The UK Government moved relatively rapidly to adjust its defence policy to its perception of the new security needs after the end of the Cold War. The rush to change its defensive posture was accelerated by an urgent need to bring an overheated defence programme back into budgetary balance. Throughout the Cold War, the UK had taken pride in being a significant player in NATO, and in spending a higher than the European average percentage of GDP on defence. It is a nuclear power, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and has a number of security obligations outside of NATO. It has also had to provide military capability to support the police in Northern Ireland. During the 1980's, the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, had supported the NATO pledge for 3% per annum real growth in defence expenditure, and the UK had met these targets despite a period of poor economic performance. This growth rate was unsustainable and the fall of the Berlin Wall signalled an opportunity for a strategic review. The UK Government published a fundamental review of its defence policy in 1990. Combat capability was set to decline by around 30% over the next 5 years.
The 1990 Review, known as "Options for Change", was in retrospect undertaken too early to be based on a firm understanding of the new security context. It was assumed that a resurgent Russia had the potential to threaten the West, and that the traditional UK support for a strong NATO would be the primary requirement of British Defence Policy. The then Defence Secretary, Tom King, wrote in April 1990:
"History shows that periods of great political upheaval are also likely to be periods of insecurity. Whilst we look forward to a new security order in Europe, we have no right to assume it. New arrangements must be worked at and constructed through patient negotiation and agreement. NATO provides the focus through which its members in Western Europe and North America can coordinate and pursue arms control and other ways of managing international security. But NATO can only succeed if it can continue to demonstrate a willingness and ability to defend itself for so long as there remains a potential for military exploitation in Europe." (1)
The British planners adopted with alacrity the new NATO strategic concept and divided up their remaining forces into the three required degrees of readiness: rapid reaction, main defence and augmentation forces. The formation of the multinational Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) was enthusiastically welcomed, and the UK sought and won the lead nation role. In describing future roles for the British Army (2) NATO commitments headed the list. The ARRC was to be the UK's major contribution and would be available for "deployment anywhere within the Allied Command Europe area". (3). Defence of the United Kingdom and commitments beyond the NATO area completed the three major roles for British forces. This was a continuation of a policy which saw the major concern as a threat from the East; albeit one which was now weaker and less immediate. The UK government, while welcoming the reunification of Germany, seemed not to be thinking in terms of any changes to NATO membership.
The assumptions of the 1990 Defence Review were brought into sharp question by the Gulf War of 1990/91. The UK had shown that it was prepared to put together a significant joint force for high intensity warfare well outside the NATO area. The lessons of the ad hoc coalition building were also a factor in modifying strategic assumptions. The UK government view was that engagement of the US was now even more important in the new world order. The experience of French forces in the Gulf had showed the importance of membership of the integrated military structure of NATO in order to be able to play a major role in such deployments. The lukewarm support for Gulf operations from some Allies did not go unnoticed.
By 1993, the re-emergence of a major Russian threat was being discounted for the foreseeable future, and the UK Government was admitting that the assumptions of 1991 were no longer valid. (4). Better relations with the central European nations were seen as being achieved through the North Atlantic Co-operation Council for NATO, and the Forum of Consultation for the Western European Union. Experience in the former republic of Yugoslavia was beginning to shape policy thinking on the potential future security concerns.
The 1994 government's annual defence policy statement (5) warmly endorsed the outcome of the NATO Brussels Summit of January that year, and used it as the first opportunity to trail the longer term possibility of NATO enlargement:
"NATO is also a focus for stability, valued not only by its members but also by the newly democratic states of central and eastern Europe. The work of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council has done much to cement relations between them and NATO nations....... 'Partnership for Peace' will deepen the ties between NATO and the central and eastern European states through close co-operation on a range of military and political issues and open up the prospect of enlargement of the Alliance in the longer term."(6)
The statement focused more on the threat of Balkan type conflicts, while reminding the public that the evolution of Russia was still a cause for concern. The possible enlargement of NATO was not highlighted in the introduction by the Defence Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind.
The 1995 statement (7) makes interesting reading. The Conservative government was inclined more towards the transatlantic relationship than towards closer integration with Europe. It saw advantage in promoting enlargement of the European Union, in the hope that this would delay integration (wider rather than deeper). However, it could see that a diluting of the membership of NATO might weaken the bonds that held the United States engaged. In trying to appear enthusiastic, while preserving the current arrangements, it said:
"We place great value on the concept of partnership, for we seek a balance between partnership and membership in the development of the wider Europe we wish to see. But there is an unhelpful preoccupation with the latter, and in particular with membership of NATO and the European Union. Playing down the value of co-operation and playing up the significance of decisions on membership will risk re-creating the type of divide in Europe which we wish to avoid."(8)
By now the main thrust of defence policy was attached to wider security policy, and Britain's interests in a stable world.
The last annual statement on defence policy (9) to be produced by the Conservative Government was published in May 1996, and much of it is coloured by the experience in Bosnia. The post Cold War change in rationale for defence forces was virtually complete. The opening statement declares:
"The goal of our security policy is to maintain the freedom and territorial integrity of the United Kingdom and its Dependent Territories, and the ability to pursue its legitimate interests at home and abroad" (10)
Michael Portillo was the Defence Secretary and was well known for his lack of enthusiasm for greater integration of the European Union. In his introduction to the annual statement, he welcomed the enlargement of NATO and says: "We shall argue vigorously at the European Union's Inter-Governmental Conference that European defence arrangements must be based on sustaining NATO's strength and effectiveness."(11). NATO enlargement is given prominence for the first time, and the statement reports the outcome of the NATO study in an objective way (12). There is no discussion of the issues, or even an indication of the UK Government's view on the desirability of enlargement. The paper reports that Ministers will assess progress at the Brussels meeting in December 1996 and consider the way forward.
The British public takes only a limited interest in defence policy except when a war is in prospect. At a time when NATO was agonising over its future, little discussion took place within the UK apart from within the strategic studies elites. It was perhaps unfortunate that no further defence policy statement would be produced for two years. The election on 1 May 1997 meant that the outgoing Conservative government were not able to produce one. Nor was there much debate on the issues in either chamber of Parliament. The House of Commons had a brief debate in February 1997 followed by an even shorter debate in the House of Lords the following month.
The House of Commons spared an hour and a half to debate NATO enlargement on 26 February 1997 (13). The debate was opened by Bill Walker (14), a Conservative member of parliament, who expressed his reservations about enlargement. He advocated keeping the current NATO membership strong and ensuring that the transatlantic bond was not weakened. Members raised the questions of potential costs, but had little in the way of hard evidence to work on. The debate did not divide along political party lines; some Labour and Conservative members expressed concerns about the potential weakening of the Alliance through the process of expansion, while other were broadly supportive. Tony Lloyd, who would become a foreign office minister in the Labour government, explained (15) that the Labour party strongly supported NATO and would also support, with some qualifications, enlargement. The debate was concluded, without any vote being taken, by the Conservative government Foreign Office minister, Sir Nicholas Bonsor (16) who underlined the government's commitment to extending European security through an enlargement of NATO. In addressing the cost issues, he suggested that the lower estimates of $35 billion were nearer the mark than suggestions of $125 billion. In any event, he stated that the UK government would keep a close eye on costs.
Two weeks later, the House of Lords, provided a forum for a discussion of all aspects of NATO enlargement (17). On 14 March 1997, (a Friday afternoon when low priority business is done) Lord Kennet opened the debate by asking the Government for its policy on the proposal. In a strong opening speech (18), he expressed great concern about the potential of enlargement causing a redivision of Europe, an alienation of Russia, and a remilitarisation of Europe. He also complained about the lack of parliamentary debate before the government decided on its policy towards NATO expansion. In the brief debate, the process of enlargement had more supporters that opponents. Lord Wallace, speaking as a Liberal Democrat spokesman, wished to see Slovenia and Romania include in the first wave of enlargement (19). Many speakers regretted the lack of public debate about the important strategic issue of NATO enlargement. They blamed the government for conducting its policy development behind closed doors. Lord Williams (20), the Labour party spokesman, explained that his party supported enlargement for Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and possibly Slovenia, but not for Romania in the first wave. He also highlighted the importance of working with Russia, and supported the approach proposed by the United States. Winding up the debate for the Conservative Government, Lord Chesham (21) did little more than restate the government's support for the principle of enlargement. The debate had lasted less than 90 minutes and caused no ripple of interest among the British public.
The incoming Labour government had promised a thorough defence review on gaining power. Although they had also promised to complete the review within 6 months, it was July 1998 before it was published. This meant that at the key time when NATO enlargement policy was being shaped, Britain was either preparing for an election (with its inevitable focus on domestic issues) or reexamining its whole foreign and defence policy assumptions for the new government. Even if this had not been the case, it would have been surprising if the public had become engaged in the NATO enlargement debate. Public knowledge and interest in NATO is remarkably low. This is not to say that the British electorate are antagonistic to NATO. They appear entirely content to leave things as they are in as much as they know how they are. Defence was not a significant issue between the parties at the 1997 election. All three main parties supported a strong NATO with a significant contribution from Britain.
The Labour Party was elected with a large majority of the seats in the House of Commons on 1 May 1997. There was very little time before the key NATO meeting in Madrid in July for the development of policy on the key enlargement issues. The new government had other priorities for reform. Within two weeks of taking office, Robin Cook, the new Foreign Secretary, gave a major briefing on the priorities for British foreign policy. In this mission statement, he listed four goals of foreign policy, in which security through NATO was the first:
"The first goal of foreign policy is security for nations. Our security will remain based on the North Atlantic Alliance. We must manage the enlargement of NATO to ensure that a wider alliance is also a stronger alliance and that the process reduces rather than increases tensions between East and West"(22)
This early statement of support for enlargement was not followed by any great public discussion. In a newspaper interview in early June (23), George Robertson, the new Defence Secretary indicated that the UK favoured full membership for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary; had sympathy for the Slovenian case but was less enthusiastic about Romania as part of the first wave of new members. The indication was that UK policy on enlargement was continuing unchanged. The government view was that enlargement was a good thing, but that it needed to be managed carefully so as not to cause divisions within NATO and increase tensions in the rest of Europe.
The outcome of the Madrid summit in July 1997 was as expected by the UK government. Tony Blair reported to Parliament on 9 July 1997(24). He singled out for particular mention the position of Slovenia and Romania:
"I should say a particular word about Romania and Slovenia, whose applications were especially closely considered even though there was no consensus to invite them on this occasion. Both countries have indeed made remarkable progress. Romania's new Government deserve particular congratulation on the steps taken since they took office last November. A number of allies would have liked to see Romania and Slovenia included among those invited at Madrid. All, including ourselves, saw them as strong candidates for any future enlargement, but we felt that Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were the limit for current enlargement." (25)
He dismissed the question of additional costs as not being significant, and promised that Parliament would have a full opportunity to debate the enlargement before ratification of the treaty. His announcement of the outcome of the Madrid Summit was welcomed by the leaders of the two main opposition parties. However, Paddy Ashdown, the Liberal Democrat leader, expressed concern about the lack of a strategy:
"Does the Prime Minister accept that there is a necessary but growing divergence between the long-term strategic aims of the Americans in NATO and the Europeans in NATO? The Americans see NATO as a global institution, perhaps with implications for their policy on the middle east, while we see it as an institution concerned with security in Europe. As an ad hoc set of decisions, the decisions that were made were sensible; but they do not yet comprise a strategy, and we need a strategy urgently." (26)
Despite a rebuttal by the Prime Minister, this has been a recurring theme in the subsequent discussions both inside and outside parliament. The only critical voices over the principle of enlargement came from two left wing Labour party members.
Discussion in the main academic centres were more critical of the concept of enlargement. Jane Sharp analysed the UK non-governmental debate in the UK in a study by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (27):
"In general British public opinion is unconcerned about NATO enlargement, but opinions vary widely among the defense and foreign affairs cognoscenti just as they do in the United States. Among the sceptics, at one end of the spectrum are Cold Warriors who worry that enlargement will weaken alliance cohesion and undermine NATO's original task of collective defence. At the other are those on the left who worry that taking in central European states formerly under Soviet control will give Russia a dangerous sense of encirclement that could strengthen xenophobic nationalists in the Duma and the military."(28)
Certainly for those of us involved in the academic debate, the anti-expansionists seem to be a significant majority. Former Ambassadors, senior military officers and distinguished professors combined at every opportunity to say that the West's policy was misguided. Letters to the newspapers and articles on the dangers of expansion were published. The Times had carried an editorial against expansion:
"The most urgent reason for Europeans to rise to the Albright challenge is that the centrepiece of her European strategy, the enlargement of NATO by 1990, is dangerously misjudged. Far from enhancing the security of the European continent, this imminent decision risks creating fresh sources of insecurity, inviting confrontation with Russia and, by weakening Nato's military credibility, impairing the Alliance's capacity to respond to new dangers that wiser policies might avert". (29)
Yet the impact on UK policy of these statements was nil. It may be that the New Labour government, with its aversion to old national institutions, was peculiarly well placed to ignore the concerns of this body of great and good. Their criticisms were answered in some detail by George Robertson, the Defence Secretary, in two public speeches in the autumn of 1997 (30).
The United Kingdom parliament has a number of select committees which can shadow particular departments of state, and have the power to take evidence and produce reports to parliament. These committees are much weaker than their American counterparts, but they do provide a useful way of probing the evolution of government policies. The members of each committee are themselves elected members of parliament, and are drawn from all parties in a broadly representative manner. In January 1998, the Defence Committee began taking evidence about the UK policy on NATO Enlargement and it published its report (31) in March 1998.
The committee took oral evidence from the Defence Secretary, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, from the Prime Minister of Hungary and from the Defence Minister of Poland. They also took written submissions from the Embassies of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. As with all select committee investigations, it is open to interested parties to make submissions. It is significant that there were no such submissions from interested third parties or non-governmental organisations. The report is the most coherent UK document on the issues surrounding the question of NATO enlargement. It received little publicity and no public debate. The report conclusions (32) in full were:
(a) We certainly recognise the success of the PfP programme, which has also enabled prospective members to demonstrate their NATO-worthiness. However, we also recognise that most of the CEE states were not prepared to accept indefinitely this 'associate status'.
(b) We must concur with our predecessor Committee which commented, "the vital question has since January 1994 been, not whether there will be an extension of NATO, but its pace and manner".
(c) We conclude that the incentive to improve the structure and control of the military, to enhance democracy and to resolve border disputes and internal problems with ethnic minorities, which we have seen clearly exists within aspirant countries, would not have been as strong without the possibility of full membership of NATO.
(d) We recognise that potential improvements to the security environment could be put at risk if enlargement caused Russia to adopt a posture which could bring about a resurgence of Cold War antagonism.
(e) While we should be sensitive to Russian anxieties, we cannot accept that Russia should have a veto over Alliance decisions. Nevertheless, we recognise the importance of continued consultation with Russia and gaining Russian confidence during the necessarily delicate process of enlargement. In the final analysis, the central question that must be addressed in deciding on enlargement is whether it will provide greater security for the Alliance, and for Europe as a whole.
(f) In deciding whether to endorse ratification of the accession protocols of the proposed new members, Parliament must weigh the potential political advantages of enlargement against any potential short-term costs in terms of military effectiveness. For our part,we are clear that the benefits of increased stability in central and eastern Europe outweigh any potential military costs.
(g) We conclude that the actual shared costs of enlargement may well be greater than the $1.5 billion over ten years projected by NATO, but at this stage it is not possible to estimate how much with any great certainty.
(h) We conclude, that it would be as well, in choosing to endorse the process of enlargement, to be prepared for the costs shared among the 19 members of NATO to drift up at least towards the mid-range between NATO's $1.5 billion over ten years and the US DoD's $5-6 billion over thirteen years.
(i) We conclude that the weight of informal opinion and the evidence we have heard supports the RAND Corporation and DoD in the assumption that the threat of a direct conventional war in Europe is insignificant in the near term&emdash;and that should such a threat re-arise, NATO would have sufficient time to adjust its defensive posture. We accept, therefore, that the permanent forward positioning of NATO forces in the new members' territories is unnecessary. To do so when the risk does not justify it will in any case be interpreted as an action deliberately antagonistic to Russian concerns. The highest estimates&emdash;the CBO's more expensive options, at costs of up to $125 billion&emdash;can accordingly be disregarded.
(j) We concur with the view of one of our Members that "countries can generally achieve a higher degree of security at lower cost when operating within an Alliance than would be the case were states to pursue purely national defence strategies".
(k) We cannot share the Secretary of State's confidence that $1.5 billion represents the probable limit on the true costs of enlargement.
(I) The question that remains is: even if the costs increase, are the benefits still likely to be worth it? Even if the UK's estimated contribution of £110 million over ten years were to double to the equivalent of half of the purchase price of a Eurofighter every year we would still consider that enlargement offers excellent value for money
(m) Despite equal or nearly equal claims from a few other countries, we conclude that none of the three countries invited to accede to NATO was an inappropriate choice.
(n) We welcome the commitment made by the Government for a debate in Parliament on NATO enlargement before ratification.
(o) We express the hope that the Committee on the Modernisation of the House of Commons will turn its attention to the current unsatisfactory arrangements for Parliamentary examination of international treaties and other aspects of the exercise of the royal prerogative in relation to ratification.
(p) We believe that we should approach any further enlargement after this round with caution.
(q) We believe that consensus decisions are required where military operations may be employed, and we would not wish to see NATO operating with a 'Security Council'.
(r) We recommend that the House endorse the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the North Atlantic Alliance.
While there is no requirement under the British system for the government to seek parliamentary approval before ratification of a treaty, the Prime Minister had promised an opportunity for Parliament to debate NATO enlargement before the UK ratified. In May 1998, some 23 senior figures, including former Defence Secretary Denis Healey and two former Chiefs of Defence Staff, wrote to the Prime Minister to urge a rethink on enlargement (33). Tony Blair replied robustly on the decision to offer membership to the three countries, and also said that the writers' concerns would be debated in parliament. He was however much less positive than previously on the question of further enlargement:
"There is of course a continuing debate on further enlargement. I cannot say who will be invited next, or when. But neither do I believe that we should close the door to further enlargement at some point in the future. The contribution that NATO enlargement can, in the right circumstances, make to European stability and security is too important to be forsworn." (34)
By the Summer of 1998, the lengthy defence review was coming to a conclusion and was published in early July (34). It took as a given assumption that NATO would have three new members, but did not make any assumptions about further enlargement.
As was described earlier, there is no requirement for the British Government to take a treaty to parliament before ratification. Nevertheless, for major changes, it is normal practice to allow both chambers an opportunity for discussion. However, the government can be assured of being able to ratify the treaty. For key issues, a government may decide to conduct a referendum before entering into a treaty obligation. There was no suggestion that this was necessary on the issue of NATO enlargement. The House of Commons started its debate at 9.37 am on Friday 17 July1998 and had completed its discussion by 11 am that morning.
The debate was opened by Robin Cook making a strong statement about the right of the Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary as democratic European states to join NATO. He made it clear that this would increase the UK's commitments but also put obligations on the new members:
"The principle of collective defence still lies at the heart of NATO. Article 5 of the Washington treaty makes an attack on one NATO member an attack on all. It is the strongest possible guarantee of our security, and sends the clearest possible message to anyone with designs on the territory or freedom of action of a NATO member. The three new members of NATO will enjoy that guarantee; they will accept, too, the responsibility that it imposes on them. We will help to defend Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic; they will help to defend us. The principle of collective defence will not be weakened by the expansion of NATO's numbers. On the contrary, the capability to deliver on that principle will be strengthened by the increase in numbers and the greater security of our present borders." (37)
In his speech, he also described the process by which the applicant countries were narrowed down to three. He admitted that the UK would have supported Slovenia, but that consensus among the 16 NATO nations was necessary.
"It was no easy decision to choose which among so many applicant countries should be successful. The consensus that emerged from long discussion in Madrid was that they should be the three countries that we are debating. Critical to that judgment was the broad view that NATO enlargement should proceed at a pace that is consistent with NATO absorbing its expanded membership. We would do no service to the other countries that aspire to join NATO if we expanded so rapidly that NATO lost its effectiveness as the military guarantor of peace on our continent. As I have said, this will not be the last NATO enlargement. No one should be under any illusion about the magnitude of the current enlargement."(38)
On the subject of additional costs, he assessed the UK contribution to be as low as £110 million spread over 10 years. In his response, John Maples, the Conservative party defence spokesman expressed concern about the rigour of the cost assessment. He also spent some time discussing the effect on Russia and the difficulties of extending NATO's security guarantee effectively to the enlarged area. When asked whether he supported the proposed enlargement or not he said:
"We fully support the accession of the three new members, but it will be a significant task to integrate them into NATO's military structure, and that must be substantially completed before there is any further expansion. We should be cautious about having more new members until it is clear how the situation in central and eastern Europe is developing. Almost all the countries that want to join fail at least one of the tests that I set out earlier.
NATO has an enormous current agenda without further enlargement: the integration of the three new members; developing a new strategic concept; and building relationships with Russia and its former allies. Those are all significant tasks which will take much effort and time. Let us ensure that they are concluded satisfactorily before proceeding any further."(39)
The next main speaker was Bruce George, the Chairman of the Defence Select Committee. He brought the conclusions of his committee's analysis to the attention of the House and strongly endorsed the proposed enlargement of NATO. He made it clear that the costs to the UK were well worth paying. The debate (such as it was) closed with only one further speaker. As a number of members noted in their interventions, it was a very cursory way for the UK parliament to consider such a significant change to the strategic landscape in Europe. There was less than two hour's of discussion on a Friday morning, when the House of Commons is traditionally poorly attended. Despite the lack of need for a parliamentary vote, the UK was among the last of the NATO member states to formally ratify.
On the final afternoon of the parliamentary session before the long summer break of 1998, the House of Lords discussed NATO enlargement. (40). The debate was opened by Lord Gilbert, the minister for defence procurement. He reminded the House (41) that he had opposed enlargement in 1996 as he had worried about undermining NATO through unrestrained enlargement. he had also been concerned about the costs. He had changed his mind because the process after the Madrid Summit had been well considered and each applicant had been examined on its merits. He also believed that the costs were now affordable. Lord Wallace, the Liberal Democrat spokesman said:
"We should be developing and setting out publicly our own approach both to a domestic audience and to our allies in Europe and across the Atlantic.The Minister referred to consensus. It is never necessary to take a vote in NATO. It is an open secret that the majority of NATO members were in favour of enlargement to include five members on this occasion, of whom two were Romania and Slovenia, which would have solved the problem of Hungary as a land-locked state not having access. But the Americans said firmly and conclusively that they did not think they could get more than three through the Senate. Therefore on this occasion "consensus" meant a minority ruling the roost. NATO will not develop into a toothless security organisation as the Minister suggested so long as it has an effective European pillar.How much further should the alliance expand? The US Senate passed effectively a resolution suggesting that there should be a pause before further expansion. That seems to me to be a mistake. We must maintain the momentum at least to include Romania and Slovenia next time round. There are much larger questions over the Baltic states. To discuss the question of when and if the Baltic states come into NATO is necessarily to discuss Baltic and European security as a whole and how Sweden and Finland see their relations with NATO."(42)
The debate took as given that enlargement would happen and centred more on the longer term future of NATO. Not only was the question of the relationship with Russia seen as important, but a number of speakers were concerned about the potential differences between European and American perspectives. Lord Kennet, who had been a critic of enlargement, said:
"What in fact do we, the current European members of NATO, want for NATO? And what does the United States want for NATO? Unfortunately, that is not the same thing. What each wants is fast becoming incompatible with the other."(43)
Lord Carver, a former army Chief of the Defence Staff, argued strongly against the whole enlargement process on the grounds that it redivided Europe into two potentially hostile camps. The discussion was characterised by thoughtful and well informed analysis of the issues.As is often the case with debates in the Lords, it received no publicity in the media. The final speech was made by Baroness Symons, the Foreign Office minister (44). She made no commitment for either time or candidates for further enlargement, but said that the door remained open. Her concluding words announced the Government's intention to ratify:
"Following this debate the Government will deposit notifications of acceptance of the enlargement protocols with the United States Government in Washington in accordance with our obligations under the Washington Treaty. We expect a formal joining ceremony to take place when heads of state and government meet in Washington on 24th and 25th April 1999 which is also the celebration of 50 years of NATO's history. In anticipation of that event I hope that the whole House will join me in welcoming the Czech Republic,Hungary and Poland to the NATO alliance."(45)
As we have seen, official opinion in the UK has moved from almost giving a promise to Slovenia and Romania that they were next in line for NATO membership to much vaguer assurances of the door remaining open. In a major speech (46) on NATO in early 1999, Robin Cook made no reference to further enlargement. On the official Ministry of Defence web site, the section on NATO enlargement made it clear that the UK was not pushing for further enlargement to be decided at the Washington Summit in April 1999:
"Enlargement is a long-term process, closely related to wider developments in NATO and in Europe as a whole. It requires a consensus of all NATO members. The Washington Summit will not therefore necessarily issue any invitations to begin accession negotiations.
The UK Government is committed to the continuation of the enlargement process, guided by the following factors:
* the readiness of individual candidates
* the readiness of NATO to absorb new members
* the effects on overall European security" (47)
Again there has been virtually no public or parliamentary debate about further enlargement. Officials make it clear that it has been hard work to prepare the three new members, particularly at a time when NATO has had a heavy operational load to bear. Now that those who had pushed for the original enlargement seem prepared to wait, the critics of the enlargement process are also content to keep quiet. The roles and purpose of NATO, to be distilled in the new Strategic Concept, are where staff work is most active. The challenges of European Union enlargement are becoming clearer, and the elite debates have focused more on the implications in this area.
To many non-British commentators, the lack of interest in the whole adventure of NATO enlargement will seem surprising. Traditionally, all mainstream political opinion has been supportive of NATO. There are few votes to be won by making NATO an issue in the country. The elites, both within government and outside, seek ways to manage the transition of NATO to the new post Cold War world. The debates, such as they are, have been about how this can best be done. Given the lack of political dogma, the UK has seen itself in the role of being able to broker consensus between the US view and that of the other main European players. That it could not bring the French back into the integrated military structure at Madrid was seen as unfortunate. For the future, the UK can be expected to wish to play a continuing role as a pragmatic member of NATO. There are however signs that this may become more difficult as thinking about security on either side of the Atlantic diverges.
References
(1) British Defence Policy 1990-1991 MOD PR pamphlet April 1990
(2) Britain's Army for the 90's Cm 1595 July 1991 London HMSO
(3) ibid para 14.
(4) Defending our future Cm2270 July 1993 London HMSO para 108.
(5) Statement on the Defence Estimates Cm2550 April 1994 London HMSO
(6) Ibid para 209
(7) Stable Forces in a Strong Britain Cm 2800 May 1995 London HMSO
(8) ibid para 234
(9) Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996 Cm 3223 London HMSO
(10) Ibid para 101
(11) Ibid page 2
(12) Ibid paras 123-126 and Table 2
(13) Commons Hansard 26 February 1997
(14) Ibid Col 257-260
(15) Ibid Col 271-272
(16) Ibid Col 274-276
(17) Lords Hansard 14 March 1997
(18) Ibid col 619-622
(19) Ibid col 636
(20) Ibid col 637
(21) Ibid col 638-642
(22) Text is on FCO web site at http://www.fco.gov.uk/texts/1997/may/12/mspc.txt
(23) Financial Times 4 June 1997
(24) Commons Hansard 9 July 1997
(25) Ibid col 937
(26) Ibid col 941
(27) Nato Enlargement: The National Debates over Ratification edited by Simon Serfaty and Stephen Cambone, CSIS Washington, October 1997
(28) Ibid p 23-24, British views on NATO Enlargement by Jane M.O.Sharp
(29) The Times 17 February 1997
(30) "Building European Security, and the Role of Defence Diplomacy" given at the English Speaking Union on 4 September 1997. "NATO, its Partners and Defence Diplomacy" given to the European Atlantic Group on 29 October 1997. The text of both speeches is available on the Ministry of Defence web site at http://www.mod.gov.uk
(31) Defence Committee Third Report NATO Enlargement, The Stationery Office, 18 March 1998.
(32) Ibid pages xxxi-xxxii
(33) Defence Chiefs warn against enlarging NATO, Daily Telegraph 6 May 1998.
(34) Letter from Prime Minister to Sir John Killick and others dated 8 June 1998. Text is available on the MOD web site http://www.mod.gov.uk.
(35) The Strategic Defence Review Cm 3999, London:The Stationery Office July 1998.
(36) Commons Hansard 17 July 1998
(37) ibid col 684
(38) ibid col 687
(39) ibid col 695
(40) Lords Hansard 31 July 1998
(41) ibid col 1750-1751
(42) ibid col 1764
(43) ibid col 1769
(44) ibid col 1803-1809
(45) ibid col 1809
(46) Ernest Bevin Memorial lecture, 22 January 1999
(47) MOD web site information on NATO Enlargement dated 6 January 1999