We have moved into a somewhat confused period for Western policy on countering the threats from nuclear weapons. We look back on the period of the Cold War almost with nostalgia where the mixture of deterrence, confidence building and arms control appeared to offer an intellectually coherent approach to a very dangerous strategic situation. Proliferation was constrained, and much slower than many had predicted. For the decade of the 90's, the nuclear threat seemed to sink beneath the waves of the more exciting challenges of peace support doctrine, and we looked for ways to reduce our own nuclear arsenals in a managed manner. However the new century has bought a savage downturn to our perspective on future peace and security. The mass killing on 11 September 2001 has made the previously theoretical risks of non-state actors acquiring nuclear capabilities appear much more realistic. It has also given the United States Administration much greater domestic support for a proactive security agenda, which includes addressing perceived risks from future proliferation. Revelations about the activities of A.Q. Khan, who disseminated nuclear technology to a number of clients, have further strengthened concerns. The illusory weapons of mass destruction, which were used to justify the 2003 intervention in Iraq, does not seem to have diminished the Anglo-Saxon world's enthusiasm for talking tough.
Yet, it is difficult today for a medium sized democratic nuclear power, the United Kingdom, to articulate the purpose of its nuclear capability. The development, at extraordinary cost, in the aftermath of World War 2 of strategic nuclear forces was understandable in terms of Britain's view of itself as a victorious world power. In the days of the Cold War, there was an intellectual argument for the enhanced deterrence that came from the UK as a second centre of nuclear decision making. While the Soviet Union might have come to believe that the US would be unwilling to risk a strategic nuclear exchange on behalf of Europe, the presence of British, French and NATO weapons made such an assessment much less likely. With the end of the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved. Former enemies have joined NATO and the EU. Russia has established close relations with NATO, and is no longer seen as having territorial ambitions.
There are currently no nuclear weapon states which threaten the United Kingdom. Thus the UK minimum deterrent force of four Trident submarines has no enemy to deter. Nevertheless, a decision to abandon the UK's nuclear weapon status cannot be made purely on the basis of normal threat analysis. It would be extremely unlikely that such a decision could be reversed if circumstances changed. Therefore a careful assessment of costs and benefits to UK security need to be made before such an irrevocable step is taken. This essay analyses the key issues of future threats, resource implications, international status, arms control and options for the future. It assumes that nuclear weapons can have no other purpose for the United Kingdom than as a deterrent. The taboo on their use for warfighting has strengthened over the years since 1945, and must be maintained.
When we look at the nuclear problem, we find that it remains limited in scope. The states with a known nuclear weapon capability are in alphabetical order: China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, UK and US. Somewhat strangely, current western policy seems to accept all of these as being to a greater or lesser extent all right. Counter-proliferation policy is not really directed at any of the 8 in a serious way. North Korea claims to have a nuclear capability, which if true is rudimentary. Yet some of these capabilities affect regional stability. Israel would argue that its nuclear weapons provide a deterrent against attack by WMD or overwhelming conventional force in an area with virtually no strategic depth. Its Arab neighbours are concerned to be threatened by nuclear capability without their own ability to deter. This gives a strategic rationale for Iraq, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt to pursue such capabilities. Similarly, we can see the concerns raised by the India-Pakistan-China nuclear weaponry on each other, and on neighbours. A North Korean nuclear capability has implications for not just South Korea, but also for Japan and beyond. A longer term policy aim must be to reduce this dependence on nuclear and WMD capability.
In terms of missile delivery systems, the nations either operating or developing capabilities for missiles of over 500km range are: the 5 nuclear weapon states, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Taiwan. All of the proliferators are in reaction to regional rather than global balances of power, although gaining a nuclear capability would change their status within the international community. Iran is active in its development of both cruise and ballistic missiles. Libya has tried unsuccessfully to obtain strategic missile technology, but has now opened up to inspection and co-operation. We have also become more aware of how a policy of isolating proliferators can make them sell on their technology. Following the Iraq regime change of 2003, the focus for international attention has been on Iran and North Korea.
While the state to state WMD problem remains, the more difficult problem is that of non-state actors. The West possibly faces three different types of security threats: al-Qaeda type fanatical terrorists; terrorists furthering a regional power agenda, and perhaps insurgents taking operations back to the occupying forces' homeland. None of these is very likely to have a nuclear explosive capability, but all could be prepared to use it if they gained one. In this, the stability of Pakistan is a particular concern, as well as the long known problem of nuclear material in post-Soviet Russia. None of the potential terrorist users are likely to be deterred by counter threats. The most effective methods to be adopted will be the traditional counter terrorist intelligence, police and protective measures.
Since the end of the Cold War, the UK has taken all of its nuclear weapons out of service apart from the remaining Trident ballistic missile systems based on 4 submarines. After the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 1998, even the numbers of those missiles and warheads per missile were further reduced. UK nuclear forces now number 4 submarines each with a maximum of 16 missiles carrying a maximum total of 48 warheads in one submarine. The total warhead stockpile is under 200, which makes the UK the smallest of the five official nuclear weapon states, and it may even have fewer than Israel. Nevertheless 48 nuclear weapons represents a devastating power. The SDR recognised that this could be inappropriate and hence incredible. It said therefore:
"The credibility of deterrence also depends on retaining an option for a limited strike that would not automatically lead to a full scale nuclear exchange. Unlike Polaris and Chevaline, Trident must also be capable of performing this 'sub-strategic' role."
What was not explained in any more detail was the thinking behind this sub-strategic task. Presumably it was for occasions when one or two nuclear weapons might be sufficient to show resolve in some unspecified future crisis. However the SDR was quite clear on the circumstances under which UK nuclear weapons could and could not be used. It repeated what is known as the Negative Security Assurance, and spelled out what that assurance means:
"Britain has repeatedly made it clear that we will not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state not in material breach of its nuclear non-proliferation obligations, unless it attacks us, our Allies or a state to which we have a security commitment, in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state. Britain has also undertaken to seek immediate UN Security Council action to assist any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that is attacked or threatened with nuclear weapons."
This assurance is designed to act as an encouragement to non nuclear weapon states to stay that way, and is a sensible diplomatic approach to dissuade potential proliferators. That said, like any assurance given in peaceful times, it will probably not be believed by an enemy at times of crisis. Thus Saddam Hussein may have been deterred from using chemical weapons during the first Gulf War, because he believed that there was a possibility of western nuclear retaliation. Deterrence can happen without explicit statements.
The British Government has indicated that it needs to consider relatively soon what to do about the nuclear deterrent capability in anticipation that the current system will need replacement. It has not been clear on why a decision is needed so early. The original decision on the Trident programme was announced on 15 July 1980 and the first boat was operational in 1994 with a planned life of 30 years. Trident D5 itself was an overly sophisticated procurement, but at the height of the Cold War was seen as a good "off-the-shelf" deal with the US. By the time it came into service, the Cold War was over, and a much less complex system would have sufficed. If any successor system were to take as long, a decision would be needed in 2010 for the first replacement in 2024. This could be extended by the phased changeover as the fourth Trident submarine does not go out of service until 2029.
Most weapon systems are kept in service for far longer than originally planned. They receive mid-life extensions to keep them viable. They may change their method of operating in later life to further extend their time in service. Nuclear systems are no different, and it might be expected that Trident could be operated well beyond the current expected out of service dates. There are no defences in prospect that would reduce its deterrent effect. Thus one option is continuation of the current minimum deterrent force for the indefinite future, with life extension work when necessary. Given the lack of any enemy with advanced countermeasures, it is possible that the Trident system could be operated on more constrained deployments if necessary.
Now state based threats are much reduced, it is difficult to outline a convincing scenario in which the UK deterrent plays a key part. However we have seen very great changes in the international security situation over the past two decades. Looking forward over a similar period, we cannot discount equally dramatic upheavals. On current plans, a replacement system would have to counter possible challenges in the period 2025 to 2055. We have no crystal ball to tell us whether the threats will be from undeterrable non-state actors, or from a return to nationalism with nuclear-armed potential enemies. Nor can we know if the world will have become more peaceful, and nuclear weapons a historic irrelevance. This uncertainty underpins the strategic rationale for continuing to deploy a nuclear weapons capability. By the middle of the century, the international power structures could have changed markedly, and our successors might regret a decision taken now, which deprived them of a deterrent option, or had committed them to a system which had no relevance to the circumstances of the day.
Some would claim a further strategic justification beyond the defence rationale. They argue that Britain's place in the world is in part related to its nuclear status. While such arguments may have had some credibility in the immediate post Second World War period, economic strength has become a more important factor in the age of globalisation. In any future reform of the United Nations, membership of the Security Council will not be decided on the basis of nuclear weapon ownership. Only in the field of arms control will nuclear status continue to offer a special status at international negotiations.
A more compelling foreign policy rationale for retaining the minimum deterrent force is that it gives the UK a significant card to play in future nuclear disarmament negotiations. All the nuclear powers have undertaken commitments under the Non Proliferation Treaty progressively to reduce their nuclear arsenals. The UK retains some leverage on this process while it has some weapons.
In any analysis of future defence capability, the question of costs must be a major consideration. Acquisition of Trident cost £12.52 bn at 1998 prices, while current running costs are around £700m per year. Just as Trident procurement was described in 1982 as being comparable to the Tornado acquistion, we might expect a successor system to bear comparison with Typhoon or aircraft carrier procurement costs. Some argue that the next generation of nuclear weapons may be designed to be smaller and carried by cruise missiles. These missiles would replace similar conventional weapons on submarines, ships or aircraft. However, it is unlikely that any nuclear certified system can be procured cheaply. Design costs, safety requirements will drive costs up. There are also costs associated with the decommissioning of the current system. Disposal of nuclear powered submarines and redundant warheads will be a significant cost to the defence budget. Changes to the planned dates for removal from service will have consequential effects on the defence programme. An early removal will cause extra unplanned expenditure; a delay will ease defence budget pressures.
A related, but separate, cost question will be whether the need for a particular system merits its share of the defence budget. The effect on other conventional capabilities – the opportunity costs – are likely to be considerable. The defence budget is under progressive strain through the tightening effect of greater than normal inflation. Military personnel and equipment costs rise at rates above that of domestic inflation. With budgets limited in real terms, this results in year on year cuts in the size of armed forces. Provision of a nuclear weapon system, which has no utility virtually all security challenges, will use funds that would provide for tasks that armed forces are undertaking on a regular basis.
To make the judgement on the way forward, the key issue is to seek the approach has the best prospect of providing, and if possible enhancing, long-term security for the UK. This requires an approach which will not adversely affect international secuirty. The relatively low running costs of Trident, coupled with high decommissioning costs, mean that there is no strong rationale for taking it out of service early, unless that could be shown to provide plausible security benefits. Maintenance of the current minimum deterrent posture does not stimulate proliferation, or carry any significant risks of accidental use. If some future international arms control opportunity arose, where we could improve our security by reducing or eliminating our nuclear weapons, then it would be a different calculation. Such a possibility does not look likely currently, but over the next two decades there may be new initiatives. If global reductions in nuclear weapons could be achieved through the UK putting its capability on the negotiating table, then security could be enhanced.
Any radically new nuclear system, whether ballistic or cruise missile based, would involve significant development costs for the platform, missile and warhead. Such costs would put further pressure on a defence budget which is already finding it difficult to retain coherence. Nor is it clear that such systems could contribute to our security needs beyond deterring indeterminate future nuclear threats. The constraints of the NPT would cause further complications.
If Trident becomes limited in its capability through age, then using it in a more constrained mode can be considered. The need for long underwater patrols was a requirement of the Cold War, when second strike survivability was the key deterrence factor. Indeed, there will be many decision points in the years ahead about how much to invest in extending the life of the Trident system. A sustained improvement in the international security situation might allow for storage of weapons separate from the missiles at some future date, with the submarines maintained in dock on a care and maintenance basis.
It is clear that the prudent way forward today is to keep the Trident system going with life extension programmes, when needed. We can have a useful public debate about the future of UK nuclear weapons, but we would be foolish to rush into decisions that are likely to prove costly and irrelevant.
Tim Garden is the Liberal Democrat Defence spokesman in the Lords, a former nuclear bomber pilot and the author of a book on nuclear strategy.