New Security Structures for Europe? Pugwash Workshop 2-4 July 1999
Europe as a Strategic Power
It is sometimes argued that there is no need to change the current arrangements for security within Europe. NATO served the continent well throughout the Cold War, and has reinvented itself to adapt to the security needs of the post Cold War era. Indeed the enlargement of NATO, the new strategic concept and the recognition of the needs of a European Defence and Security Identity within NATO are all a part of a new security structure for Europe. The question is whether this process of development within the NATO structure is sufficient for the future. In the last 10 years, Europe has seen its security interests threatened, and a number of European nations have been involved in high intensity military operations both within the Continent and beyond. We now have the examples of the Gulf War, Bosnia and Kosovo in a relatively short time to assess whether the current security structures are likely to be adequate into the future.
Europe is an economic power, but it is a long way from being a strategic power. To be a strategic power requires two key elements: a clear and coherent foreign policy, and the diplomatic and military means to implement that foreign policy. Europe currently has neither. For the 21st Century, it seems inconceivable that a region which is as rich and populous as the United States can expect to continue its foreign and security policy on either an exclusively national basis or only through NATO. The limitations of the European position were highlighted by the Kosovo operation. Even for a tragedy so close, Europe looked to the USA to provide the lead and the major military capabilities. The USA had previously to take the lead in the Gulf and also eventually in Bosnia. As a result, Europe must shape its security strategy always mindful of how it will play in the US Congress. Looking to the longer term, NATO remains important, but there is no guarantee that it will remain in existence for ever. Had the Kosovo operation ended in failure, the future utility of NATO would have been very much in doubt. There will doubtless be other tests of Alliance cohesion in the years ahead.
Improving European Capability
The question is how to develop a European Foreign and Security Policy which is underpinned by the necessary diplomatic and military capability to implement it. We need a design which maintains and supports NATO but gives us a European capability to protect and promote European vital interests. The arguments too often revolve around the institutional debates. The linkages between NATO, WEU, and the EU, coupled with debates over second and fourth pillars, do little to advance the military capability available to Europe. The institutional framework is important but it is nothing without the military and diplomatic capability to underpin it. Too often the institutional debate revolves around how to give Europe a greater voice in the deployment of US assets. What needs to be addressed is how to provide more European useful capability, and then how it should be organised in both a NATO and an EU context.
A recent analysis by the Brookings Institution claims that despite spending two thirds of what the United States does on defence, European NATO countries have less than 10 per cent of the transportable defense capability for prompt long range action. In the Kosovo operation, we have seen an overwhelming reliance on US capability, with the European nations each providing relatively small force contributions. While the data of the breakdown of missions between nations has yet to be published, it is clear that the US provided just over half the total missions; but a considerably higher proportion of the bombs dropped on targets. Hopes for fixing the problems of European defence capability currently centre on each nation modernising their military on a national basis. Each nation is expected to transform its forces into rapidly deployable smaller more flexible units tailored to peace enforcement. While this would certainly offer some extra resources for the types of operation which are currently being undertaken, it would not greatly improve the total defence capability that Europe obtains for its vast expenditure of defence.
Ideally the development of the common defence policy for the European Union, like the United Kingdom's recent strategic defence review, should be foreign policy led. The scale and the scope of the armed forces would be determined by the objectives of foreign policy developed within the CFSP, while ensuring that members of the North Atlantic Alliance could meet their NATO obligations. This would not lead to any decoupling of European countries from their NATO undertakings. Nor should there be any duplication of the critical contribution to military co-operation provided by NATO, namely its command structures and headquarters, although certain developments of double-hatting could take place. The most effective way for the members of the European Union to get more deployable forces for a euro is by systematically developing economies of scales in the support, training and operational management of their armed forces.
Current Examples of Integration
There are two approaches whereby duplication between European armed forces could be eliminated and additional resources made available for increased force effectiveness. One would be in the development of new common capabilities, and the other is the development of common support and logistic services. An existing Alliance example of the first approach is the common procurement and operation by fourteen allies of the AWACS (airborne early warning and control) aircraft. An example of the second approach is the way that four Nordic countries providing troops to IFOR/SFOR are supported by a common logistic battalion. The agreement by the Netherlands and Belgian navies to develop common headquarters and support services for their fleets is a hopeful sign that some European states have made a start to the elimination of expensive duplication. Already this approach is allowing greater military capability to be deployed. While the Dutch and the Belgian planners would individually be reluctant to offer an unlimited deployment of a frigate for operations, they can now arrange to share a task with a roulement of forces between themselves. The management of the force from a shared headquarters results in a greater military capability at no extra cost.
The inefficiencies of the national approach to defence within European states is widely recognised. Some argue that the most effective way to tackle it is through common procurement and perhaps greater integration of European defence industries. Attempts at both elements have not always been successful in the past. Recent experience in procurement of an Anglo-French frigate shows how difficult it is to see such projects through successfully. Moreover, the defence industries are reluctant to be integrated by European fiat. They look to partnerships which improve their shareholder value. This may in any case be a better approach as it is likely to improve competition and hence value for money. Nevertheless, there will be opportunities for sensible common procurement where there is a widely shared common requirement, and it makes sense to try to exploit these where it can reduce procurement costs.
Early Opportunities for Initiatives
An immediate opportunity to explore common procurement is the Medium Scale Transport Aircraft, for which common tenders are being sought by seven European countries. There is also a need for large strategic air lift capability which could be approached jointly. These are two examples where after common procurement, common operation could be considered. If operated as a European force, a reduction in the number of operating bases required would lead to much greater cost effectiveness. These could become early examples of European Force Elements. The development of a common European flight refuelling service could also be examined. In the longer term the common support and servicing of helicopters could make sense.
The Eurofighter, already ordered by five countries, could provide a trial for a number of these concepts. If Europe moved towards the American large airbase concept, we might perhaps imagine an operationally ready force of some 400 Eurofighters made up of 20 multinational squadrons distributed over as few as five airbases. In addition an operational training base on a sixth airfield would be required. The training base could also provide a home for the European Union Eurofighter HQ. The operating costs would be much less than the planned national arrangements, even if the traditionally smaller European airbases were retained. The key to success would be the application of common training, procedures and aircraft modification programmes. By making each unit truly multinational and by developing the overall common operational policy through the EU HQ, the problems of national divergence could be eliminated.
In the marine environment, one can cumulate existing capacities and provide common supply services, possibly leading to a rationalisation of the number of European naval bases. Fleet auxiliaries can be envisaged as developing a common European service. An early candidate as one of the European Force Elements, would be a European mine counter measure service. The principle could be applied to larger ships. France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom all wish to have some aircraft carrier capability; could it be provided by a common squadron thereby providing savings in support and logistic chains, while also ensuring that a viable force was available at all times? A European led Combined Joint Task Force in the maritime environment at present lacks a satisfactory headquarters ship; one, or more, of these could be acquired on a common basis.
It would make sense to begin the approach to land forces by looking at engineers, communications, transport and medical services, which could provide the first common programmes. The wider field of logistic support could follow and an early candidate would be the development of common IT systems for logistics. The question of outsourcing logistic and support services is now under active consideration in a number of European countries. There would be economies through the working out of common specifications and the use of a limited number of common suppliers. Success in these areas would enable a subsequent application of the approach of European Force Elements to artillery, armour and infantry units.
There are some force elements which are provided jointly to all armed services. Some of these, like protection against nuclear, biological and chemical warfare, are obvious candidates for common provision. Others, such as intelligence and mapping, are more difficult because of traditional transatlantic patterns of co-operation, but it would be a mistake for the development of a separable NATO for any capability to depend on a single ally, even the United States.
The Need for a European Defence Budget
These examples suggest some practical areas where the development of European Force Elements and common support and logistic services could provide building blocks for the strengthening of European defence capabilities. They would make more effective use of European defence budgets through the removal of the cost overhang of separate support systems. Valuable as such individual initiatives would be, they would not by themselves represent a coherent new security structure for Europe. They would however illustrate how significant improvements in effectiveness could be achieved through merging particular national capabilities and sharing common services.
For this approach to become coherent, it would be necessary to develop a planning and budgetary system at the European level. The ultimate requirement would be for a European Defence Budget. Under such a system EU members would provide either defence capability or money as their contribution. This would have a number of beneficial effects: not only would the free ride be stopped, but nations would probably prefer to improve their military capabilities rather than to contribute money to the employment and industries of other nations. A virtuous circle of improved military capability and effective European defence could be established. There would be many problems in assessing the true worth of each contribution, but the process would also make the planning and audit at the European level more effective.
The Long Term European Goal
These suggestions do not move into the much more sensitive area of national allegiances. Servicemen and women would still be recruited, given basic training, and paid by national governments to whom their basic loyalty would remain. In any event those nations with defence commitments beyond NATO, such as France and the United Kingdom, would continue to maintain the necessary independent capability in some areas despite the additional costs. For others the opportunity costs of continuing a policy of conscription will need to be addressed. The issues in these areas, which would take a common defence policy even further, may have to be addressed at some stage but are not on the immediate agenda.
The long term goal might be a true European Defence Capability which would make for an equal partnership with the United States within NATO. Even if such a regional approach proves too difficult politically, the implementation of some sensible measures of closer integration of particular capabilities could provide more effective forces at no greater cost. The institutional structures to support such an approach would develop in parallel through the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy.