Paddy Ashdown has written an extraordinary handbook for the politician, diplomat, academic and soldier. Few international statesmen can bring his breadth of experience to bear on what has become the intractable security problem of today. Paddy explains how to approach these kinds of conflict with the best chance of success.
He does not discount the possibility of future inter-state wars, and indeed believes they become more probable if we are unable to deal with local conflicts and humanitarian interventions. He admits to being very pessimistic about our ability to avoid large-scale war involving the use of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in the next five years, and in the Far East in the next twenty. He argues that if we are to maximise the chances of a peaceful transition through these unstable decades, we shall need to develop international law, and be prepared to intervene where necessary. If that is so, then we need to do it better in the future than we have in the past.
Most of his examples are drawn from the post Cold War period: the Balkans, Somalia, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq in particular. Although he cites his own experiences, both good and bad in Bosnia, he relegates the personal story of his time as High Representative to fascinating appendices at the end of the book. His main message is about a wider global canvas than just the Balkans. He makes it clear that there can be no assurance of success in any intervention, but believes that we now have enough experience to know what makes success more likely. He is highly critical of those who separate an intervention into phases of conflict prevention, military intervention and post conflict reconstruction. For success, any operation must be planned as a single entity. Ideally, conflict prevention will work and the later phases not be needed. But if intervention is needed, then it must take account of the conditions which will be required later for the post conflict phase as Iraq has shown so graphically. Modern warfare may need fewer troops, but rebuilding a country afterwards needs more for both civilian and military assistance. This is an area where the EU could be particularly well suited.
His checklist for the post conflict phase is clear and precise. He identifies the very short period at the end of hostilities when the military forces can win the support of the people. Ideally the agencies of the rule of law, the police, judiciary and civil authorities, must be in place very quickly. If this is not possible, the military forces had better be up to the job, with the other agencies following in as quickly as possible. When the intervening force also acts as the government, it has to look after every aspect of government. This is made more difficult when the expertise is spread across a range of international agencies. The economy must get moving quickly with a stable currency. Paddy places great store by the role of auditors who can help stop corruption, promote the rule of law and help the economy. The public utilities must work, and education is key to the battle for hearts and minds. Often security sector reform is needed to reduce the power of the former military leaders.
Right at the end of his priorities comes elections. He admits that the world and the people expect early elections, but fears that they slow progress towards the rule of law and a viable state. He rightly says that democracy consists of so much more than voting. He would prefer to see the rule of law, a free press, an independent civil service and an active civil society first, but realises that you cannot hold back on elections for too long.
While this book will serve future planners well, it is clear that judgements about when to intervene will remain difficult. Paddy Ashdown supported the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Yet the caveats in his book seem to reinforce the concerns of those of us who opposed the operation. It also gives little comfort over the prospects for our current in Afghanistan.
In looking to future security arrangements, he concludes that "The expeditionary approach to peacemaking and peacekeeping, with its emphasis on military power, has not succeeded." If this is true, then British defence policy is now based on a failed concept, and we are overdue for a new review of our own security.
Tim Garden is Lib Dem defence spokesman in the Lords and a former assistant chief of the defence staff.