This week the world remembered the events of 11 September 2001on its fifth anniversary. It was perhaps for many of you a first international event which you recollect. It is a commonplace to say that the world changed on 9/11 with the destruction of the World Trade Centre in New York. Certainly this unprecedented form of terror attack set in train a series of responses, which are still ricocheting around the world. The wave of global sympathy for the United States in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks were a unique opportunity for the international community to act together to formulate a coherent long term strategic plan. Unfortunately, the opportunity was lost, and a series of short term tactical moves have made the future much less certain. The problems today with Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran are all inter-connected, and our strategy seems inadequate.
A good chess player must analyse a game many moves ahead, and the foreign policy expert should adopt a similar approach. Unpredictable events may occur, but they should not deflect us from the long term aim. The requirement after the terrorist outrages was to prevent further such attacks. This meant defensive measures at home, and offensive action at the source of the threat.
Let me look first at Afghanistan, because that was where the initial response to the terror attacks on America was seen.
Afghanistan was identified as the epicentre of al-Qaeda training, where a compliant Taleban authoritarian regime was in a symbiotic relationship with the architects of 9/11. The US-led attacks on the training camps and the Taleban rule were necessary and were supported by the international community. However, Western leaders accepted that they should not have left the country to radicalise after the end of the Cold War, and promised that they would not make the same mistake again. On 22 October 2001, the British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, in a speech to the IISS laid out an ambitious and expensive international plan for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, once al-Qaeda had been destroyed. Military victory, in the sense of the fall of the Taleban, was achieved by the end of that year.
While the difficult task of post-conflict reconstruction, constitution building and seeking donors made a reasonable start, the US Adminstration was diverted by the perceived threat from Iraq during 2002. As the diplomatic temperature rose over Saddam's supposed weapons of mass destruction, the spotlight on Afghanistan dimmed. Hamad Karzai's call for 50,000 troops to help restore the rule of law was answered with just one tenth of that number limited to the Kabul area. Even as the political process advanced, the warlords consolidated their control in some regions, and the opium poppy fields were resown. The US forces in Afghanistan concentrated their efforts on Operation Enduring Freedom, the continuing war against al-Qaeda in the East of the country, and paid scant attention to the reconstruction task. In due course NATO took on this stabilising role, and provided small reconstruction teams to a number of towns in the north and west of the country.
This has left the South and East of the country to fester over nearly five years, and NATO has agreed that it must push its reconstruction effort into these more hostile areas.The focus this week has been very much on what NATO is going to do. It has been difficult to get agreement over which troops to deploy, and it has not proved possible to merge the US offensive operations into the NATO reconstruction tasks. This may prove to be particularly unfortunate in the lawless areas where the opium harvest is the main source of income. But at last, the international community is trying to deliver on its earlier promises. As is so often the case, leaving a problem makes it much more difficult to solve later.
The bottom line on Afghanistan is that it was a threat to us in the past with the training of international terrorists, and unless we help the new Afghan government it will become one again. We must also look at how we can move it away from a dependence on the drug economy, which again feeds into the west.
The military intervention of March 2003 in Iraq has been justified by the US and its allies in a number of different ways. Nevertheless, one aim was certainly to remove any long term threat that Iraq might pose to its neighbours or beyond, and perhaps also to create a centre of stability with shared western values. Three years on, the outlook remains gloomy. While the moves towards a democratic government through the constitutional referendum and the December elections give some cause for hope, the security situation and the continuing infrastructure problems undermine confidence. The multinational forces are rightly seen by most Iraqis as foreign occupiers, who should leave as soon as practicable. Yet the new Constitution has yet to engender the necessary sense of unity between the Kurdish north, the Sunni centre and the Shia south.
The security problems are from multiple sources: insurgents, extremists, militias, armed criminals, and inter ethnic conflict. It would be a problem for any western police force to deal with in their own country. We saw in Northern Ireland, in a much less hostile environment, how long it took to win the confidence and support of all elements of the local population. It will be much more difficult for the embryonic Iraq security forces to achieve stability. Meanwhile the US, UK and other western forces try to hold the ring until Iraqi security forces are sufficiently well trained, and have experienced leadership.
We see now the signs of a breakdown in governance is some areas. A US military report leaked this month has shown that Anbar province is now no longer under any central government control. The death rates have risen very significantly particularly in Baghdad. Much of the violence is between Sunni and Shia which makes a civil war seem more likely. The constitution also made it possible for regions to become more independent, as the Kurds in the north have already done. It looks as though the Shias in the South are pushing strongly for a similar arrangement, and many fear that this will lead to a splitting up of Iraq.
The bottom line on Iraq is that there is little sign that it will be better in the near term, and there will be very difficult decisions for those nations, particularly the US and UK, as to when they decide that the presence of their troops is doing nothing to help the situation.
The Iraq adventure has had a number of unfortunate consequences. Most should have been foreseen by those who advocated the intervention of March 2003. In each arena that we intervene, as the Balkans showed, the post conflict phase absorbs large numbers of troops and considerable funds for many years. Regular professional armies are much smaller than the vast forces that could be conscripted in the past. The result has been a real difficulty in sustaining sufficient forces year after year in post conflict trouble spots. Three years on in Iraq, the US are still fielding over 120,000, and the UK have 8000 troops. Both forces take casualties on a regular basis. In Afghanistan, the forces will be increased to meet the new tasks. They also take casualties on a regular basis.
The western militaries which have been engaged in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Africa, Iraq and elsewhere are all suffering from overuse. This means that they have had to call too much on their Reservists to plug gaps, and they are depleting their ability to react to extra burdens. It may be that the periods individuals are prepared to serve in the military decrease, and experience levels will suffer. This will result in even the US being less powerful in its military capacity despite its enormous defence budget.
This year we have also had a new crisis which has led to a call for more European and other troops in a peacekeeping role. The short but very violent intervention by Israel against Lebanon, after the seizing of two soldiers by Hezbollah based in Lebanon has resulted in an uneasy ceasefire. The Israelis want the Southern part of Lebanon cleared of Hezbollah to prevent them using their rockets to target Israel. This is another requirement for troops as policemen. Lebanon was emerging as one of the more successful Arab countries, but is now in great difficulty after the bombing by Israel.
Israel blames Iran for supporting Hezbollah and supplying weapons to it through Syria. This has added to the feeling that something must be done about Iran.
Four years ago President Bush promoted Iran to the "axis of evil", alongside Iraq and North Korea. This was unfortunate as Iran was a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and had a more developed form of governance than many nations of the region. Nevertheless, it was entirely likely that it wanted to keep a nuclear option open. It had fought a bloody war of attrition with Iraq in the '80s, and Iraq was said by the West to be arming itself with WMD. It had nuclear neighbours in Pakistan, Russia, and Israel. It also feared intervention by the US. However, it might have been that with Iraq neutralised, the diplomatic and economic route adopted for disarming Libya could have worked with Iran.
Meanwhile, western entanglement in Iraq has given a new dimension to the regional strategic balance. Iran presumably feared the rise of a reconstructed Iraq under US influence, which could threaten it again. It has watched the growing power of the Shia community through the Iraqi elections with relief. If anarchy were to lead to fragmentation, Iran would see advantage in aligning with the Shias to form an enlarged Islamic state. It can therefore see advantage whether Iraq is stable or not.
Iranian politics are complex. However, it is likely that President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad would consolidate his position further if Iran were isolated or feared attack. It may therefore be to his personal advantage to be confrontational is his dealings with the international community.
Finally in these interlocking crisis areas of the greater middle east, I must mention Israel-Palestine. While the UN, the US and the world argues that the only just settlement is for two states leaving in harmony, we seem ever further from achieving it. The Palestinians have a feeling of deep injustice about the seizure of their lands to establish the state of Israel. Israel feels that it is threatened by terrorists based on Palestinian areas. The election of Hamas – viewed as a terrorist organistaion - as the Palestinian government has divided the two even more, and has also made life much more difficult for the ordinary Palestinian.
It is time to stand back from the chess board and take a long look at progress so far. Is the piecemeal strategy working for the West? The threat from extremist terrorism is now worse than it was five years ago. More Muslims have been radicalised. Afghanistan is supplying Europe's heroin and thus increasing international crime and corruption, as well as still providing safe havens for terrorists. Iraq is broken and lawless in some parts. Its citizens die violently at the hands of extremists, criminals and insurgents.
Iran makes threats to Israel, and flaunts its nuclear enrichment aspirations. It threatens to use its energy exports as a counter to any international sanctions regime. It can incite violence in Iraq without difficulty. Meanwhile, the Israel-Palestine and the Israel-Lebanon problem fires radicalism further, and gives electoral success to Hamas and Hezbollah.
While it is clearer now than ever that the intervention in Iraq is the major cause of our many difficulties, we have to deal with world as it now is. Afghanistan must be helped, and it will cost more in cash and casualties than it need have done. But we cannot ignore it as it is remains a twofold threat from drugs as well as terrorism. Iraq and Iran cannot be compartmentalised given the geography and history. Isolating Iran and a long term occupation in Iraq will deepen the problems. Difficult as it is, a way to re-engage with Iran must be found. Nor can the problems around Israel be left to fester.
Unfortunately, the signs are that little has been learned by the key decision makers over the past 5 years. While we advocate the ballot box for the countries of the region, we refuse to face up to the consequences of uncongenial outcomes. Nor do we treat the people as our equals. Injustice turns to anger, and anger to violence. Meeting this with military intervention can only perpetuate the cycle.