Madingley Hall – 26 November 2001
The history of warfare has seen a continual search for technological advantage. In the early days, aircraft, both heavier and lighter than air, were seen as little more than giving extra tactical height to the military commander for his surface battle. Yet the ability to threaten deep behind the frontline was rapidly realised, and governments feared that they would be unable to defend their cities against bombs dropped from aircraft or airships. A new approach to warfare has been developed through these experiences in the last decade of the 20th Century. Air power has become much more precise in its application using conventional weaponry. This has allowed powers to exert force without risking either large casualties to their own forces or to non-combatants in the target zone. Air power has become the weapon of first choice: to be used ahead of, and perhaps instead of, surface forces. After a century, the world is looking at the use of military force in a new way through the capabilities of air systems.
Controlled powered heavier-than-air flight was realised at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina on 17 December 1903 by the Wright Brothers. Military interest was variable, but enthusiasts ensured that airplane technological development was rapid. Louis Bleriot flew across the English Channel in 1909 showing that England was no longer safe as an island nation. In 1911, a Curtiss biplane was successfully launched from and landed back on a warship. That year was to see the first use of air power in war. Italy was at war with Libya, and began using aircraft and airships for aerial reconnaissance. By the following year, hand held bombs were being dropped on desert troops below.
The French followed these trends closely and took the lead in developing air commands. At the outbreak of World War One they had some 138 military aircraft, and had also been building them for Russia. Germany had concentrated its early development work on airships for military use, but it too was building heavier-than-air machines, and had 232 by 1914. The United States showed remarkably little interest in military aviation developments, which was why the Wright brothers spent their time selling their machines in Europe. The British reorganised their air capabilities into an army specialist force, the Royal Flying Corps, and subsequently added the Royal Navy Air Service in early 1914.
Although of relatively limited military effectiveness, the most significant air power development of the war was to be that of strategic bombing. Targets were both military and civilian; and the greatest shock was to Britain, which, as an island nation, had long felt secure from enemy attack. As a consequence, the Zeppelin and Gotha raids on London had a disproportionate effect on future air power thinking. The British public clamour was for air defence at home and retaliatory strikes on Germany.
The development of air power during World War One was extraordinarily rapid, but was not particularly well thought through. Army and Navy commanders had no experience of what the new technology could offer. It was expensive in terms of cost of equipment and also in its need for trained manpower. Arguments over funding priorities further hampered developments. These organisational problems led to the establishment of the first separate military arm for air power, the Royal Air Force, in Britain in 1918.
In World War One, air power was used in virtually all of its modern military roles, which were to be greatly developed subsequently. There was no time for theorists to discuss optimum strategies for incorporating this new capability into traditional warfighting doctrines.
With the end of the Great War, there was little general interest in learning the air power lessons of the conflict. The expectation that this had been a war to end war meant that military spending was rapidly scaled down everywhere. The RAF was reduced within 6 months of the Armistice from 188 operational squadrons to just 23, of which fewer than half could be deployed. Hugh Trenchard, who had served with the Royal Flying Corps, and had risen to be Chief of the Air Staff of the new RAF, became the custodian of British air power thinking throughout the 1920's. He was a strong believer in offensive air power, and of the importance of the bomber in any future wars. However, in the absence of any planning for major wars, he was better able to promote the RAF in the role of imperial policing. Britain had a large empire to control, but was short of money to fund the necessary troops. Trenchard was able to offer his small and relatively inexpensive force as a cost effective way to keep dissident rebels in check. In Iraq in 1921, five RAF squadrons were used to replace a ground force of 33 battalions.
In this period of peace, it was the ideas of an Italian General, Giulio Douhet, which captured the imagination strategic thinkers. His book, The Command of the Air, was published in 1921 and translated into English two years later. He declared that in future wars whichever side could win in the air would achieve victory. He argued that aircraft had extended the traditional battlefield to include civilian populations, and that attacks should be made on national institutions and infrastructure. The effect of such bombing would undermine the population's will to fight as well as disrupting its means to fight. To this advocacy of strategic bombing, he also added the importance of attacking an enemy's air power capability when it was on the ground and vulnerable. His ideas were echoed widely by those who had been involved in the air operations of World War One.
The ability to project military force in air or space by or from a platform or missile operating above the surface of the earth. Air platforms are defined as any aircraft, helicopter or unmanned air vehicle.
(as defined in British Air Power Doctrine)
To have command of the air means to be in a position to prevent the enemy from flying while retaining the ability to fly oneself.
(as defined by Douhet in The Command of the Air)
In the United States, General Billy Mitchell was making himself well known with the public, but unpopular with his military colleagues, for his strong advocacy of air power. In 1921, he provided a practical demonstration of the sinking of a captured warship by air attack, followed two years later by two more high profile test attacks and sinkings. But it would be another 20 years, before the United States discovered at Pearl Harbour that it was as vulnerable as Billy Mitchell had predicted. He railed, as successive airmen have, against the inefficiencies of air power being shared between the Army and the Navy. He was court-martialed in 1925 (Douhet had suffered a similar fate in 1916).
If the victorious powers of World War One were investing little in military air power, this was not true elsewhere in the world. The defeated Germany was notionally constrained in the development of military capability. However, the importance of air power was recognised and was developed initially secretly in co-operation with the Soviets. The Luftwaffe came in to being in 1935 as an independent service with a different philosophy from the strategic bombing doctrine of the Trenchard, Mitchell and Douhet. The Luftwaffe was primarily trained and equipped to attack enemy forces in the air and on the ground and at sea. It was designed to concentrate firepower to disrupt and destroy the opponent's military capability. The German doctrine of blitzkrieg required early and massive air power to be brought to bear on the enemy's combat forces. Japan developed its own military air capability, which was used to great effect against China from 1931 onwards. In particular, by 1937 they had a capability for long range bombing missions. They developed a technique for forward refuelling airfields to extend the range of their fighter aircraft.
For the USA and the rest of Europe, the advances in air power technology in the inter-war period were driven more by the growing civil interest and enthusiasm for flying than by the worries of air-minded strategists. Air races accelerated the developments in engines and airframes. Altitude record breaking attempts were just as important.
There were also real operations for nations to test their new capabilities. The Japanese air operations against the Chinese received little attention in Europe, but allowed the Japanese to develop their air doctrine significantly before World War Two. Of greater significance was the Spanish Civil war from 1936 to 1939. As well as the Spanish air force, Soviet, German and Italian air power was in action. The Soviet force was some 1500 aircraft, but they were inaccurate as bombers and also vulnerable to German fighters. The German Luftwaffe exercised their doctrine of joint operations in support of ground forces to great effect.
As war broke out in 1939, Germany was better prepared with good aircraft and experienced crews, who had developed air power as a key part of their military doctrine. In Britain, the late build up of capability, and the focus on bombers, had left the air defences less than comprehensive. Nor was there much agreement within the RAF, or beyond, on the most effective employment of these scarce resources.
In the six years from 1939-1945, every theory of air power was put to the test and modified, and all the main roles of modern air warfare were exhaustively exercised. World War Two was a new type of war in terms of communications, speed and extent. Air power had made every civilian potentially vulnerable, and had taken away the safety of dispersal and distance. Yet the promises of technology were often found wanting, and each new technological development was matched rapidly by a counter move. Radar made air defence practical, but was soon degraded by counter-measures.
In popular images of the war, the Battle of Britain remains the most memorable of air campaigns. A less well publicised, but as important, aspect of the air war was the Battle of the Atlantic. The strategic bombing campaign encapsulates many of the weaknesses of the strategic thinking of the inter-War years. Proponents had overstated the psychological effect on populations, and had also expected far more technical capability from bombing systems than was achievable. The nature of the bombing escalated as the war continued. The British began the war by dropping leaflets and ended it by destroying cities.
On the other side of the world, the Japanese showed that it was possible to use air power to provide tactical surprise. The attack on the US fleet at Pearl Harbour in 1941, and the subsequent Japanese victories in the Philippines and Singapore showed how well they had developed their offensive air power capability.
If the atomic bomb was to dominate strategic thinking for the next half century, the jet engine and the missile were also set to transform the mechanics of air power. All three technological developments had been deployed in the latter days of World War Two, but there was limited experience on which to extrapolate the potential consequences for air power. Despite the whole range of air power tasks having contributed to the war effort, the post-war focus for the victorious powers was on development of nuclear weapon delivery capabilities. Yet very rapidly, a non combat form of air power was to prove critical in the growing confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West. Berlin, blockaded by the Soviets in 1948, was sustained by a unique allied air transport re-supply operation throughout .
The Korean War (1950-1953) was a reminder that conventional wars with limited aims remained possible in the nuclear age. Jet aircraft were available in numbers for the first time, but had to operate in a confined airspace. A limited war meant political constraints on targets, and as a result strategic bombing of China was ruled out. Again, the value of flexible air support to troops on the ground was demonstrated in what was a very difficult ground campaign. The British undertook operations in Malaya and the French in Indochina. The Israelis were developing a serious air force to defend their newly independent country. However all three nations were reminded of their limitations in the Suez operation of 1956.
Yet for the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom the key air power role was that of the nuclear bomber. Resources were poured into aircraft and weapon development and production. Conventional weapons were of secondary importance in the battle for funding, despite the growing experience of the need for limited war capability. The Soviets and the British also progressed in the 1950s, followed in turn by the French and Chinese, with developing long range nuclear bombers. and providing the air defences to protect them from pre-emptive destruction.
The nuclear powers have in the years since moved from reliance on manned bombers for nuclear delivery towards greater use of missiles based in silos on land and in submarines at sea. Indeed, the United Kingdom by 1998 had abandoned all its other nuclear delivery systems.
The building and maintenance of a credible deterrent capability exercised both the USA and the USSR throughout the 1960s. It can be argued that more thinking about the lessons of air power in limited wars would have helped the Americans in Vietnam and the Russians in Afghanistan.
The Vietnam war (1964-75) was a savage reminder of the limitations of air power in fighting a guerrilla campaign. It was, however, a period of intense development in conventional air warfare tactics and technologies. Airmobility with helicopter gunship support brought a new level of integration between ground and air forces. While the massive scale of US air power could achieve tactical victories, the strategic victory was more difficult. Escalation of conventional strategic bombing was seen as the way to bring North Vietnam to the negotiating table. Yet again, air power theorists were taught the lesson that conventional bombing does little to make your enemy more amenable.
If Vietnam and Afghanistan reminded the two superpowers of the limitations of air power in long campaigns lasting years, Israel showed the world the importance of air supremacy in much shorter wars. It had given priority to developing a modern air force which was rightly feared by its Arab neighbours. The Yom Kippur war of 1973 lasted only 18 days but provided a wealth of air warfare data of the effectiveness of modern air weapon systems in a classic set piece battle for national survival. The British and Argentineans also learned the strengths and weaknesses of their air power capabilities during the Falklands conflict of 1982. It was a remarkable achievement for the UK, with its very small aircraft carrier force, to wage a successful war at a range of some 8000 miles from home.
NATO nations raced to reduce their military spending as the threat from the Soviet Union disappeared. However in August 1990, before most governments had completed their post Cold War defence reappraisals, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The United Nations imposed economic sanctions, intense diplomacy was undertaken, and this was underpinned by the build up of a US-led military coalition of 29 countries in the theatre. Following failure of diplomatic solutions to the crisis, an air campaign (Operation Desert Storm) was launched against Iraqi forces on 17 January 1991. Although massive ground forces had been assembled nearby in Saudi Arabia, the force commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, continued a purely air offensive operation for 6 weeks. Precision weapons were used extensively against infrastructure targets. Massive area bombing was used against armour in the desert.
On the 24 February, Schwarzkopf assessed the Iraq forces as sufficiently degraded to launch the ground campaign. It was still assumed that there would be a difficult fight to free Kuwait. In the event, the Iraqi forces were routed and Kuwait freed in under 4 days. Air power advocates had found a new role. They claimed that modern precision air systems in overwhelming numbers would in future win wars, leaving ground forces the easier task of moving in afterwards to secure territory. However, even in the Gulf, it was a limited victory. Air operations of various kinds continued against Iraq for the rest of the decade.
While the scale of the coalition for the Gulf War was impressive, it was clear to all that the success depended on American technology, numbers, doctrine and leadership. The USA had emerged from the Cold War as a military power unmatched by any other nation. It was investing much more in defence research and particularly in aerospace and information systems. It appeared that US air power would be the dominant factor in military thinking. However, the very public success in achieving war aims with few casualties in the Gulf had implications for future operations. US forces were withdrawn from Somalia when 18 of their troops were killed. In the worsening Balkan crisis, the US preferred air strikes to promote agreement in Bosnia rather than contributing troops on the ground.
The 1990s saw a series of operations, mainly under UN auspices, to try to restore order in failing states around the world. Air power had few answers to mass killings in civil wars in Africa. Where agreements were achieved, such as in Bosnia, the peace could only be maintained by the long term presence of international ground forces. Yet the decade was to finish with a war that was even more important to the air power dominance school of thought. Having come to an uneasy settlement over ethnic divisions in Bosnia, the focus moved to Kosovo.
For the first time NATO nations agreed, without a formal UN resolution, to use military means to solve a growing humanitarian crisis within a sovereign state's boundaries. The instrument of choice was explicitly solely air power. NATO leaders, when they launched an air offensive on 24 March 1999 against Serbian forces, ruled out an offensive ground campaign. Air power was being used to bring the Serbian leadership back to the negotiating table. Over 23,000 bombs were dropped in the ten weeks of operations. From the 38,000 NATO missions flown, there was not a single casualty to the alliance forces. On the other hand, a combination of political constraints on targets, poor weather and good Serbian defensive measures meant that the military effectiveness of this prolonged air operation was limited. Nevertheless a peace settlement was made in the June, before ground operations became necessary. Again a large international force was needed to police the settlement in Kosovo. Shortly afterwards, Russia followed NATO's example of the use of air power in its rather less surgical approach to quelling rebellion in Chechnya.
While air power studies have concentrated on the offensive operations in the Gulf and the Balkans, a growing need for humanitarian intervention worldwide has had other implications. Rapid response to sudden crises requires deployable forces. Nations are restructuring their military capabilities to provide such forces more easily. Planners in defence ministries around the world finished the decade with a much clearer view of the need for the full range of air power capabilities than they had had in 1990.
The Launch of air operations by the US, with the direct military support of the UK in October 2001 was as part of what was described as a "war against terrorism". Air Power could be said to have been used by the terrorists who attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon using hijacked civil airliners. The use of high tech airpower in the search for a terrorist organization pushed back the boundaries, although the Israelis and Russians were testing similar methods.
The twentieth century was one of extraordinary progress in the application of air power. Most air power forecasters failed to make the right projections. This was scarcely surprising as the technologies advanced rapidly, the tactical implications were poorly understood and the strategic context changed. Air power enthusiasts often overstated the capabilities of their systems, and found it difficult to make their case for resources in opposition to their land and maritime colleagues. Successful air power nations needed a good technological and industrial base, as well as institutional understanding of what air power could offer.
The surges in practical military utilisation of air power took place in fighting wars of the 20th century. Theorising was extensive in the periods of peace, but was often based on unjustified extrapolation of available data. Airmen were attached to the thinking of Douhet, who saw the importance of control of the air, and the bomber as the ultimate weapon system. Yet for much of the century, support of ground forces was the more effective task for air systems.
Currently, the United States has an overwhelming military capability which is, to a large extent, based on its modern air power forces. It can carry out precision offensive operations on a world-wide basis from its home territory. It can deliver conventional or nuclear weapons from aircraft or from submarines. It also has the most advanced space and information capabilities, and it outspends all other nations on military research, procurement and deployment. Given this focus of air power, it will be inevitably be a prime influence for all other nations, when looking at their own forces.
Analysts argue whether the air campaign for Kosovo has set a precedent which will mean many more such humanitarian interventions. Some believe the political difficulties of maintaining NATO cohesion mean that it will not be repeated, and that only UN authorised operations will be possible. These are more likely to be at the lower intensity end of the spectrum and thus be less dependent on combat air power. There are still however areas where serious conflict is possible. The division of the Korean peninsular remains. India and Pakistan remain fiercely confrontational over Kashmir, and are both nuclear capable. China has the potential to cause difficulty, particularly over Taiwan. Russia is not yet a stable market economy. Ethnic problems erupt without warning, and sometimes with great ferocity. And now we have the 50 year campaign against terrorism. In any of the possible scenarios, air power is almost certain to have a part to play. However, the costs of air systems remain a problem for all governments including the United States. There are signs that regional co-operation at providing air capabilities may be the pattern of the future. NATO nations clubbed together to procure an expensive airborne early warning system in the past. European nations are looking at how they might provide such capabilities as intelligence satellites and strategic airlift on a co-operative basis.
Air power has become an increasingly attractive option for western nations, which wish to minimise the risk of casualties to their own forces. This will increase the pressure for the developing air systems and tactics which keep the operator out of harm's way. Unmanned air vehicles will provide some solutions as will greater stand off range for weapon systems. However, concern about unintended collateral damage will ensure that the man or woman is kept firmly in the decision-making loop.
Military air power began as a form of support for armies and navies. It grew to have strategic influence on its own. Many of the problems of development have come from the division of labour between armies, navies and, latterly, air forces. Recognising this, the most recent moves have been towards joint military organisations, which are designed to makes most efficient use of all resources. This comes just at the time when doctrine seems to be moving more towards the independent use of air power for serious operations.
Air power has become the weapon of first choice: to be used ahead of, and perhaps instead of, surface forces. After a century, the world is looking at the use of military force in a new way through the capabilities of air systems.
• Any successful military operation requires effective control of the air.
• Control of the air is only retained by continuous effort
• Air power relies on advanced technologies, industrial production and skilled manpower.
• Air power is expensive and setting resource priorities correctly is the most important factor for success.
• Air power cannot hold territory.
• Air power provides many politically attractive options for constrained limited operations.
• Air power must be co-ordinated with sea and land power for greatest effect.