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Much has been written in the West about the overall strategy of the Soviet Union for the employment of its nuclear weapons.An analysis of the public pronouncements of the leaders of a closed society, the unclassified military manuals, the editorials of the state controlled press, and the writings of dissidents is unlikely to provide the complete picture. Experts in the We stare unable to agree about such basic points as the future military intentions of the Soviet Union: whether they are offensive or defensive.
While it may not be possible to determine their intentions, it is possible to draw broad conclusions on Soviet philosophy for the use of nuclear weapons, from their force structure both now and in the past.
The decision to build the Soviet atomic bomb was taken in the summer of 1942.(1) The Soviet reaction to the Baruch Plan for the international control of atomic weapons in 1946 ensured that it would fail. Stalin saw the turmoil at the end of World War II as an opportunity for expanding the Communist empire.The forces of the United States and Western Europe had been massively demobilised, while the Soviet forces had not. Stalin's major test of the resolve of the West was the Berlin Blockade in 1948. That he chose not to use his superior conventional strength and tactical position suggests a concern for nuclear vulnerability.
The Soviet strategy for the period when it had no strategic nuclear capability appears to have been one of exploiting advantageous but low risk situations. It was not prepared to risk a full scale conflict with a United States which could use nuclear weapons with impunity. The large conventional forces must be kept in being while the nuclear capability was developed- The first successful test of an atomic device took place on 23 September 1949.
By 1955, Nikita Khrushchev had emerged as the major figure of the Soviet leadership. At the same time, they were at last gaining a strategic nuclear capability, which, however inferior,they were prepared to brandish. Bulganin told Eden of Britain's vulnerability to attack using 'rocket technique' should Britain continue the Suez operation.(2) While the British may not have taken this threat seriously in 1956, the launch of Sputnik the following year made the world realise the new strategic capabilities of the Soviet Union.
Khrushchev made it absolutely clear that he considered the nuclear strategic missile to be the cornerstone of his military policy. In his statement to the Supreme Soviet in 1960, he proposed reducing the armed forces by 1,200,000 men and disposing of military aviation and surface ships. The strategic rocket forces would make the current structure unnecessary:
In our time a country's defence capacity is determined not by the number of soldiers it has under arms, the number of men in uniform. Aside from the general political and economic factors about which I have already spoken, a country's defence capacity depends to a decisive extent upon the firepower and the means of delivery it has.(3)
Although some reductions were made, the opposition of the military establishment and the Berlin and Cuba crises prevented Khrushchev from fulfilling his aim. There is little doubt that he considered the strategic rocket forces to be an overwhelming deterrent to external aggression. Hannes Adomeit concludes that Khrushchev deduced the effectiveness of deterrence from the lack of retribution in August 1961,following the building of the Berlin Wall. This then encouraged him to attempt to present a second fait accompli in Cuba,having resumed weapon testing as a forceful reminder of Soviet capabilities.(4) If this analysis is correct, as seems possible, then the Soviet strategy was one of opportunistic action under the~cover of nuclear retaliatory threat. The military view differed~greatly from the political doctrine of the overriding importance of nuclear fire-power over manpower. Many leading figures of the Soviet military establishment made clear their belief in the need for a grand war-fighting capability.(5)
Following the fall of Khrushchev in 1964, the military view of the need for strong conventional forces coupled with strong nuclear forces prevailed. It is evident that achieving parity with the United States was the first priority. By the start of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in Helsinki in late 1969, the Soviet Union had agreed with the United States on the existence of and the need to preserve parity, mutual deterrence and strategic stability.(6) In fact, because of delays to the SALT process as a result of the invasion of Czechoslovakian 1968, when the agreement was made the numbers of launchers permitted gave the Soviets a numerical superiority in this area.
The agreements to arms limitations did not mean that the Soviets accepted the American concept of mutual assured destruction. The Soviet military writings, the political statements and the force structure all appear to be internally consistent with the view that nuclear weapons are seen as an essential part of the preparations for war. Joseph Douglass, in his Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War, draws extensively on the classified organ of the Soviet General Staff, 'Voyennaya mysl',which was passed to the West by Penkovsky. Quotes from this source give an indication of the development of current Soviet strategy:
The most important task of the General Staff in preparing for modern war is the detailed employment of nuclear weapons by all services of the armed forces.(Major General N. Komkov, October 1964) (7)
For the achievement of victory in a present-day nuclear war, if it is unleashed by the imperialists, not only the enemy's armed forces, but also the sources of his military power and state control as well as areas where different branches of the armed forces are based, will be subjected to simultaneous destruction.(Colonel M. Shirokov April 1968)(8)
In view of the immense destructive force of nuclear weapons and the extremely limited time available to take effective countermeasures after an enemy launches its missiles, the launching of the first massed attack acquires decisive importance for achieving the objectives of war.(Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Moshalenko January 1969) (9)
These writings from closed circulation journals do not differ in philosophy from open publications. The policy is further confirmed by the force structure. The strategic rocket forces form a separate arm of the armed forces; active defence against air attack is widely deployed; and civil defence measures have been widely implemented. Irrespective of the effectiveness of these measures, the resources devoted to them show that the Soviet view of deterrence is significantly different from the American one. It is usually described as 'deterrence by denial',rather than the West's doctrine of deterrence by punishment. (10) The demonstrated capability and willingness to fight a nuclear war, and hence deny a victory to the enemy, acts as the deterrent to aggression. What we can glean of their targeting doctrine from quotations, such as those of Colonel Shirokov above, is that it is entirely counter-force. That large cities will contain points of 'military and state control', ensures that the collateral damage would be as great as that from a counter-value targeting doctrine.
It does not necessarily follow, as is sometimes suggested, that a force posture and doctrine for nuclear war fighting mean~that the Soviets believe they can use nuclear war as a~instrument of policy, or could win, in any meaningful sense, an all out nuclear war. Robert Arnett, after studying Soviet pronouncements, concludes that they are acutely aware of the American capability to inflict unacceptable damage.(11) The doctrine of fighting a war, rather than mutual vulnerability, is necessary both for ideological reasons, and for morale,especially in the military.
If they do not believe that their nuclear forces can be sensibly used to achieve a victory, then why did they engage on the massive build up in the second half of the 1960s, and why the comprehensive modernisation programme in progress now?Professor Erickson identifies three possible explanations for the first expansion.(12) Firstly, it could have been an attempt to achieve stability through parity. Secondly, it may have been an attempt to achieve strategic advantage as part of a master plan.The third possibility, which he favours, is that it proceeded without any well defined single objective, as a result of the various institutional pressures and interests at work within the Soviet system. Brian Crozier strongly favours the master plan concept, and quotes a leaked intelligence report of Brezhnev's address to the East European communist leaders in 1973.(13) At this meeting, Brezhnev is said to have spoken of a decisive shift in the correlation of forces, such that by 1985, they could exert their will whenever they needed to.
Whatever the true motives, the Soviet armoury is entirely logical in their terms. They may not want a nuclear war, but they realise that it could happen. In that event, they would wish to limit the damage to themselves, and would also wish to emerge as the most powerful of the survivors. To this end an offensive war-waging capability, which is superior to the potential enemy, is a logical posture. Active and passive defences improve prospects of recovery.
The Soviet strategy differs from the American in how nuclear war is likely to be conducted, should deterrence fail.The early use of decisive fire-power is basic to the doctrine; and the relatively high dependence on vulnerable land-based ICBMs suggests that they would be used in a first strike, or in a launch on warning role. Certainly the NATO concept of an escalating limited nuclear war is totally discounted:
As a matter of fact, there can be in general no 'limited' nuclear war. If a nuclear war breaks out, whether it be in Europe or in any other place, it would inevitably and unavoidably assume a worldwide character ... So, those who possibly hope to set fire to the nuclear powder-keg,while themselves sitting to one side, should not entertain any illusions.(L.I. Brezhnev)(14)
The American proposals of a change of strategy to strategic defence is no more welcome to the Soviet leadership:
Should this conception be converted into reality, this would actually open the floodgates of a runaway race of all types of strategic arms, both offensive and defensive.Such is the real purport, the seamy side, so to say, of Washington's 'Defensive conception'.(Y. Andropov)(15)
It is difficult to imagine any radical change in Soviet nuclear strategy, especially while the old guard retain the reigns of power. It has been remarkably consistent and, some might suggest~ more successful at instilling fear in its enemies than the American strategy in recent years. Paul Nitze has suggested six main Soviet objectives for the 1980s: the separation of NATO Europe from the US; increase of influence in the Persian Gulf;encirclement and neutralisation of China; subversion in the West, particularly the Caribbean; ability to deal with direct East/west military confrontation if necessary; and finally, the improvement of the Soviet image as a responsible participant of the international community.(16) An increasing conventional and nuclear superiority, to give deterrence by denial, and a damage limiting doctrine should deterrence fail, would not be at variance with these aims.
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