I could tackle this question in a number of different ways. The most stimulating, but probably least useful, would be to say " in a rational world, what missions should the EU be prepared to undertake?". That would have been a session for the start of the day, and then we could have discussed how we could have given the EU the necessary capabilities for such missions. In the light of our earlier discussions, we might have looked at a European nuclear deterrent, or EU counter-proliferation forces. But we know that is not going to happen in the forseeable future. I can of course take the mirror image approach and ask, in the light of our discussions so far, what capabilities do I realistically think the EU will have over say the next 5 years, and what does that mean for the missions that are feasible. In either case however we have the question of what missions, EU member states are willing to see the EU undertake – and to an extent given the NATO/EU relationship, we also have to question what the US feels about any given EU mission.
My start point is the ESS paper assertion that the EU is a global actor and that it should be ready to share in he responsibility for global security. The 2010 Goals also give us a clearer idea of what EU heads of state think is possible.
"Member States have decided to commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond to with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations. This includes humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. As indicated by the ESS this might also include joint disarmament operations, the support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The EU must be able to act before a crisis occurs and preventive engagement can avoid that a situation deteriorates. The EU must retain the ability to conduct concurrent operations thus sustaining several operations simultaneously at different levels of engagement.”
Given the experience of attempting to put together European contributions to the more challenging areas in Afghanistan under the NATO label, and the lack of enthusiasm for entanglement in Iraq, I think we must assume that EU missions, for the forseeable future, will need UN agreement, be self evidently about stabilisation, with the agreement of the host country, and that full scale military intervention to impose order – unless a direct threat to Europe – is not on the agenda. This begs the question of whether NATO is going to find the NRF development makes any great difference to the utility of European forces, and whether we will see much in terms of capability improvements at the high end of warfighting.
The successes have been where the EU has worked with the grain rather than trying to impose an external solution. Bosnia is possible because NATO had brought it to a position where the mix of civil-military inputs were better provided by the EU. The carrot of eventual EU membership helps as well. The Congo Artemis operation was a set of circumstances where a small force could hold a crisis situation until the larger UN force could be assembled. It was limited in size, scope and duration. Hesitation over Darfur has shown the limits of such operations.
These operations have shown that the EU can provide capabilities that make a difference. The easy answer to this future missions question is that there will be more of the same. As the Balkans progress, we shall see the EU doing more both on the military and civil side. When there are crises further afield which need small rapid deployments to hold a deteriorating situation, EU forces will be an option. I find it difficult to envisage more challenging scenarios in the near term. And the fact that it is difficult to envisage, will have a consequential effect on the willingness to equip for more challenging environments.
If there is little enthusiasm for new missions, how far can we excite member states to take on more tasks? We were asked to be provocative in the is session, and so I shall conclude by putting one proposal on the table, which I think could be a mission which the EU should take on, and would be attractive to citizens. Indeed it is already within the task definitions, but we are not properly organised or equipped for it.
All natural disasters have a number of common demands for which military resources are well suited. Rapid response saves lives. We have seen in the Tsunami, in New Orleans, in Pakistan and now in Indonesia how long it takes to get help to those who survive the initial event. There is also the problem caused by the destruction to the road, rail and airports links. Professional armed forces can provide leadership, and rapidly deployable elements. In combat, they expect to be denied the use of normal routes such as road and rail, and equip themselves appropriately.
An army expects to have to deal with battle casualties suffering from life threatening injuries and trauma. Allocating priorities to save the many comes naturally. In adopting a new disaster security role, forces would have to be kept at high readiness for rapid deployment. This is expensive, and can be achieved more easily at the European level, with nations rotating elements through the force, than at the national level where such a capability is required continuously.
Europe should devote a proportion of its military effort to providing deployable emergency task forces. They would include helicopters, paramedics, field hospitals, engineers and infantry. The more nations that provide such capabilities, the more likely that a timely response will be available wherever a disaster strikes. The EU could take up the requirement to provide the more expensive specialist equipment on a pooled basis. They could also organise training and set standards so that multinational effort would be easier.
If disaster relief were to become a new primary task for the EU, there would need to be a change in the current priorities. But a move towards more air transport – both helicopter and fixed wing, specialist troops and reconstruction equipment could have wider benefits. In Afghanistan, NATO is fielding reconstruction teams to help rebuild the society. Their composition is not that different from what would be needed for a disaster relief force. Thus if the Europe did more in this respect, the troops would have wider utility when other units took on the short notice standby for an emergency.
There will be arguments made against having forces held at high readiness which cannot be used for other operations. Yet the experience of the last two years shows that there is no lack of business for disaster relief. It does of course also have an effect on how Europe is perceived in the world where these disasters strike. An emergency response force would also be able to cope with the consequences of a large scale terrorist attack within the EU. This would seem to be a mission where Europe could provide a military capability which would be attractive to electorates, and have wider benefits to operations being done under the NATO or coalition banners. Success in this field might then lead to the wider missions which some still hope for.