If the possible consequences had not been so serious, the saga of the 15 hapless sailors and marines captured by the Iranians might have seemed more appropriate to the Navy Lark than the traditions of Admiral Nelson. The media circus that followed their welcome release, with order and counter-order, has taken the spotlight away from the operational mismanagement that led to the original hostage taking. The Westminster and Wapping frenzy over who knew what about payments for stories must not obscure the much more serious question of how such a catastrophe occurred and what has happened to the reputation of our armed forces as a result.
When the 15 sailors and marines were captured, as politicians, we rightly deferred questions about the circumstances. In a time of delicate diplomacy, the last thing that was needed was a row over how we got into this mess. However, now that all have returned home safely, we need a full examination of how Britain found itself outwitted by the Iranians. The Royal Navy is well practised in boarding and searching operations in many parts of the world. However few areas are as sensitive as the al-Shatt waterway border between Iran and Iraq. It seems clear that the UK was operating within Iraqi waters, and that the Iranian action was illegal. Yet that does not explain why the task force failed to foresee the risk. In June 2004, six British marines and two sailors were seized by Iran in nearby waters. They were released unharmed after three days, but their boats have never been returned. So even the casual observer should have know there was a threat. What were the Intelligence agencies saying? There is another concern, which should have been taken into account. The possibility of terrorist, including suicide bombers, from the sea is very real. Again, the precautions necessary to prevent potentially hostile attacks should have coped with a surprise raid by the Iranians.
What we know so far about the tactical position suggests complacency was the order of the day. While the lead ship, HMS Cornwall, may have been unsuitable for closer inshore operations, this was multinational task force. Where were the appropriate support vessels? Why was there no constant helicopter reconnaissance of incoming threats?
The sense that no problems were anticipated is compounded by the apparent lack of training in conduct after capture for the hapless hostages. In Cold War days such training was widespread. Some argue that since the UK and Iran are not at war, the normal Geneva Convention rules are not appropriate. However, given that this is not the first time that Royal Navy and Royal Marine personnel have found themselves paraded on Iranian television, it might have been wise to give rather firmer guidance. As a result of their "admissions of guilt", the reputation of the UK has sunk further in that part of the world.
The Foreign Office has come out of this sad tale rather better that the Ministry of Defence. Bringing pressure to bear on Iran to release our people needed a complex mix of negotiations with allies and the international community. Whatever the combination of international sticks and carrots, coupled with the opaque internal politics of Iran, the captives were released just 12 days after their original capture. They returned to North Devon and gave a formal press conference, which went some way to set the record straight.
Meanwhile, at the top of the Royal Navy a very rum decision was made. The freed sailors and marines were to be allowed to sell their stories to the media. It is difficult to understand how it was possible that senior commanders thought this might be a good idea. Leave aside the effect on the families of those who have died in recent times in Iraq and Afghanistan, cheque book journalism is a very rough trade. Those who fail in the bidding wars take their revenge with spoiling stories. Nor did the deprivations of Faye Turney or Arthur Batchelor, who got their stories out before the new ban, seem to be the stuff of heroes.
A major military blunder was salvaged by good diplomacy, and then ruined by a bizarre public relations exercise organised by the Royal Navy, and initially not stopped by Des Browne, the Defence Secretary. It looks as though the Ministry of Defence may be joining the Home Office as "not fit for purpose". Des Browne needs to take a firm grip on his civilian and military staff, and get clear answers as to how the who sorry mess could have happened. The two inquiries which he has announced will need to be thorough, open and honest.
Tim Garden served in the Ministry of Defence for 9 years. He is now the Lib Dem defence spokesman in the Lords.