|
|
|
|
|
Although French scientists had been involved in early work on the development of the atomic bomb, France - like Britain - had no prospect of sharing in the fruits of American research after the war. The trauma of occupation made the reestablishment of France as a major power within a secure Europe the great concern of post-war governments. While the formation of NATO was welcomed as an aid to security, there was considerable debate in 1949 as to the credibility of the Anglo-Saxon guarantees to the European mainland. 1 The French military were well aware of the importance of atomic weapons, and much emphasis was placed on the tactics of the nuclear battlefield. This concern over the effect of atomic weapons on war tactics led to the emergence of a body of military opinion which considered them an essential part of the nation's arsenal. From the mid-195Os, this military view, coupled with the establishment hope that atomic weapons could give more strength per franc, formed a climate of opinion for the production of such weapons which could survive the changing governments.
While the government of the day did examine the question of producing atomic bombs from time to time, the decision was always postponed. As in Britain, research continued unhampered by political decision. The Commissariat d l'Energie Atomique (CEA) had been set up by General de Gaulle in October 1945 with similar broad terms of reference to those of Harwell. The CEA was entrusted with the mission of developing the uses of atomic energy for science, industry and national defence.2 The initial period of research was followed by an industrial phase from 1952, which involved the construction of two plutonium producing reactors. In this way, the weapons production option was retained. The weapon development phase emerged in the mid-195Os, without any specific government decision having been taken. A study of how this happened concludes that:
Guidance and direction for nuclear policy came not from the French Government or the French Parliament, but from a small dedicated group of administrator-techno- crats, politicians and military officers, whose activities centred on and emanated from the CEA.3
Through the changing coalition governments, the question of nuclear weapon development was raised at various times in the French parliament. A general understanding emerged that France was researching towards an eventual nuclear weapon capability. The Suez crisis of 1956 reinforced the mistrust of American protection, and a new CEA National Defense protocol was signed, which formally established a five year military programme. The decision to prepare for the first French atomic test was not taken until April 1958 by Premier Gaillard. This was no more than a rubber stamp decision by another of the succession of weak governments.
What coherent policy discussion that there had been during the Fourth Republic suggested that the role seen for atomic weapons was as a part of the NATO Alliance, albeit as an independent great power. The advent of Charles de Gaulle and the Fifth Republic changed this. After an early attempt to wrest the control of NATO from the United States by a change to tripartite control, de Gaulle declared his position at a speech at the Ecole Militaire on 3 November 1959. Having dismissed the NATO concept of integrated forces, he went on to say: ... what we must achieve during the coming years is a force capable of acting exclusively on our behalf, a force which has been conveniently called a force de frappe' susceptible to deployment anywhere at any time. It goes without saying that the basis for such a force will be atomic armament- whether we manufacture it or buy it- - but one which belongs to us.4
There was little discussion of the strategy or force structure necessary. Kohl suggests that the aims of de Gaulle in producing the force de frappe were: the restoration of French grandeur, the reunification of Europe, the subordination of West Germany and hence French leadership in Europe, and ultimately an independent role for Europe in the world.5
On 13 February 1960, France successfully tested its first atomic bomb. Later that year, the government introduced its first five year plan for the development of national defence. The plan was concerned with nuclear weapons research and the procurement of both aircraft and missile delivery systems. In 1963, the first of the supersonic Mirage IV prototypes was delivered, and 50 were operational by 1966.6 The arrival of the hardware of nuclear warfare might have been expected to lead to greater debate over nuclear strategy in the country. De Gaulle's interest in such academic matters appeared to be limited. He saw the nuclear force primarily as a diplomatic tool. His strategy is usually described as that of 'proportional deterrence'. He explained this in 1964:
Doubtless the megatons that we could launch would not equal in number those that the Americans and Russians are able to unleash. But once reaching a certain nuclear capability, and with regard to one's own direct defence, the proportion of respective means has no absolute value. Indeed, since a man and a people can only die once, the deterrent exists provided that one has the means to wound the possible aggressor mortally, that one is very determined to do it and that the aggressor is convinced of it 7
The French posture was one of immediate and massive retaliation once French territory was threatened. The concept of flexible response was rejected on the grounds that Europe would be destroyed as the host to the battle. The leading strategic thinkers in France in the 1960s were Generals Gallois and Beaufre. The former strongly resisted the concept of tactical nuclear weapons and their use for graduated deterrence, and the latter highlighted the importance of the second decision centre, which improved the overall credibility of the NATO deterrent. One official publication 8 reflected this view of deterrence enhanced through the uncertainty caused by independent decision centres.
Under de Gaulle, the nuclear strategy was completely interwoven with foreign policy. Up to 1962, he looked for power within the Western Alliance, and nuclear independence was the method of achieving this. From 1962 to 1965, he sought an independent position to deprive the Americans of control over the destiny of France. This was reflected in the concern over flexible response and multilateral force proposals. From 1965 until the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the French cultivated a very independent foreign policy. A nuclear strategy of tous azimuths was propounded, in which France must be prepared for attacks from any direction. General Ailleret argued that to meet unknown alliances of the future, France would need to build a completely independent defence system, which would include a significant number of long range strategic missiles.9
The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviets brought an improvement to French-NATO relationships and a change in the declared nuclear strategy. The new Chief of Staff, General Fourquet, dropped all reference to tous azimuths, and made it clear that the threat was once more perceived as being from the Soviets. It is likely that financial constraints also influenced the decision to drop the long range missile programme. Some reappraisal of the instant massive retaliation strategy also took place. This was necessary to assign a role to the newly developed tactical nuclear weapons, and may have been a case of technology determining doctrine. Fourquet described the new strategy as one in which the tactical nuclear weapons would have the task of testing the enemy's intention and demonstrating France's will. Deterrence must be equally manifested at all conceivable stages of combat so that our will to resist any aggression :. appears quite clear, and marks our determination to have, if necessary, rapid and inevitable recourse to the ultimate weapon. 10 .
This was acceptance of flexible response, albeit with fewer - rungs on the escalation ladder and a lower nuclear threshold.It raised a number of problems in relations with NATO, given that such tactical weapons would need to be used against an enemy in West Germany.
In France, the credibility of the nuclear deterrent was little' questioned. The force was never large, was vulnerable on the' ground, and the survivability of the Mirage IV was suspect after 1969. The 1965 plan had recognised this by planning for ' an intermediate range ballistic missile force, based on land, and- a submarine-based force. Financial constraints and difficulties in development resulted in delays and cutbacks. It was not until 1971 that the first submarine, Le Redoutable, became operational, with 18 land-based missiles coming the following year. Yet the charisma of General de Gaulle had made the force de frappe a credible deterrent up to 1969.
President Pompidou sought a strategy which could combine the requirement for an effective force with the need for economic restraint. He did, however, instigate a review for the improvement of the armed forces in general, and the navy in L particular. The 1971-75 programme recognised the need to improve conventional strength. President Giscard d'Estaing also initiated a review in 1974, with a view to improving conventional forces. He confirmed his belief in the doctrine of proportional deterrence and said, 'France is and must remain the third nuclear power in the world and it goes without saying that we reject any idea of a ceiling on the French nuclear force'.l1 His 1977-82 plan noted the depletion of conventional forces, which had suffered at the expense of nuclear forces since 1960. The trend would be reversed, although the weapons yield
|
|
|
|
|
