Communist revolution have not necessarily changed the traditional perception that the Chinese have of their world role. In 1943, Chiang Kai-shek, when speaking of the imposition on China of unequal treaties, said:
The people as a whole must regard this as a national humiliation, and not until all lost territories have been recovered can we relax our efforts to wipe out this humiliation and save ourselves from destruction. l
Professor Liu has drawn attention to the similarity of the views of both the Nationalist and the Communist leaders in this respect. Mao Tse-tung was equally bitter about the many dependent states and parts of its territories which China had lost to the imperialist powers. Both leaders recognised the traditional superiority of China, and anticipated its future return to great power status.2 Nevertheless, the advent of a Communist government has meant that ideology, rather than nationalism, is the declared driving force of foreign policy. An examination of nuclear strategy must bear in mind the undercurrent of the great power tradition.
Mao Tse-tung refused to acknowledge the importance of atomic weapons. There was, however, no doubt that China expected to get the technology, if not the bombs, from the Soviets. In 1953, the Committee of Atomic Energy was set up in the Chinese Academy of Science. In 1955, the Soviet Union announced that it would help China to study the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and would provide a research reactor. Two years later, the 'New Technology for National Defence' agreement was signed, and in 1958, the first experimental reactor came on line. The following year, the Soviets withdrew their assistance and the Chinese were later to claim that this broke a promise, given by the Soviets, that they would provide China with a sample atomic bomb.3 It has been suggested 4 that the original Soviet aid was provided to buy unity in the Communist world, and subsequently delayed, in the hope that a Test Ban Treaty would stop China from producing a bomb.
During this period, the Chinese leaders both advocated general nuclear disarmament and also declared nuclear proliferation to be desirable. The rationale for these apparently conflicting policies was that either would break the nuclear monopoly of the United States and the Soviet Union. On proliferation they said:
Whether or not nuclear weapons help peace depends on who possesses them. It is detrimental to peace if they are in the hands of imperialist countries; it helps peace if they are in the hands of socialist countries. It must not be said undiscriminatingly that the danger of nuclear war increases along with the increase in the number of nuclear powers.5
It is suggested that Khrushchev personally made the decision, based - on the suspicions of the independent course of the Chinese missile development.6 It is a measure of the importance which Mao attached to the programme that as early as 16 October 1964, they tested their first static 20 kt atomic device. They rapidly increased yields, and reduced size, and by the test of 17 June 1967, they had exploded a thermonuclear device of 3 to 7 MT. The tests in 1965 and 1966 had included live aircraft and missile delivery respectively.' The three years from first atomic test to first thermonuclear test compares with eight years for the United States, five years for Great Britain and four years for the Soviet Union. Those working on both the weapons and the delivery systems development must have been exempted from the excesses of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution which began in September 1965.
Having successfully broken the nuclear monopoly, China seemed less enthusiastic about the prospect of proliferation. Vice-Premier Chen Yi in talking about nuclear cooperation with other countries, said in 1965, '... as for the request for China's help in the manufacture of atom bombs, this question; is not realistic'.8 Although China refuses to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, there is no evidence that the of ficial view has changed since the policy expressed by Chen Yi. It has also been necessary to accommodate the possession of nuclear weapons with the policy of nuclear disarmament. To explain the position, Premier Chou Enlai wrote to heads of government on the day following the first test:
The Chinese Government consistently stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China has been compelled to conduct nuclear testing and develop nuclear weapons. China's mastering of nuclear weapons is entirely for defence and for protecting the Chinese people from the US threat. The Chinese Government solemnly declares that at no time and in no circumstance will China be the first to use nuclear weapons.9
As China did not test its first intercontinental ballistic missile c until as recently as 1980, this nuclear strategy of protecting China from the United States is difficult to follow. Yet the stated policy was to bring nuclear retaliation to the American homeland. In 1965 the Defence Minister said:
US imperialism relies solely on its nuclear weapons to intimidate people. But these weapons cannot save US imperialism from its doom ... If it threatens other countries with nuclear weapons, US imperialism will expose its own country to the same threat.10
The 29 issues of the secret Chinese military journal, Kung-tso T'unghsun, which were acquired by the United States government give some insight into the more realistic top level thinking in the Chinese military in the early 1960s. Hsieh concludes, from an examination of these journals, that Chinese thinking about war with the United States was entirely defensive.11 They expected an American initiated attack as a 'bolt from the blue', with nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. They realised their vulnerability for the next three to five years, but they could still live to fight another day. A leading member of the Military Affairs Committee, Marshal Yeh Chien-ying said:
The objective in a war is primarily to annihilate the enemy, but attention should also be paid to the theme of self preservation. Particularly under the present circum- stances, weapons causing casualties on a large scale and mass destruction have appeared in use. We cannot annihilate our enemy unless we pay enough attention to the preservation of our lives and strengths. We should not only prepare ourselves against the use of such weapons by our enemy in a sudden attack, but also safeguard ourselves from disaster when we ourselves employ them.12
In addition to the deterrence of American attacks, nuclear weapons were also seen as a means of encouraging those peoples who were engaged in revolutionary wars. A number of the nuclear tests were accompanied by statements similar to this One of 9 May 1966, following the third test explosion: 'The Chinese people's possession of nuclear weapons is a great encouragement to the peoples who are fighting heroically for their own liberation'.13 It is unlikely that the Chinese intended any direct application of their tiny nuclear forces to revolutionary wars; but the rhetoric may have been aimed at - making the American nuclear guarantee less credible t o pro-Western states in Asia. As the stockpile of weapons -- increased, the statements accompanying each test became more specific. After the tenth test, a three megaton bomb on 20 September 1969, the statement specified 'encouragement and support' given by Chinese nuclear weapons to the Vietnamese, the Laotians and the Palestinians, and to the people of all countries who are fighting for the people's liberation. 14 It is difficult to postulate a consistent nuclear strategy ; through Mao's time, given the internal turmoil of 1966 and 1967, the widening rift with the Soviets, and the eventual rapprochement with the United States in 1972. Richard Nixon saw the warming of relations with America coming from the increasing concern about China's potentially hostile neigh- bours: Russia, India and Japan.l5 Gelber saw the Chinese as having five objectives: national security; regaining the lost great power status; extending influence in Asia; regaining lost territories; and leadership of the Communist world.16 One can draw a number of parallels with the French view of nuclear strategy, if this was the case. He went on to describe how, as a lesser nuclear power sharing a common frontier with Russia, 4 and possibly in conflict with either it or America, China has cultivated a strategy of 'strategic ambiguity': leaving everyone uncertain as to their strategy. There is much to support his view that:
There is no evidence that Peking considers these matters principally in terms of scenario writing, or that the usefulness of a Chinese force need depend on precisely - formulated strategic purposes. 17
The Chinese nuclear strategy after the death of Mao in 1976 was not made any clearer by the internal power struggles which took place. Test explosions continued, with a record four in one year in 1976, but there have been none reported since 1980. Rocket development has also continued. However, there seems to be no urgency in deploying operational forces. The force of less than 150 missiles are all liquid fuel, and hence vulnerable to first strike attack. The few hundreds bombs can only be delivered by aging Soviet-designed bombers, which would have little chance of penetrating Soviet air defences. One submarine had been produced in 1970, with missile launch tubes, but the missiles were not tested until ten years later. Thus despite all the development effort, there seems to be little effort to make the force credible. It has been suggested 18 that China has not worried about fielding an invulnerable second strike force because it no longer believes that there is a threat from the Soviet Union: or that the people's war doctrine, with a limited nuclear capability, and credible civil defence is an adequate deterrent posture; or that it is worth waiting, despite the risk, until technology makes these weapons cheaper. The tests of the long range missile, CSS, in May 1980 show that the intention to keep up the development programme remains. That it is prepared to bear the economic burden, without gaining a significant operational capability, suggests that China's strategy is predominantly that of an insurance policy, against future world developments.
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