As I write, yet another "last deadline" approaches for an agreement between the Serbs and ethnic Albanians over Kosovo. The only factor that is able to keep them talking is the threat of imminent air strikes. It seems that every month, there is a new threat of bombing to help the diplomatic process in one of the world's difficult areas.
Yet, the end of the Cold War has returned us to an age where the tools of diplomacy can be used more flexibly. No longer is the primary concern which camp, West or Communist, benefits from any change in strategic balance. Of most of the day to day interactions between states, the wider public remains blissfully unaware. Trade discussions only hit the headlines when local jobs are threatened by the outcome. Arms control negotiations rarely impinge beyond a small elite. Even major international treaty changes, such as NATO enlargement, wring few withers among the British public. However, the prospect of our military being in action will invariably hit the headlines. We have seen an extraordinary rise in the use of threats of force by the West to underpin diplomatic strategy. We have restructured our forces so that they are tailored to such actions.
The sequence of media reporting in the UK is now well rehearsed. The crisis with its human suffering is reported in detail. The brutal invasion of Kuwait, the fleeing of the Kurds in Northern Iraq, the plight of the Marsh Arabs in Southern Iraq, the miseries in Somalia, the refugees in the Great Lakes, the atrocities in Bosnia, and now the inhumanities of Kosovo are all brought to life on the television news. In most cases, there will have been work going on behind the scenes through normal diplomatic channels, through the United Nations and through Non Governmental Organisations to try to prevent a crisis or alleviate the suffering. For those events in which one or more players are acting in an unacceptable or illegal manner, the focus turns to methods to coerce more reasonable behaviour.
The United Nations is not yet the universal international policeman able to enforce an agreed body of international law. It has no standing police or military force, no assurance of agreement for action and indeed in many cases no certainty of interpretation of international law. Yet there are well established norms of behaviour, reinforced by the universal declaration of human rights, with which to measure whether particular behaviour by a State needs international action. The process of negotiating agreed Security Council resolutions is again not a part of diplomacy which will excite the public, who are telling their elected representatives that "something must be done". Resolutions for imposing sanctions lack the thrill of deploying military capability, and, as we have seen in Iraq, can over time be turned into useful propaganda issues for the transgressor.
We have become used to the call for the threat of force to back diplomatic negotiation. So long as the negotiations appear to have a reasonable hope of success, there is not much criticism of such threats if they will speed the process to arrive at a reasonable settlement. However, once the use of force becomes likely, media opinion becomes more critical. If air strikes are to be a regular tool of diplomacy, we need to make sure that we face up to the problems of sustaining political will. There is much to learn from the successes so far.
The threat of force must always be underpinned by the political will to use the force if necessary. Empty threats undermine the ability of the international community to take action in future crises. This does not mean that bombing should be entered into lightly. When deadlines are extended in the hope of achieving diplomatic resolution, commentators must not characterise this as weakness or lack of resolve. Such delays show how seriously the allies take the use of force as the method of last resort in the diplomatic process. It is a very difficult moment to decide when all alternative avenues have been exhausted. The last minute faxed agreement by Saddam Hussein in February 1998 was an example of ultimate brinkmanship. The waiting bombers were rightly stood down. When the crisis began again in August, the process leading to the December bombing campaign of Desert Fox was much more acceptable to Western publics because of the flexibility shown earlier in the year.
When the fateful decision to use force is made, the first question for both government and the media commentators must be what outcome is sought through the bombing. What are the political and military aims? It will often be said that an intransigent leader will be bolstered at home by a bombing campaign. Perhaps, we should always be prepared to think of the rationale for the use of force in terms of the three 'C's: Coercion, Containment and Chastisement.
Coercion is the stick with which the transgressor is threatened in order to make him more amenable to a negotiated settlement. In the Cold War we were used to the concept of nuclear force as a deterrent. It was designed to prevent something undesirable from happening. Force today will sometimes be used in a purely deterrent sense, but is more likely to be there to coerce a State, or even non-State actor, into a particular course of action. The diplomatic process must continue during and after the bombing campaign so that the coercive aims can be achieved.
Containment is an important ingredient of the design of the military intervention campaign. The problem which generated the international crisis in the first place must be addressed. If Iraq threatens its neighbours, the bombing campaign can be designed to reduce that threat. If the Serbian forces are likely to massacre the Albanians in Kosovo, their movements can be restricted by the use of air power. If the Kurds are driven out of their homes to take refuge on the mountains in Northern Iraq, intervention forces can provide them with safe havens and security to return to their homes.
Chastisement is the most difficult element in the intervention plan. The media will often characterise a bombing campaign as being used to punish Saddam or Milosevic. If it is possible to weaken key supporting elements of the leadership, punishment for failure to keep to previously given undertakings may be open to punishment in this way. Thus attacks on the Republican Guard in Desert Fox could be seen as partly chastisement and partly contributing to both containment and coercion.
When the media asks what good will bombing serve, the answer must always be framed in terms of the alternative outcomes if the threat to bomb were removed. Are the likely outcomes, both short term and in the longer term for peace in the world, better or worse? In the past 10 years, there are more examples of the threat of military intervention helping the diplomatic process than there are of it causing greater chaos. Bombing is an important diplomatic tool.