Europe is an economic power, but it is a long way from being a strategic power. To be a strategic power requires two key elements: a clear and coherent foreign policy, and the diplomatic and military means to implement that foreign policy. Europe currently has neither. For the 21st Century we must ask first whether we want Europe to become a strategic power. For myself, but not necessarily for most people in Britain, the answer must be yes. It seems inconceivable to me that a region which is as rich and populous as the United States, particularly after the start of monetary union, can expect to continue its foreign and security policy on either an exclusively national basis or only through NATO.
We see the limitations of the European position today as we try to deal with the Balkans. Even for a tragedy on our doorstep, we must look to the USA to provide the lead and the major military capabilities. We must shape our strategy for Europe always mindful of how it will play in Congress. We see this now as we debate the use of ground troops in Kosovo. NATO is important, but we cannot be sure that it will always be there to save us from ourselves.
The question then is how do we develop a European Foreign and Security Policy which is underpinned by the necessary diplomatic and military capability to implement it. We need a design which maintains NATO but gives us a European capability to protect and promote European vital interests.The arguments too often revolve around the institutional debates. The confusion of acronyms and organisations. The linkages between NATO, WEU, and the EU, coupled with debates over second and fourth pillars, do little to advance the military capability.
A recent analysis by the Brookings Institution claims that "despite spending two thirds of what the United States does on defense, European NATO countries have less than 10 per cent of the transportable defense capability for prompt long range action." In the Kosovo operation, we have seen the almost total reliance on US capability, with the European nations each providing quite small capabilities. Hopes for fixing the problems of European defence capability currently centre on each nation modernising their military on a national basis. I believe that we are more likely to be able to improve Europe's defence effectiveness by eliminating unnecessary duplication through seeking European, rather than national, capabilities.
The development of the common defence policy for the European Union, like the United Kingdom's recent strategic defence review, should be foreign policy led. The scale and the scope of the armed forces would be determined by the objectives of foreign policy developed within the CFSP, while ensuring that members of the North Atlantic Alliance could meet their NATO obligations. This would not lead to any decoupling of European countries from their NATO undertakings. Nor should there be any duplication of the critical contribution to military co-operation provided by NATO, namely its command structures and headquarters, although certain developments of 'double-hatting' could take place. The most effective way for the members of the European Union to "get more deployable forces for a euro" is by systematically developing economies of scales in the support, training and operational management of their armed forces.
There are two approaches whereby duplication between European armed forces could be eliminated and additional resources made available for increased force effectiveness. One would be in the common development of new common capabilities, and the other is the development of common support and logistic services. An existing Alliance example of the first approach is the common procurement and operation by fourteen allies of the AWACS (airborne early warning and control) aircraft. An example of the second approach is the way that four Nordic countries providing troops to IFOR/SFOR are supported by a common logistic battalion. The agreement by the Netherlands and Belgian navies to develop common headquarters and support services for their fleets is an hopeful sign that some European states have made a start to the elimination of expensive duplication.
In attempting to identify early candidates for common procurement, the fact that the armed forces of different countries want new tanks or new fighter aircraft at different times will be raised as a major objection. This can best be solved by concentrating on new projects on which there is a widely shared common requirement. The second approach will be a systematic analysis of support and logistic services to see where these could be provided on a Europe wide basis or for a group of countries procuring a common item of equipment.
An immediate example is the Medium Scale Transport Aircraft, for which common tenders are being sought by seven European countries, as well as the proposed large Strategic Air Lift projects. These are two examples where common procurement and common operation could be considered. A reduction in the number of operating bases required would lead to much greater cost effectiveness. These could become early examples of European Force Elements. The development of a common European flight refuelling service could also be examined. In the longer term the common support and servicing of helicopters could make sense. The Eurofighter, already ordered by five countries, could provide a trial for a number of these concepts.
In the marine environment one can cumulate existing capacities and provide common supply services, possibly leading to a rationalisation of the number of European naval bases. Fleet auxiliaries can be envisaged as developing a common European service. An early candidate as one of the European Force Elements, would be a European mine counter measure service. The principle could be applied to larger ships. France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom all wish to have some aircraft carrier capability; could it be provided by a common squadron thereby providing savings in support and logistic chains, while also ensuring that a viable force was available at all times? A European led Combined Joint Task Force in the maritime environment at present lacks a satisfactory headquarters ship; one, or more, of these could be acquired on a common basis.
It would make sense to begin the approach to land forces by looking at engineers, communications, transport and medical services, which could provide the first common programmes. The wider field of logistic support could follow and an early candidate would be the development of common IT systems for logistics. The question of outsourcing logistic and support services is now under active consideration in a number of European countries. There would be economies through the working out of common specifications and the use of a limited number of common suppliers. Success in these areas would enable a subsequent application of the approach of European Force Elements to artillery, armour and infantry units.
There are some force elements which are provided jointly to all armed services. Some of these, like protection against nuclear, biological and chemical warfare, are obvious candidates for common provision. Others, such as intelligence and mapping, are more difficult because of traditional transatlantic patterns of co-operation, but it would be a mistake for the development of a separable NATO for any capability to depend on a single ally, even the United States.
These examples suggest some areas where the development of European Force Elements and common support and logistic services could provide building blocks for the strengthening of European defence capabilities by the more effective use of European defence budgets through the removal of the cost overhang of separate support systems. We would need to develop common budgeting arrangements in order to avoid concerns about countries getting a "free-ride".
The time has now come to move forward with practical steps to develop a European Defence Capability. It will take time, perhaps many years, but a start must be made. It does not necessarily mean greater expenditure: much can be done with better use of current resources. If Europe is to be a strategic power in the 21st Century, this work on defence capability must start now.