Lord Garden: My Lords, I, too, am grateful to the Minister for repeating the Statement on the NATO summit. From these Benches we welcome the historic location of the summit in Riga. We also welcome the fact that, for once, the summit seems to have passed without too much public acrimony between the participants.

I was slightly surprised at the claims in the Statement about the three priorities with which the UK went to the summit. I had previously tabled a Written Question about the UK’s priorities and the Answer that I received on 9 October from the Minister’s colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, did not mention those as the three priorities. It might be useful—not now—if the Minister could consult his colleague and decide whether the Foreign Office and the MoD were working to different agendas and let us know in writing.
In the short time available, the summit inevitably focused on the current operational problems in Afghanistan rather than on the long term. I think that the diplomatic fudge—because that is what it was—that was achieved was probably the best that could be achieved in the time.

I share in one respect the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Astor of Hever, about the availability of back-up forces in an emergency. We know that we should have had Reserve Forces when we went into the south, but did not; we now seem to have a commitment for emergencies. How are these emergencies defined? At what state of readiness will the forces provided for emergencies be on? It will be no good if they are at days’ notice.

I do not share the fierce criticism of the noble Lord, Lord Astor, of our European allies, which I notice has also come from some government spokesmen as well—but, I am sure, not from the Minister. Such criticisms do not help in keeping NATO together in these matters. I also believe that they are not fair. Does the Minister agree that what the other European members of NATO have achieved during the five years that we have been in Afghanistan in the north and the west—particularly when the UK could do relatively little because it was busy away invading Iraq—has done a great deal to stabilise those parts of the country? Some of those nations’ forces have been put at risk and they have lost people as well. They have been relatively successful in their areas with a rather different technique for winning hearts and minds than we are now seeing applied in the south, which we all know is a different area. Does the Minister agree that it would be a matter of regret if calling on them to deploy into the south meant leaving the places that they have secured in the north to return to anarchy and chaos?

I am surprised at the enthusiasm with which the Statement welcomes the fact that there will be no national caveats. Does that mean that in future British forces operating in coalition and alliance operations will operate without national control over what they do? That is what it sounds like. If we expect other nations to do it, we presumably will do it ourselves. That would be a massive step forward.

The Statement trumpeted the great operational declaration of the NATO response force of 20,000 highly capable troops, with associated air and naval support, ready to deploy at five days’ notice. That is an impressive capability. But I again ask the question that I have asked on several occasions in different debates: if we have a NATO force that is operationally capable of doing that, why are we scratching around for 2,500 troops and a few helicopters? Why can we not call on the apparently operationally capable force that NATO has?

All kinds of strange things are missing from the Statement. There is no mention of the comprehensive political guidance that most people expected to be formally agreed at Riga. We all know that NATO needs a new strategic concept to replace the way out-of-date one of 1999. The chances of getting all the members to agree to such a document are fairly slim and, as I understood it, the comprehensive political guidance was going to be a way of papering over the cracks. Does the fact that it is not mentioned in the Statement mean that it is so bland that it is not worth mentioning, or does it mean that even that was not agreed at Riga?

The Statement also does not address the enlargement strategy. The noble Lord, Lord Astor, highlighted parts of that. We on these Benches agreed that the time was not right for extending relationships further with Ukraine and Georgia. There is, however, the question of the Balkan strategy, which he raised. I was surprised that the Statement did not talk about what is now reported in the press: the UK’s support for Serbia moving ahead, with the status of Kosovo and the question of the war criminals still to be settled. What is the Government’s position, and why did they change their minds? There has also been the question of whether NATO should link more closely with like-minded countries in distant parts, an issue raised particularly by the United States, Japan, South Korea and Australia. Did that come up at the summit? If so, what was the Government’s position, and what was decided?

While there was no time in the short summit at Riga to take a hard look at where the alliance is going, there could have been an opportunity to steer the agenda for the 2009 summit. That will be NATO’s 60th anniversary—a suitable occasion for NATO to renew itself. A new strategic concept document could define the alliance’s operational and membership limits. It could change the funding arrangements for operations, which are the bane of all NATO’s activities, so that costs are shared equitably among members. It would also need to analyse whether the alliance is properly prepared for military tasks in the 21st century, instead of continuing to acquire equipment for past battles. It would need to show that the alliance could co-operate more closely with the European Union, which can, as the Minister said, offer complementary capabilities. Would the Government support such an agenda for that important future NATO summit, which might re-energise the Alliance?