European Security
George Robertson has achieved the impossible in his first 18 months as Defence Secretary. He has produced a Strategic Defence Review (SDR) which has met with critical acclaim from the Services, the Foreign Office, NATO allies and defence academics. Even the Treasury appear to have accepted it as realistic. The parliamentary debate on the SDR on 19/20 October 1998 focused almost exclusively on the single issue of the future size and role of the Territorial Army. Although this is a strong constituency issue for many MPs, it is hardly the key strategic issue. Future European security must be the prime concern of government.
Yet as the House debated the SDR on very parochial issues, the foreign policy assumptions that underpinned the Review seemed to be under question from No 10. The next day, in an interview with Philip Webster of The Times, Tony Blair completely reversed his position on the desirability of an EU defence capability. He trailed the line that he would be taking the following weekend in Austria with fellow European heads of government. Britain would be in the lead in developing thinking on how the EU could develop its defence capability.
The previous Conservative government had an Atlanticist policy on European security. It believed that NATO was the only organisation that mattered, and that the Western European Union (WEU) needed to be kept in its box. Anything which smacked of EU defence policy was seen as putting at risk the cohesion and effectiveness of NATO, and, more importantly, undermining the transatlantic bond. The new Labour Government had given no indication of change in its manifesto, and early statements seemed to reinforce the Atlantic Community approach to foreign and security policy. However, there was less emphasis on the special position that the United States enjoyed in foreign policy priorities. Robin Cook's Foreign Office Mission Statement had nothing to say about the importance of the United States.
Tony Blair returned from his first EU summit at Amsterdam jubilant that he had beaten off those (France and Germany) seeking to strengthen the EU defence arrangements. As the Daily Telegraph (18 June 1997) reported:
Facing the stiffest possible test of his negotiating skill at his first full EU summit, Mr Blair insisted that he would not agree to any "commitment" in the treaty to a WEU-EU merger. Europe's defence should remain a matter for Nato and not the EU, which had proved itself unable to run a successful foreign policy.
To launch the Strategic Defence Review, George Robertson and Robin Cook held three seminars of experts. At the first in July 1997 in the Locarno Room at the FCO, Robin Cook listened for over 3 hours to various views about alternative foreign and security policy priorities before delivering a homily on the importance of the UK as a global player. He made it clear that getting into bed with Europe for security arrangements was not high on his agenda.
Unsurprisingly, the Strategic Defence Review, when published in July 1998 continued to extol the benefits of transatlantic partnership both explicitly and implicitly. The small section which deals with European security makes it clear that NATO is the only game in town. The European Union is listed as just one of many in the paragraph which states: "A wide range of other institutions also have major parts to play in the development and reinforcement of European security".
The House of Commons Defence Committee noted that the SDR had done little to clarify or advance the development of the European Security and Defence Identity (8th Report para 140). In evidence to the Committee, Tony Lloyd, the Minister of State at the FCO, had explained the importance of the Treaty of Amsterdam as a defining moment: "whilst it allows the European Union to engage in dialogue with the WEU, it certainly does not see it within the European Union's capacity to make political decisions which would command the WEU and that is very important" (8th Report para 2881).
Whitehall officials claim that the desire for better arrangements for co-operation on defence matters within Europe is nothing new. The failure to achieve a consensus European position on the use of force in Iraq in the Spring showed how far Europe has to go. Kosovo demonstrates that Europe continues to rely on the US to sort out local problems. Yet, the Prime Minister's initiative has signalled a fundamental change from the traditional UK government line.
His interview in The Times of 21 October 1998 contained little in the way of concrete proposals, but was strongly supportive of the European Union taking a more proactive role in defence matters. He cited the Kosovo crisis as underlining the need for Europe to be able to speak and act more effectively. The article left the role of the WEU in future European security arrangement under some question
There are a number of possible reasons why Tony Blair may have launched this new approach to European defence. Given the high international standing of the UK military capability, the government might wish to play to its strength in Europe. Excluded from the inner circle of EU economic debate, the UK might seek to take the lead in security matters. There may also be concern that the Euroland participants will move quite quickly to shared foreign and security arrangements. There is also the looming appointment of an EU head of foreign and security policy. Perhaps, the UK wants to make sure that it has a strong voice in the selection process, and in the definition of the role for the post. The pressures for rationalisation of European defence industries may also be a factor. There is no doubt that the UK government is keen on promoting the process, and it may see that it will be helped by more structured European defence policy co-operation.
While there are a number of policy advantages to this change of approach by the UK, it is likely that Tony Blair is bruised by his experiences over Iraq and Kosovo. Having the UK always cast in the role of servant to the United States at the expense of Europe is not a comfortable position for a pro-European Prime Minister. That said, he can have few illusions about the difficulty of achieving a true common foreign and security policy among the disparate members of the EU. The prize is great: currently the defence capability of Europe is less than the sum of its parts. A coherent defence effort could make Europe a more equal partner in its relations with the United States.