ACHIEVING THE HELSINKI HEADLINE GOALS

An Analysis of European Military Capabilities in the light of the process of developing forces to serve the European Security and Defence Policy

November 2001

Research directed by Professor Sir Timothy Garden and Professor Michael Clarke

at the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London

The research project, sponsored by the Ministry of Defence, was undertaken on the basis of a consortium of institutes in London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, The Hague and Stockholm to investigate ways of helping to achieve the Helsinki Headline Goals to create a military capability at the service of a European Security and Defence Policy.

Principal findings

The Helsinki Headline Goals (HHG) are due to be achieved by 2003, but in reality this is only the first step in what will be a far longer process The numbers of armed forces pledged to the HHG are not the key question: rather the quality of the performance of armed forces, and their availability and sustainability will be dependent on clusters of 'enabling capacities' of which the Europeans are somewhat short.

There is insufficient agreement on the scope of the Petersberg Tasks in crisis management which the HHG are designed to help facilitate. There is no consensus over how deeply into the realm of combat and war-fighting Petersberg Tasks will, or should, lead the Europeans.

Analysis of comparable work in NATO and within national defence plans reveals a series of areas where enabling capacities are likely to improve; in particular in strategic transport, air-to-air refuelling, amphibious capabilities, some aspects of joint, multinational headquarters, elements of ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance), satellite communication and satellite surveillance.

Such analysis also reveals important areas where they will not; in tactical transport, Air/Ground Surveillance (AGS) capabilities, suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD), data fusion and ground links, and all-weather precision offensive forces.

We propose a 3-tier model for enhancing progress towards the HHG.

1. Greater harmonisation at the EU level of the analysis of trends revealed in national defence plans and the creation of explicit methods of burden-sharing and auditing within the EU
2. Identification of the most useful existing multinational force arrangements, and the further development of those which can offer a framework for future initiatives
3. Identification of a range of ideas) to enhance capabilities through pooling, sharing and adopting elements of force integration.

In relation to '3', above, a good deal could be achieved at low cost and without undue political sensitivity through a range of initiatives to improve capacity at the European level. These could include contractorisation for certain functions such as motor transport, freight distribution, language training, equipment repair and base operations. Other initiatives would be possible in the field of air-to-air refuelling and air transport. More demanding, though feasible, initiatives could be adopted to create a police force and special forces at the European level, and at the most demanding level, a common aircraft carrier task force among the Europeans.

Very few parts of the HHG can be costed with any certainty, both because the level of enabling capacities required to perform Petersberg crisis management tasks still remains in dispute, and also because there is no agreed way among the European partners of accounting for military commitments and contributions made in the HHG framework.

On the basis of all the above, there is a clear immediate Agenda for Action which should be addressed at - or immediately after- the second Capabilities Commitments Conference between the EU partners on 19/20 November 2001.

The Agenda for Action

1. EU members need to agree urgently a detailed definition of the Petersberg Tasks, including the scale and intensity of operations envisaged. This should now include the internal and external military aspects of counter-terrorist operations in the light of the attacks of 11 September. There is no possibility of sensible measurement of achievement the HHG without this work.
2. A formal co-ordination system between the EU HHG process and the NATO DCI should be established so that priority can be given to those areas which improve both NATO and EU needed capabilities.
3. The EU needs to be involved in the national defence planning process of each member state. The individual long-term plans of members offer opportunities for coherence and harmonisation for greater efficiency. However, this can only happen if co-ordination occurs at an early stage in the planning cycle. In particular, member states should identify areas for contractorisation/privatisation at an early enough stage for EU-wide provision to be contemplated.
4. An EU sponsored review of the plethora of European multinational military arrangements should be undertaken. It should seek to identify those arrangements which should be built upon, and also those which have now become less useful.
5. The EU needs to put in hand formal accounting arrangements for the defence area. If any progress towards procuring key enablers at the EU level is to be made, the budget sharing arrangements will be needed.
6. EU member states should identify a small number of uncontroversial and near term projects, where a useful military capability could be provided on a pooled basis. These should be rigorously audited to provide data for future budgetary arrangements, and as indicators of the way ahead for the future.
7. A plan for the long-term development of the HHG process should formally be articulated, both for planning purposes and as a focus for public debate on the future of security among the EU members.

[Copies of the full report are available for the Centre for Defence Studies (tel 020 7 848 2338) on request]