Assured forecasts of the security environment out to 2050 are impossible. We can only make some assertions about broad trends We can be fairly certain that climate change will be having serious consequences, and we can worry that that may lead to more conflict. Energy security may be a big security concern, and may have led to more availability of nuclear material. Populations will have increased with India the largest followed by China, but Europe perhaps declining. What this means for balance of powers is conjecture, but is likely to mean a different kind of world. Just look back 45 years and think of the unexpected global security changes that we have seen. After the Cuban missile crisis, we have seen the building and demolishing of the Berlin Wall in this period. More recently, we have seen international terrorism change strategic thinking after 9/11.
In looking at putting together the short section on the future security environment, we have narrowed our focus to those aspects that are relevant to the Trident replacement decision. We take as our fundamental start point that the only purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter the use of other nuclear weapons. They have no military utility. We also take the view that deterrence against a non state actor, a nuclear armed terrorist, is not possible using UK (or other) nuclear forces.
This means that the relevant security issue is what we expect the future to hold in terms of states which might threaten nuclear attack on us, or perhaps on our allies. If we see maintenance of the deterrent as an insurance policy against an uncertain future, assessment of this risk is a key issue. After, 60 years of the nuclear age, only 8 or 9 (if North Korea is included) states have become nuclear weapon states. The non-proliferation regime has been fairly effective. Can it be made more so, or will it become looser. Which states do we fear? Here we need also to consider whether our relations with current nuclear powers might deteriorate, as well as considering those countries that we think might wish to acquire a capability to threaten us. In this respect we have to consider future relations with Russia and China, as well as the implications of North Korea, Iran and perhaps others developing intercontinental range capabilities. We also have to consider implications of changes in our relationship with the US against this long timescale.
However, the look at the future strategic environment should not just be a worst case analysis. We need to consider if our actions in the nuclear field can shape the future for reductions in nuclear threats. In the end we shall be making a judgment in a very important area of national security. The question will be whether a British nuclear deterrent remains necessary to deter a threat, which currently does not exist, but which we believe has a finite probability of emerging. If we answer that question in the affirmative, we shall also have to be prepared to say why the argument does not apply to other countries.