The
International Response to global terrorism
The
Role of Britain
RIIA Panel 7 November 2001
Terrorism was here before, some of it motivated by local political aims, some by single issue fanaticism, and some by unfathomable beliefs. Suicide bombers were not new. What is different is the targeting on a global scale of targets designed to cause casualties without limit and to undermine the global economy. They might be called strategic acts of destruction, rather than the tactical terrorist acts of the past. While it may have been possible for the international community to live with occasional acts of local terrorism around the world, it is not possible to live with non-state actors who have a mission to destroy the global system.
The
most effective approach remains very much the same as in more traditional
counter-terrorist campaigns, and these are unfortunately well known over the
past century to UK security forces. The priority must be to defend the most
vulnerable targets and to arrest the in-place operatives before they can carry
out new atrocities. These are jobs which belong primarily to the intelligence
and police agencies around the world. Sharing information on a global basis is
the only way to respond to a global threat. The lead taken by the prime
Minister in his shuttle diplomacy will have contributed to setting up these
linkages.
The second priority in defence terms (but
it is rapidly becoming the first priority in political terms) is finding and
eliminating the direct supporting infrastructure of the sponsor of terrorism.
This is always difficult, but is especially so when head office is located in
the wild country of Afghanistan. The use of $2 million cruise missiles (whether it is British or American) to
take out a camel and a tent is a real problem. Nevertheless given good
intelligence, carefully targeted air attacks and small but capable ground
forces we should be able to dismantle the bin Laden infrastructure. The UK has useful niche capabilities in
intelligence gathering, and in specialist operations which can be helpful to
what is inevitably primarily a US effort. Capturing the man will depend on good
luck as much as anything. Remember that this does not remove the threat from
the already trained and deployed terrorists. I worry that some of the political
rhetoric in defence of the air campaign is beginning to attach too much
significance to the effect of eliminating bin Laden. We need to bring him to
justice or remove him as a factor for obvious reasons, but we should not delude
ourselves that the world will return to normal just because we have done that.
The indirect support by States of
terrorist organisations requires many different approaches. The Taliban have
few supporters among the governments of the world; but some of those
governments are aware that sections of their population are pro-Taliban.
Overthrowing the Taliban is not a simple military objective, particularly given
the constraints on collateral damage. However, it is likely to provide the most
visible part of the military campaign which is currently underway. As we have
seen in the Balkans, planning what happens after the military action is perhaps
the most important element. It is not yet clear how the power vacuum can be
filled in a way which makes life better for the people and thus stops the
growth of yet more recruits for international terrorism. Certainly providing a
government that can bring the rule of law and dispense humanitarian aid must be
a priority, and it will be a role in which a significant international military
presence is likely to be needed for some time. I think Jack Straw's vision of
the future of Afghanistan has been an important input into this project. The UN
will have to take the lead, but the UK will have an important contribution to
make.
One other aspect to consider when
planning for action in Afghanistan is what may happen in other areas of
concern. The massing of military power in the region is not just useful for any
strikes on Afghanistan. It ensures that an opportunist action by Iraq can be
deterred or countered quickly. Nor should we forget the Balkans. After a decade
of work to stabilise that region, we need to make sure that we are not so
distracted as to allow them to regress. We must also address urgently the
Israeli/Palestinian crisis, and that may require a military contribution in the
form of an international peacekeeping force.
I
worry that the focus is perhaps too much on the war in Afghanistan, and not
enough on the counter-terrorist campaign at home. It appears that extra money
has gone to the intelligence agencies, which is a start. But redirecting the
intelligence effort takes time. The enhanced police presence in London is a
visible sign of greater preventative security, but is as much a reassurance to
the public as a defence against the next mass killing attack. I wonder if we
are being radical enough in our approach to the defence of the UK. We have been
somewhat self-congratulatory in Europe: that we already had counter-terrorist
measures in force before September 11, because of our various local terrorist
problems.
It
seems to me that we need to look seriously at a more formal central direction
for the new defence of the homeland since it crosses so many different
departments and agencies. Many in the audience will know the current Cabinet
Office arrangements for counter-terrorism, and perhaps feel that they are well
tried and sufficient. The US has felt it necessary to instigate a new office
and organisation for the homeland security. Perhaps we need to think about this
ñ a cabinet minister for UK Security. Have we got a Red team exercising our
planners? Have we thought about a new role for our military reserves, back to
their traditional roles of home defence? Would we feel safer with the TA
supplementing the police rather than civilian part-timers? Have we established
a hot-line for information from the public on terrorist matters? Do we need
military defences (including air defences) for the most vital facilities? Does
the military need to re-establish a Home Defence Command in support of the
police and security services ñ a sort of GOC NI writ large. Do we need to
reactivate the civil defence organisation for a new challenge of potential mass
casualties, which may be more likely than a nuclear exchange in the Cold War
ever was?
I
could continue to list measures which it might be wise to consider in terms of
defence in the UK. Many of them will already be underway already, but are not
seen by the public. There is a natural caution about publicising measures at
home for fear of causing unnecessary alarm. However there is perhaps a need to
remind the public that there is a threat at home as well as in distant
Afghanistan, and although the two are related, they need to both be addressed.
An opportunity for the public to play a part in reducing the risk to themselves
and their families at home might also give greater reassurance and
engender continuing support for
the wider difficult campaign.
It
seems to me that the UK has played an important supporting role in all aspects
of the international response to terrorism. The military contribution to the US
forces in Afghanistan has had both political but also real military
significance. The sharing of intelligence is something we can facilitate.
Bringing the EU into the picture is also an important role. If I were to
express a concern, it might be that we have been slower and perhaps less
effective at protecting ourselves from the very real threat. I hope we won't
come to regret that.