Lord Garden: My Lords, we on these Benches also supported the intervention in Afghanistan after the terrible events of 9/11. We supported the Foreign Secretary's remarks at that time that we had to carry out reconstruction in Afghanistan after the international community had abandoned it at the end of the Cold War. We have been saddened that the focus on Iraq has meant that progress in Afghanistan has been much slower than it should have been. While advances have been made in some respects, we still have lawlessness and a flourishing opium harvest after four years of operations there. We therefore strongly support the principle of the UK contributing both military and civil aid. The military element which the Statement described as peaking at 5,700 is a very substantial force.
Writing in the Financial Times on Monday, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO's Secretary-General, said:
• "Nato's operation in Afghanistan . . . is the most ambitious mission in Nato's history".
When he talked about the overlap of the American Operation Enduring Freedom and NATO's one, he said:
• "Nato's mission is different and it is distinct. With this in mind, allies have agreed command arrangements to ensure that the two missions do not get in each other's way".
We on these Benches have concerns over potential problems from two military organisations with overlapping areas of responsibility, different doctrine and different missions. It is not ideal. The Minister talked about the transition period when British forces will be moving effectively from being part of Operation Enduring Freedom to being under NATO. We would like assurances that that can be managed, given the NATO Secretary-General's problems.
On the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps headquarters—we are the framework nation, and it will be a task for about 1,000 of our troops—we agree that it is sensible to go to an enlarged headquarters for an enlarged mission. The Statement says that the ARRC headquarters mission is for nine months, from May through to February next year. The problem is, what other headquarters will be available to take over next February? What does the Minister think are the options for an enlarged headquarters other than the ARRC come next February? Should we be planning on a sustained commitment there?
The second aspect relates to the forces contributing to stage 3 in the south of Afghanistan. Everyone agrees that this is a challenging environment—as challenging as the eastern area of Afghanistan, according to some analysts—and the task is important if we are to stabilise Afghanistan. But it is not going to be quick or easy, as the Defence Secretary said earlier today in the other place.
NATO has been having prolonged discussions on the force generation to meet this southern, stage 3 task and the questions of who will provide the forces, how big the forces are and how they are configured. The Statement indicates that that process is not yet complete as regards at least the Dutch, Australian, New Zealand and Danish forces. Before the main deployment takes place, we need to ensure that we know what kind of force we are going to have. Indeed, at the Defence Select Committee on 17 January, a MoD official said of the Defence Secretary's position:
• "The final condition was that there was a properly populated NATO plan".
Surely that means that we need to know which NATO allies are going to provide which forces. Can the Minister tell us when that agreement is likely to come about, given that many of the Parliaments still have to decide? Meanwhile, I think it entirely sensible that preparations for the preliminary deployments referred to in the Statement are carried out.
I agree totally with the noble Lord, Lord Astor of Hever, on the question of rules of engagement. We need harmonised rules of engagement and a harmonised doctrine for adjacent forces. Given the NATO Secretary-General's remarks, there seems to be a problem over that. Can the Minister explain how it will work in the UK's area of responsibility in the very hostile south?
The question of the size of the force is a judgment for the Chiefs of Staff. I accept the assurances given on that but I hope that they have got it right by having sufficient reserves of force capability there.
I am delighted to see that the Statement also focuses on the important roles that the attack and support helicopters will play in this operation. Remembering the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, I recall that helicopter losses was its greatest problem. We need to ensure that we have adequate safeguards for our helicopters. The Statement is not entirely clear whether we are talking about six Chinooks or nine Chinooks. Three are going out with the preliminary force from one of the squadrons, and then there will be another six. Will the force ultimately be nine Chinooks or will it reduce back to six?
I ask one last question of the Minister. I hear that troops are now being told that deployments will be for eight months—rather than six month, as they were—before roulement happens. Is there a change of policy? If so, does the Minister believe that this will affect retention and the long-term health of the services? If we are going to extend each deployment, will there be a proportionate one-third increase in the space between deployments?
What we have heard today in the Statement—and I am grateful to the Minister for relaying it—is an important step forward in the future of Afghanistan. But we know that the deployment is going to be long and hard and that it is going to be a great task for our military and civilian components out there. From these Benches we wish them every success.