Terrorism was there before, some of it motivated by local political aims, some by single issue fanaticism, and some by unfathomable beliefs. Suicide bombers were not new. What is different is the targeting on a global scale of targets designed to cause casualties without limit and to undermine the global economy. They might be called strategic acts of destruction, rather than the tactical terrorist acts of the past. While it may have been possible for the international community to live with occasional acts of local terrorism around the world, it is not possible to live with non-state actors who have a mission to destroy the global system.
The most effective approach remains very much the same as in more traditional counter-terrorist campaigns. Priorities are to defend the most vulnerable targets and to arrest the in-place operatives before they can carry out new atrocities. These are jobs which belong primarily to the intelligence and police agencies around the world. Sharing information on a global basis is the only way to respond to a global threat.
The second priority in defence terms (but it is rapidly becoming the first priority in political terms) is finding and eliminating the direct supporting infrastructure of the sponsor of terrorism. This is always difficult, but is especially so when head office is located in the wild country of Afghanistan. The use of $2 million cruise missiles to take out a camel and a tent is a real problem. Nevertheless given good intelligence, carefully targeted air attacks and small but capable ground forces we should be able to dismantle the bin Laden infrastructure. Capturing the man will depend on good luck as much as anything. Remember that this does not remove the threat from the already trained and deployed terrorists. I worry that some of the political rhetoric in defence of the air campaign is beginning to attach too much significance to the effect of eliminating bin Laden. We need to bring him to justice or remove him as a factor for obvious reasons, but we should not delude ourselves that the world will return to normal just because we have done that.
The indirect support by States of terrorist organisations requires many different approaches. The Taliban have few supporters among the governments of the world; but some of those governments are aware that sections of their population are pro-Taliban. Overthrowing the Taliban is not a simple military objective, particularly given the constraints on collateral damage. However, it is likely to provide the most visible part of the military campaign which is currently underway. As we have seen in the Balkans, planning what happens after the military action is perhaps the most important element. It is not yet clear how the power vacuum can be filled in a way which makes life better for the people and thus stops the growth of yet more recruits for international terrorism. Certainly providing a government that can bring the rule of law and dispense humanitarian aid must be a priority, and it will be a role in which a significant international military presence is likely to be needed for some time.
One other aspect to consider when planning for action in Afghanistan is what may happen in other areas of concern. The massing of military power in the region is not just useful for any strikes on Afghanistan. It ensures that an opportunist action by Iraq can be deterred or countered quickly. Nor should we forget the Balkans. After a decade of work to stabilise that region, we need to make sure that we are not so distracted as to allow them to regress. We must also address urgently the Israeli/Palestinian crisis, and that may require a military contribution in the form of an international peacekeeping force.
Prime Minister's speech at the Labour Party conference was an inspiring call to the international community. It might be undermined by the somewhat limited capability that the UK can deploy compared to the US. The possible rebalancing of British Defence policy, announced by the Defence Secretary at the Conference, suggests that the UK government is not thinking of spending much more on defence.
I worry that the focus is perhaps too much on the war in Afghanistan, and not enough on the counter-terrorist campaign at home. It appears that extra money has gone to the intelligence agencies, which is a start. But redirecting the intelligence effort takes time. The enhanced police presence in London is a visible sign of greater preventative security, but is as much a reassurance to the public as a defence against the next mass killing attack. I wonder if we are being radical enough in our approach to the defence of the UK. We have been somewhat self-congratulatory in Europe: that we already had counter-terrorist measures in force before September 11, because of our various local terrorist problems.
It seems to me that we need to look seriously at a more formal central direction for the new defence of the homeland since it crosses so many different departments and agencies. Many in the audience will know the current Cabinet Office arrangements for counter-terrorism, and perhaps feel that they are well tried and sufficient. The US has felt it necessary to instigate a new office and organisation for the homeland security. Perhaps we need to think about this – a cabinet minister for UK Security. Have we got a Red team exercising our planners? Have we thought about a new role for our military reserves, back to their traditional roles of home defence? Would we feel safer with the TA supplementing the police rather than civilian part-timers? Have we established a hot-line for information from the public on terrorist matters? Do we need military defences (including air defences) for the most vital facilities? Does the military need to re-establish a Home Defence Command in support of the police and security services – a sort of GOC NI writ large. Do we need to reactivate the civil defence organisation for a new challenge of potential mass casualties, which may be more likely than a nuclear exchange in the Cold War ever was?
I could continue to list measures which it might be wise to consider in terms of defence in the UK. Many of them will already be underway already, but are not seen by the public. There is a natural caution about publicising measures at home for fear of causing unnecessary alarm. However there is perhaps a need to remind the public that there is a threat at home as well as in distant Afghanistan, and although the two are related, they need to both be addressed. An opportunity for the public to play a part in reducing the risk to themselves and their families at home might also give greater reassurance and engender continuing support for the wider difficult campaign.