We have moved into a somewhat confused period for Western policy on countering the threats from nuclear weapons. We look back on the period of the Cold War almost with nostalgia where the mixture of deterrence, confidence building and arms control appeared to offer an intellectually coherent approach to a very dangerous strategic situation. Proliferation was constrained, and much slower than many had predicted. The mass killing on 11 September 2001 has made the previously theoretical risks of non-state actors acquiring nuclear capabilities appear much more realistic.
Yet, it is difficult today for a medium sized democratic nuclear power, the United Kingdom, to articulate the purpose of its nuclear capability. There are currently no nuclear weapon states which threaten the United Kingdom. Thus the UK minimum deterrent force of four Trident submarines has no enemy to deter. Nevertheless, a decision to abandon the UK's nuclear weapon status cannot be made purely on the basis of current threat analysis. It would be extremely unlikely that such a decision could be reversed if circumstances changed. Therefore a careful assessment of the overall likely costs and benefits to UK security need to be made before such an irrevocable step is taken.
Now state based threats are much reduced, it is difficult to outline a convincing scenario in which the UK deterrent plays a key part. However we have seen very great changes in the international security situation over the past two decades. Looking forward over a similar period, we cannot discount equally dramatic upheavals. On current plans, a replacement system would have to counter possible challenges in the period 2025 to 2055. We have no crystal ball to tell us whether the threats will be from undeterrable non-state actors, or from a return to nationalism with nuclear-armed potential enemies. Nor can we know if the world will have become focused on other uniting security challenges, and nuclear weapons by then a historic irrelevance. This uncertainty underpins the strategic rationale for continuing to sustain a nuclear weapons capability. By the middle of the century, the international power structures could have changed markedly. Indeed, among the uncertainties must be our relations with the US over this timescale. They have in the past denied nuclear co-operation with the UK, and might once again. Our successors might regret a decision taken now, which either deprived them of a deterrent option, or alternatively had committed them unnecessarily to a system which had no relevance to the circumstances of the day.
Some would claim a further strategic justification beyond the defence rationale. They argue that Britain's place in the world is in part related to its nuclear status. While such arguments may have had some credibility in the immediate post Second World War period, economic strength has become a more important factor in the age of globalisation. In any future reform of the United Nations, membership of the Security Council will not be decided on the basis of nuclear weapon ownership.
Only in the field of arms control will nuclear status continue to offer a special status at international negotiations. For me, a more compelling status rationale for retaining the minimum deterrent force is that it gives the UK a significant card to play in future nuclear disarmament negotiations. All the nuclear powers have undertaken commitments under the Non Proliferation Treaty progressively to reduce their nuclear arsenals. The UK retains some leverage on this process while it has some weapons.
As we look at the options, they seem to me to fall into three main groups in terms of strategic planning, rather than detailed descriptions of systems. First, we could make the decision now to get out of the nuclear weapon business – and then play with the timing to gain maximum international effect. General Lee Butler's piece in International Affairs may be ten year's old, but is still a powerful argument. Michael MccGwire also makes the argument for the UK to renounce its nuclear capability, adding that it would add the benefit of decoupling us from the US.
Second, we could make the decision now that a nuclear deterrent is as Julian Lewis says in his piece, "an unpleasant necessity" which counters a threat so overwhelming that no other military capability could avert it. Therefore we must insure against the future uncertainties by keeping our deterrent up to date.
The third strategic option seems to me to be that we give ourselves the best opportunity to make the right decision. The safe play is to keep options open as long as they appear to be needed or are not counter to our security interests. That means not making an irrevocable decision before it is necessary. Forecasting out to the middle of the century is an imprecise science, but as the years go by, it will the strategic context should become a little clearer.
The British Government has indicated that it needs to consider relatively soon what to do about the nuclear deterrent capability in anticipation that the current system will need replacement. Gordon Brown seems to have made his decision. Yet, it has not been clear on why a decision is needed so early. The original decision on the Trident programme was announced on 15 July 1980 and the first boat was operational in 1994 with a planned life of 30 years. If any successor system were to take as long, a decision would be needed in 2010 for the first replacement in 2024. The Defence Select Committee on quite conservative assumptions take this decision date up to 2014.
Most weapon systems are kept in service for far longer than originally planned. They receive mid-life extensions to keep them viable. They may change their method of operating in later life to further extend their time in service. Nuclear systems are no different, and it might be expected that Trident could be operated well beyond the current expected out of service dates. The US has adopted this model for both the missiles and its submarines and extended the system life out to the 2040s.
There is one other dimension that needs to be thrown into the analysis – and that is the question of opportunity costs. Spending in one area, in this case the deterrent, implies less spending in some other area – most probably conventional forces. Keith Hartley writes about the economics reminding us that Trident cost £15 bn to procure at today's prices, and helpfully shows what conventional equipment that would buy for our hard pressed armed forces. We need perhaps to remember that we are asking much more in sustained operations of our military now than we did during the Cold War when defence spending was more than twice the proportion of GDP that it is today. Paul Rogers' article draws our attention to the distortion that would happen to UK defence with both the Trident and aircraft carrier programmes dominating defence spending, when the kinds of operations that we face are not primarily maritime in nature.
These arguments seem to me to argue for looking for the lowest cost options where the spend profile is least damaging to other important aspects of defence – as Michael Quinlan indicates in his article.
To make the judgement on the way forward, the key issue is to seek the approach has the best prospect of providing, and if possible enhancing, long-term security for the UK. This requires an approach which will not adversely affect international security. The relatively low running costs of Trident, coupled with decommissioning costs, mean that there is no strong rationale for taking it out of service early, unless that could be shown to provide plausible security benefits. Maintenance of the current minimum deterrent posture does not stimulate proliferation, or carry any significant risks of accidental use. If some future international arms control opportunity arose, where we could improve our security by reducing or eliminating our nuclear weapons, then it would be a different calculation. Such a possibility does not look likely currently, but over the next two decades there may be new initiatives. If global reductions in nuclear weapons could be achieved through the UK putting its capability on the negotiating table, then security could be enhanced.
Any radically new nuclear system, whether ballistic or cruise missile based, would involve significant development costs for the platform, missile and warhead. Such costs would put further pressure on a defence budget which is already finding it difficult to retain coherence. Nor is it clear that such systems could contribute to our security needs beyond deterring indeterminate future nuclear threats from states. The constraints of the NPT might cause further complications.
If Trident becomes limited in its capability through age, then using it in a more constrained mode can be considered as the Defence Select Committee report has suggested. The need for long underwater patrols was a requirement of the Cold War, when second strike survivability was the key deterrence factor. Four submarines were not really needed even then. Indeed, there will be many decision points in the years ahead about how much to invest in extending the life of the Trident system.
It is clear to me that the prudent way forward for the moment is to keep the Trident system going with life extension programmes, when needed. We can have a useful public debate about the future of UK nuclear weapons, but we would be foolish to rush into decisions that are likely to prove costly and irrelevant.