by Sir Timothy Garden
Media reports have been coming thick and fast about the British military taking the lead in a UN peacekeeping force to be deployed to Afghanistan before Christmas. As fast as the reports come in, the MOD issues statements denying that any such commitment has been agreed. None of this is surprising. We are in a difficult transition period. The US led operation to eliminate terrorists and the Taleban still continues. Although the main combat area is now restricted to the Tora Bora tunnel complex in the East of the country, there are still operations in the south in and around Kandahar province. Meanwhile the surprisingly successful conference near Bonn between some of the Afghan players means that the UN is into the post-conflict reconstruction phase for most of the rest of the country. Finally, the humanitarian crisis has yet to be solved. The opening of a rail bridge in the North allows mass transit of supplies, but they still have to be distributed to all in need. The emergence of bandits and local warlords makes the distribution of aid by road an uncertain business.
The UN is keen to get some form of law order force in place with the implementation of the agreed political arrangements on 22 December. No one is yet certain what sort of force will be appropriate, and a great deal of staff work both internationally and within nations is going on. Hence the many media reports with apparently contradictory stories. From the British point of view, there is a fairly clear picture emerging. Indeed, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, the UK Chief of Defence Staff, outlined the factors to be considered in a remarkably candid on the record presentation to the Royal United Services Institute on 10 December.
The first requirement is a clear UN mandate for whatever stabilising/peacekeeping force is to be fielded. The nature of that mandate will depend on what the Afghans want. It would be a potential disaster if the international community were to attempt to impose an uninvited force on Afghanistan. That is not to say that diplomatic and economic pressure cannot be used to ensure that the invitation results in a sensible mandate. The next problem is the area of responsibility of such a force, which in turn will determine its size. Policing the whole of Afghanistan would need a force of perhaps 100,000 troops. It is difficult to see how such an international force could be mustered in less than 3 months. In any event, the US would have concerns if such a force seemed to be hampering the remaining operations against bin Laden and al-Qaeda. All this suggests that the initial deployment may be much smaller, and perhaps more localised in its remit.
It has been suggested that a force for Kabul would be a sensible place to start. In fact, Kabul seems to have fewer problems than most of the rest of the country. Nevertheless, it is obviously sensible to promote stability in the capital, and it would be a good place from which to direct the security of the humanitarian aid. British forces, and other European nations, have plenty of experience of these sorts of operations, particularly from Bosnia and Kosovo. The British Government attaches great importance to the rebuilding of Afghanistan, and it therefore is likely to be prepared to give tangible support through commitment of UK troops. Unfortunately, the British armed forces are now stretched to near breaking point. They remain on operations in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo, Falklands, Sierra Leone and over Iraq. They are already in Afghanistan. Increasing the presence there to a large contingent for an indefinite period would give great difficulties. It would be likely to make it impossible for the UK to follow the US into any next phase of the war on terrorism. Thus it seems likely that the UK will try to offer a modest force, which could act as the headquarters for any UN sponsored larger force. The hope would be to be able to call on many nations, both Western and Muslim, to help with the post-conflict reconstruction of Afghan society. Part of this will involve training Afghan peacekeepers so that they can take over the role as soon as possible.
All this is very logical, but the outcome may be more messy. Admiral Boyce warned of the danger of getting "our hand caught in the mangle" of Afghanistan. British forces are stretched amazingly thinly around the international crisis management scene. They may be good at peacekeeping, but even the best soldier can only be in one place at a time. And the deficiencies in manpower in the Services make the problem even worse. Tony Blair and Jack Straw have the best of motives in their strategy for Afghanistan, but they may find that the defence cupboard is bare after the continuing lack of investment in the well being of the servicemen