1. First let me say what an honour it is to have been invited to give the Trenchard memorial lecture. It adds a particular flavour to the event when it takes place on the day of the 75th Anniversary of the foundation of the Royal Air Force, and here at Cranwell, which is itself a memorial to the forward thinking of Trenchard. The Commandant and I have spent the day at Marham where HM The Queen presented a new standard to the Royal Air Force to commemorate this 75th Anniversary. How would Trenchard have felt about the Service he founded as he watched the flypast today? In such a short time, indeed in the lifetime of some, we have seen aircraft develop from the Wright Brothers simple machine to the high technology of the F117 Stealth or in a different direction to the vast capacity of today's airliners. We have also seen cycles of growth and contraction in the scale of the Royal Air Force, and tonight, I would like to review those lessons of the past, and consider what they mean for the future of the Royal Air Force.
2. The aircraft has transformed every aspect of military operations in this century. While there were of course earlier instances of the use of balloons for military operations, it is only since the development of the heavier-than-air machine, that airpower could provide a decisive component of the military might of a nation. We are therefore looking at a remarkably short time span, when we compare the strategy and tactics of our operations with land and sea campaigns. In 1911, the Italians used airships, balloons and aircraft in both reconnaissance and bombing roles against the Turks in Libya, and drew to the attention of the other great powers the potential that such capabilities might offer in the future. In 1912, Major Hugh Trenchard transferred at the age of 39 to the Royal Flying Corps - formed in May of that year, and after a course with a total of just over one hour's flying spread over a fortnight was awarded his wings on 31 July 1912. By the end of August he was at Upavon as the central Flying school examiner.
The First World War saw the major development of fighting capabilities in the air. Initially both land and sea commanders regarded observation as the primary purpose of aircraft, and radio communications were developed to allow rapid reporting. Fire power soon became a requirement. Pistols and rifles gave way to the machine gun. Reconnaissance aircraft now added to their tasks that of keeping the enemy away from friendly positions. Control of the air became important. As World War I progressed, or did not progress, the advantages of attacking the enemy rear areas became apparent, and interdiction was added to the rapidly emerging role of air power. From 1915 onwards, Germany carried out its strategic bombing campaign against England using airships. Developments in air defence were necessary, and resulted in a German response of the Gotha aircraft bombing raids against London in 1917. These raids were important, not because of the number of people killed, but because of the lasting effect on both military and civilian thinking about strategic bombing after World War I. 1914-19 therefore saw a very rapid development in the application and technology of air power, but its effect could not be decisive. Yet the roles for airpower that we know today, had already emerged: recce, offensive air, defensive air, interdiction, and transport.
3. The inability of the military forces to defend England against strategic bombers, and the lack of any central control over aircraft procurement policy, led to the recommendation by the Smuts Committee that a separate air council be formed. This in turn led to the formation of the Royal Air Force on 1 April 1918: the event we are celebrating today. By June 1918, Sir Frederick Sykes, CAS, was predicting to the Cabinet that any future war would start with a knock-out blow directed at the enemy's capital city. In Italy, Douhet was developing his theories on the decisive use of strategic air power. In the United States, General Billy Mitchell was promoting the importance of military aircraft and the need for an independent air arm, and getting court martialled for his pains.
4. As is so often the case, the copious strategic writings were not necessarily reflected by the procurement processes of the government in office. Certainly, in Britain, the survival of an independent air force had little to do with the new strategic bombing doctrine. Trenchard had been brought back by Churchill to be CAS in 1919. He showed the effectiveness of air power for imperial policing, and this was a much more telling argument to successive governments, who were working on the principle that there would be no major war within the next ten years. There is no doubt that it was Trenchard's leadership as CAS between 1919 and 1929 which ensured that the Royal Air Force survived as an independent service. He was also responsible for developing the institutions of the Service which meant that even in the lean years, it could grow to meet the challenges of 1939. Indeed there are many parallels with today, as the prospect of general war moves from the immediate to the far future, and we have to ensure that we have an air force which can meet the current security tasks, but also be able to develop if we were great threats were to develop again. I shall return to this theme.
5. World War II was the Blacksmith's forge of air power. Theories were tried, tested, tempered or broken against the background of rapidly developing technology. The Germans had used the lessons of the Spanish Civil War, to concentrate airborne fire power in support of army operations for Blitzkrieg. Their successes highlighted the critical importance of command of the air. The Battle of Britain was fought for control of British airspace, and there was no doubt as to the consequences of a German air victory. The importance of using sufficient air resources to maintain control of your own airspace, and to produce a favourable air situation to exploit over the enemy's territory, was established. This principle remains valid today. In the early years of the war, the lack of accurate night bombing capability, meant that strategic bombing could not meet the expectations that had been raised for it. The ability to attack the enemy in his homeland, was more of a boost to the morale of the attacker, than a cause for the catastrophic breakdown of enemy morale that Douhet had predicted. To produce results which could affect the outcome of the war, required accurate target intelligence, careful target selection and a capability to find and destroy the selected targets (another theme I will return to). The bombing offensive could not by itself be a war-winning operation: it could contribute by diverting enemy resources. Nevertheless, in the debates about the role of strategic bombing, which were given new life by the long overdue statue to Arthur Harris, we must keep in mind that it was for the darkest period of the War, the only method of taking the battle to the enemy.
6. The Battle of the Atlantic was as vital. Technology had to be developed to provide aircraft with sufficient range, radar, and effective attack techniques, if the sea lanes were to be safeguarded. In the Pacific in 1941, the Japanese had demonstrated that air power could be used decisively against surface ships, particularly in a surprise attack. In other overseas theatres the effectiveness of tactical air forces, where joint operations were the key to success, was demonstrated. For the final assault on the Continent, all the air power resources were used to provide total air supremacy over the battlefield. Troops were transported into battle by air, and precision bombing was used to great effect. Finally air power demonstrated the ultimate power at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, and many of the strategic bombing enthusiasts felt that their ideas had come to fruition at last.
7. In the post-war era, air power had made an important contribution to the outcome of many conflicts. The Berlin airlift showed the decisive use of air transport. Korea showed that the lessons of World War II had not been made obsolete by the advent of the nuclear age. The Malayan operations showed that the mobility afforded by air power could prove to be more important than offensive capability. The Americans in Vietnam used all the conventional roles of air power. Interdiction against a low technology enemy proved to be difficult especially given political constraints. Air mobility operations, using helicopters in particular, were developed successfully, and this is an aspect of air power which still needs developing. Strategic air transport provided the essential supporting lifeline to the whole war effort. In 1967 the Israelis demonstrated that air power can be decisive on some occasions when surprise is possible. In 1973, the tables were turned with technological surprise from new ground-based air defence systems. The importance of the electronic warfare battle was highlighted. In 1982, the Falklands War has provided us with a unique example of the use of air power for conducting operations along greatly extended lines of communication. The Vulcan operations from Ascension Island to Port Stanley showed the enormous reach of airpower in a way never before conceived. The threat to our Naval forces from Argentinian aircraft with modern anti-ship missiles, brought home the importance of control of the air over an ever widening area. In the same year the Israelis also showed how technological advantage can affect the air battle, and reduce losses to zero.
8. Less noticed perhaps were the air power lessons of the Afghanistan campaign through the 80s. The British in Malaya, the French in Algeria, and the Americans in Vietnam had taken forward the use of helicopters in counter-insurgency. The Russians had an impressive range of combat and support helicopters and some fixed wing airpower to attempt to control Afghanistan.
9. All these operations were significant in the development of techniques and technologies for the use of airpower, and Trenchard would have recognised the ways in which air was being used. Yet, there was little recognition in the wider world of the importance of the air in any form of military operation. The Gulf War changed all that. I will not spend long on the operation, for the first time everyone watched a war close to from start to finish. It was unique - just as the Falklands had been unique - but it was nevertheless representative of the new post Cold War style of conflict. There were of course a multitude of lessons to be learned, as there are after any war, but let me draw out a few of the key ones. First, the effect that control of the air has on one's ability to fight. The coalition had total control of their own airspace, - with the exception of Scuds - and could thus mass enormous ground, sea and air forces to mount operations at a time of their choosing. On the other hand, Iraq's air defences were targeted at the start and it rapidly lost control of its own airspace. This meant freedom to attack any targets, and to continue the air phase of the operation as long as was necessary. The attention of the world media can be a mixed blessing in war, but it is here to stay. This put much greater emphasis on the use of precision air delivered weapons to minimise collateral damage. We must not of course forget the role that non-precision weapons had to play. They are much cheaper individually, if not for some targets in terms of cost effectiveness. Where they were most needed was in reducing the fighting capability of the enemy frontline ground forces. Air superiority made the continuing pounding by B52s and others possible, and hence reduced the ground war to a 100 hours.
10. Since the Gulf War, air operations - real ones - have continued at an unprecedented rate for peacetime. I will just run over those which UK forces have been involved in to give a flavour of what the demands for the future may be. The aftermath of the Gulf War included the need to protect Kurds in the North and Shias in the South. For both, airpower was the solution. Helicopters (RAF Chinooks and RN Sea Kings for the UK) and Hercules to provide humanitarian aid to the Kurdish refugees, to set up the safe areas, and then offensive air and air reconnaissance to do much the same job as Trenchard's Imperial policing of the 20's. Here the UK has provided Jaguars, which are to be replaced by Harriers. In the South, a similar need and the UK has provided Tornados to this operation in support of the Shias.
11. The breakup of Yugoslavia has seen a growing involvement by UK and other nations forces in support of UN operations. Nimrods contribute to monitoring the sea for breaches in the embargo. The E3D Sentry takes its turn with NATO AEW to monitor the no-fly zone. The Hercules joins the airlift into Sarajevo. Our Carrier stands off with helicopters and Sea Harriers available. We see the US using airdrops as their way of contributing to the UN operations without entangling forces on the ground. One can speculate on many scenarios for the future of the former Yugoslavia, and airpower will have a significant role to play in the peacekeeping or peacemaking options.
12. While considering current operations, we must not forget Northern Ireland. It ties up a significant part of the Army, and would use even more were it not for the contribution that helicopters can make to mobility of these forces. We are also involved in unpredictable humanitarian relief operations, of which Somalia was the last, where the UK Government was able to contribute through the use of Hercules rather than deploy more of our hard pressed troops.
13. What does all this mean for the future of airpower? The post Cold War world is in many ways a more uncertain place. The breakup of the former Soviet Union may have sown the seeds for some bitter conflicts, which could cause problems within Europe. We have not seen the endgame of the breakup of Yugoslavia. The Middle East instabilities have not disappeared and there are threats to our economic interests. Africa is a vast area containing all the potential ills of the modern world. Again television brings the effects of famine to the top of the political agenda, and we need to be able to contribute assistance. But it is not a peaceful area either. We need also to be concerned about the growing disparity between rich and poor nation, and the signs already of economic migration. Nor has the threat of nuclear warfare gone. Not only are a number of less than ideal nations working hard towards their own nuclear capability, the breakup of the Soviet Union has accelerated the potential for transfer of technology. Nuclear weapons remain in Russia, and we are seeing the debate with the Ukraine over future arrangements.
14. It is not my intention to spoil a pleasant evening by sending you off with portents of doom. The world has been fairly brutish for most of its history. The Cold War period froze some of the longstanding disputes for a period, - or the threat of Superpower confrontation kept the West out - but at the price of the awesome risk of general war. In the UK we are now more secure than we have been for a long time. Our potential adversaries are further away than before. But this does not mean that we can isolate ourselves from the happenings everywhere. The United Nations has taken on a more active role, Europe wishes to be seen to be working at external problems perhaps through the WEU. The arms control process led to greater cooperation through the CSCE which looks for a part to play in improving stability.
15. Finally we must not forget NATO. For all these operations which call for the use of military forces from many nations, we need common procedures, training, infrastructure and organisation. NATO has provided this, and is the only organisation in the world on which we can base sensible multinational military operations. For this reason it is important that in our enthusiasm for other groups (WEU, UN, CSCE, EC or whatever), we do not put at risk the only military one: NATO.
16. What all this means is that we will need armed forces ready to meet the demands of a wide range of operations. At the lower end of the conflict spectrum, we have peacekeeping and aid to the civil authorities. We will need the ability to gain intelligence and information if we are to capitalise on longer warning times for major conflict. We will become involved in operations at greater distances than our NATO centred forces were structured for. In operations with less than benign conditions, we may need to provide active defences. This is turn may lead to involvement in more traditional fighting wars, with the need for the range of offensive capability. At the high end of the spectrum weapons of mass destruction, and their means of long range delivery, will be an increasing factor.
17. So what does all this mean in terms of future airpower needs. Uncertainty carries with it the need for flexibility. We know, and now everyone knows, that the first requirement is security of the mounting base; and that the greatest threat is from the air. This means that air defence must be a priority whenever hostile action is possible. And when I talk about a mounting base, remember this will encompass amphibious shipping, airfields, ports and ground force concentration areas. When operations are required into or over hostile territory, the need for gaining control of the air is as important as ever it was. Satellites have improved the gathering of both strategic and tactical intelligence, but are complementary to air reconnaissance, which is unpredictable, rapidly tasked and less constrained by the weather. Offensive aircraft are now needed for a wider range of operations: precision attack, counter-air, degrading ground, air and naval forces, policing sanctions, and supporting ground forces.
18. For all these operations, from the peacekeeping to the all out war, mobility is vital. Long range mobility comes from strategic air lift - coupled with air to air refueling - and also from sea lift. Tactical mobility places great demand on helicopter resources. Indeed, if I were to identify just one change to airpower needs in the new world order, it would be the increased utility of helicopters for every aspect of operations.
19. Against this background, on its 75th birthday, how well is the Royal Air Force set to meet these challenges? For mobility, both tactical and strategic, the Tristar, VC10, Hercules, Chinook, Puma and Wessex fleets are in constant daily operational use. For the future we have firm plans for both modernisation and replacement. Indeed, even in times of shrinking defence budgets, we have recognised the need for more helicopters in the future. For intelligence and reconnaissance in its widest sense, we currently have the Nimrod MPA - and plans for its replacement, the new Sentry E3-D AEW fleet, the Tornado GR1as which flew at low level at night throughout the Gulf war to provide intelligence unobtainable by any other coalition aircraft. The Jaguars have been providing reconnaissance over Northern Iraq, and the Harriers are taking over from them. Tornados with the new TIALD pod are doing the same over southern Iraq. And still to come is EFA in the recce role. Moving to air defence, the Tornado F3 has been given a welcome update as a result of the Gulf modification programme. It will be replaced progressively by EFA as it comes into service from the end of the century. For offensive operations, the Tornado GR1 proved its unique capabilities in the Gulf - as the only aircraft in the early days capable of taking on key airfields. It remains the RAF's most capable offensive aircraft, and will be further enhanced by the extensive mid-life update. It is also taking on the anti-ship role which the Buccaneer has had up to now. The Harrier update to GR7 which is nearing completion combines the unique flexibility of the Harrier with a true night capability. The Jaguar will also be replaced by EFA in due course. Nor should we forget the equally important weapon and sensor programmes for the future. EFA will be complemented by beyond visual range air defence missiles and stand-off air to ground weapons.
20. The Royal Air Force is well equipped, and has a future programme, that is well balanced for the demands of this future uncertain world. Nor as central staff officer should I forget the importance that the other Services are attaching to air power. For the army, a modern attack helicopter is on the cards. For the Navy, the Sea Harrier is being updated and they have the Merlin on order as their new ASW helicopter. We are in a time of change, moving to smaller forces. However, we are also in a time of concentrating on the forces which can give us the greatest flexibility against the uncertainty of the future.
21. In my opening remarks I made some comparisons between Trenchard's period as CAS between the wars, with today. We too see the possibility of major European war as only a faint future possibility, we have responsibilities further afield, but we have an inclination to reduce expenditure on defence. Are the comparisons valid? Certainly, we share with Trenchard the need to keep the necessary expertise to expand (or reconstitute in the jargon) if it should ever become necessary. We also share the opportunity that he had to show that air power can make a very cost effective contribution to the nation's wider security interests. After the Gulf War, we should not have the same difficulty that he had in convincing people of the importance of offensive airpower. But perhaps we can take these comparisons too far. The Royal Air Force today is changing in response to the new world order. It will be smaller, but will still be able to carry out all its range of roles. The inventory is either new, being updated or being replaced. Its training - epitomised by the College here at Cranwell - remains the envy of the world. As we pass through the transitional time to the smaller forces, we have particular manpower management difficulties in all 3 services. In the Royal Air Force, it is important to strike the balance between keeping the very expensive expertise, but at the same time bringing in new blood for the future. Lord Trenchard died in February 1956 as the V-force was building up to provide the realisation of his concept of all powerful strategic bombing. This year we see the last vestiges of that force leaving service - the last Vulcan and the Victor tankers. A new generation of aircraft have come in , and the next generation is in sight. There are many challenges, but if Trenchard had been at Marham with us today, he could have felt pleased that his air force was changing to meet the new and future challenges.