European Defence moves forward slowly

By Sir Timothy Garden

Hidden by all the military activity in Afghanistan, a major EU defence event of this week (21/22 November 2001) has received almost no publicity. The states of the EU have gathered for their second Commitments Conference at which they will identify the shortfalls that must be filled if they are to field a useful military capability.

The impetus to create effective EU capabilities dates from the Franco-British summit meeting held in St Malo in December 1998. At that meeting, the British Government moved away from its previously sceptical position on EU-based capabilities. This allowed European defence policy to be addressed at the sequence of bi-lateral and summit meetings involving NATO, the WEU and the EU through 1999, which culminated in the Helsinki EU summit in December 1999.

The Helsinki summit established a series of ‘Headline Goals’ in terms of the military capability that should be created among the Europeans, and specified that they should be achieved by the end of 2002 so that an operating capability would be available from 2003. The summit focused on the specifics of the capabilities that Europe should be able to call upon for tasks short of territorial defence (known as the Petersberg Tasks). Leaders agreed that they would aim to set up arrangements that would allow, by the target date of 2003, for up to 60,000 troops with appropriate naval and air support to be deployed within 60 days and sustained in theatre for up to 12 months. The aim was to be able to meet contingencies up to the most demanding end of the Petersberg Task spectrum.

The first Commitments Conference took place in November 2000 in the run up to the Nice EU Summit. EU members indicated what forces they were prepared to make available at the required notice for EU authorised operations. The absolute numbers offered were impressive – 100,000 troops, 400 combat aircraft and 100 ships – but the packages were complex, and much staff work has been done to piece together the mosaic of capabilities. There is no doubt that the broad force size outlined in the Helsinki Goals is achievable.

However, the numbers of armed forces pledged are not the key question: rather the quality of the performance of armed forces, and their availability and sustainability will be dependent on clusters of 'enabling capacities' of which the Europeans are somewhat short. Part of the problem is that there is insufficient agreement on the scope of the Petersberg Tasks. There is no consensus over how deeply into the realm of combat and war-fighting Petersberg Tasks will, or should, lead the Europeans.

Analysis of comparable work in NATO and within national defence plans reveals a series of areas where enabling capacities are likely to improve; in particular in strategic transport, air-to-air refuelling, amphibious capabilities, some aspects of joint, multinational headquarters, elements of ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance), satellite communication and satellite surveillance. But there are also important areas where there are capability shortfalls: in tactical transport, Air/Ground Surveillance capabilities, suppression of enemy air defences, data fusion and ground links, and all-weather precision offensive forces.

A study (to which the author contributed) published by the Centre for Defence Studies at King's College last week recommended an agenda for action for the EU members if they are to be serious about developing useful military capabilities. The priorities are:

  1. EU members need to agree urgently a detailed definition of the Petersberg Tasks, including the scale and intensity of operations envisaged. This should now include the internal and external military aspects of counter-terrorist operations in the light of the attacks of 11 September.
  2. A formal co-ordination system between the EU and NATO should be established so that priority can be given to those areas which improve both organisation's capabilities.
  3. The EU needs to be involved in the national defence planning process of each member state.
  4. An EU sponsored review of the plethora of European multinational military arrangements should be undertaken. It should seek to identify those arrangements which should be built upon, and also those which have now become less useful.
  5. The EU needs to put in hand formal accounting arrangements for the defence area. If any progress towards procuring key enablers at the EU level is to be made, then budget sharing arrangements will be needed.
  6. EU member states should identify a small number of uncontroversial and near term projects, where a useful military capability could be provided on a pooled basis. These should be rigorously audited to provide data for future budgetary arrangements, and as indicators of the way ahead for the future.
  7. A plan for the long-term development of the Helsinki Headline Goal process should formally be articulated, both for planning purposes and as a focus for public debate on the future of security among the EU members.

    Unfortunately, with European leaders and publics more interested in Afghanistan operations, there is unlikely to be great progress towards any of these priorities for action.

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