Lord Garden: My Lords, I start by expressing from these Benches our relief over the safe return of the15 sailors and Royal Marines who were taken captive.

That feeling is of course tempered by our sadness over the nine personnel who have been killed in operations since we last met, and our sympathy goes out to the families who have suffered losses and to those further personnel who have been injured.

I thank the Minister for relaying the Statement, which spends just one page out of the six on operational matters. But I do not intend to focus my questions on media handling and who made the decision that cheque-book journalism was the new way for the Ministry of Defence. I say simply that, along with both serving and former military colleagues to whom I have spoken in the past week, we were all astonished by the naivety of those who appear to have been involved in the decision and surprised that the Defence Secretary failed to use his political nous when needed. However, in the end, he made the right decision. The Westminster and Wapping frenzy over who knew what about payment for stories must not obscure the much more serious question of how such a catastrophe occurred in the first place, and what has happened to the reputation of our Armed Forces as a result.

When the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, made a Statement on 28 March, I deferred asking any questions about the circumstances. In a time of delicate diplomacy, the last thing needed was a row about how we got into this mess. However, now that the sailors and marines have all returned safely, we need a full examination of how Britain found itself outwitted by the Iranians. In the Statement, the Minister has announced the inquiry to be headed by Sir Rob Fulton, who I know well. I join others in saying that he is an excellent choice; I have the highest regard for him.

The Royal Navy is well practised in boarding and searching operations in many parts of the world. However, there are few areas as sensitive as the Shatt al-Arab waterway border between Iran and Iraq. It seems clear that the UK was operating within Iraqi waters and that the Iranian action was illegal. However, can the Minister explain today—not at the end of the inquiry—why the taskforce failed to foresee the risk? As the noble Lord, Lord Astor of Hever, has said, in June 2004, six British marines and two sailors were seized by Iran in nearby waters. Although they were released unharmed after three days, their boats have never been returned, so even a casual observer knows that it is a possibility. What intelligence assessments has the Minister sat and listened to at the MoD which would have said this? Are there not procedures to take into account another threat in that area: potential terrorists in boats attacking our navy? Was there nothing to stop that, and would it not have stopped the Iranians? We could have those answers today, rather than waiting for the end of the inquiry.

So far, what we know about the tactical position seems to suggest complacency was the order of the day. While the lead ship, HMS “Cornwall”, may have been unsuitable for close in-shore operations, this was a multi-national taskforce. What were the other nations doing? Where were the support vessels, the helicopters and fixed-wing air reconnaissance to give the information?

The sense that the problems were not anticipated is compounded by the apparent lack of training in conduct after capture for the hapless hostages. In the past, that was normal procedure. Has that stopped? Can the Minister tell us whether all personnel in the area get conduct-after-capture training? Again, the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines have seen themselves end up on Iranian television. As a result of their admissions of guilt, the reputation of the United Kingdom has sunk further in that part of the world.

A major military blunder was salvaged by diplomacy, and then ruined by a bizarre public relations exercise organised by the Royal Navy and initially allowed by the Defence Secretary. It looks as though the Ministry of Defence is joining the Home Office as “not fit for purpose”. The Statement offers a separate review about future press relations, in which there is to be an independent component. Will there be an independent figure in the Fulton review? Perhaps there will be a distinguished defence academic such as Sir Lawrence Freedman, who wrote the Falklands official history; somebody who can look from outside of the closet of the Ministry of Defence.

Will the Minister assure us that he will provide the House with a copy of the terms of reference for the Fulton inquiry, so that we know what it is going to look at? I support the call of the noble Lord, Lord Astor of Hever, for a parallel to the House of Commons Defence Select Committee having access to the final, full report for your Lordships’ House.

Will the Minister tell us the current situation in that region for maritime border security operations? I understood that we were in the lead; if we are not doing it, who is in the lead? Who is doing it? Are the Iraqi Government content that we have now withdrawn? How long are we withdrawn for? Until the inquiry is over? For ever? What are we doing with our forces out there? Finally, will the Minister assure the House that the lessons from this shambles will be learnt by the Ministry of Defence, the Permanent Joint Headquarters and the Royal Navy, and that they will not take the Prime Minister’s advice that it is time to move on?