It is a great pleasure, Master, to be here in St. Catherineís again; and a still greater one, if also a challenge, to do so on an occasion that salutes Pat Nairne. He and I have known one another for over a third of a century, and indeed I know, as you do, what it is like to have to take on a job ñ in my case it was what would now be called Policy Director in the Ministry of Defence ñ that he had done not long before; the inheritance is rich, though the example is daunting. Whitehall recognised him as one of the great public servants of his generation in the classic mould; and the public service continued abundantly, in diverse forms, when he left those corridors.
You and I agreed some time ago, Tim, that we would talk about the future of war. That was before the monstrous events of 11 September, which have changed the scenery and heightened the awareness of us all to threats to security. We shall have things to say, without doubt, about 11 September and what flows from it. But I do not think it has changed everything; so let me begin by suggesting what some of the underlying realities still are.
It seems to me that during the second half of the twentieth century there had become increasingly understood and entrenched a huge and revolutionary truth: that old-style war between advanced states had become simply obsolete. Now something like that has, notoriously, been said before. It is almost a clichÈ in this field to hold up to ridicule the pronouncements of Norman Angell, whose book ìThe Great Illusionî argued forcefully that international economic interdependence had become so pervasive that war was effectively unwageable ñ the point of ridicule being, of course, that the book was written in 1910. More recently, people today laugh (rather out of context) at Francis Fukuyamaís phrase ìthe end of historyî as the Cold War dissolved a decade ago. But there are, I think, fundamental reasons why things are truly different from the days when Angell was writing. Some of the difference is psychological; to borrow an idea from Michael Howard (as I constantly do), the experience of two world wars has inoculated almost all the major states against the national bellicosity ñ the sense of war as natural and even cathartic - that affected several of the nations of Europe, not just Wilhelmine Germany, a century ago. But there is a more material and technical reason for the transformation. I offer another literary reference. ìI begin to believe in only one civilising influence ñ the discovery, one of these days, of a destructive agent so terrible that War shall mean annihilation, and menís fears shall force them to keep the peace.î Who said that, and when? ….The American novelist Wilkie Collins, at the time of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. And that dream or nightmare is in essence, a century or more on, what has actually happened.
Mankindís scientific understanding and technological mastery of our physical environment have placed in the hands of any large and advanced state the potential to inflict upon others what is by human standards infinite harm; and a contest of strengths between infinite capacities to harm is not merely foolish but actually nonsensical ñ what has happened amounts to the reductio ad absurdum of warfare in the classical sense. It is nuclear explosive power that has embodied this, but it could sooner or later have been something else ñ consider what chemical or biological weapons could by now be capable of if they had had the same massive input of resources as nuclear weapons have. And I believe that awareness of this fundamental – and, I am ready to argue, essentially irreversible - reductio ad absurdum has sunk very deeply into the consciousness of advanced states and their governing regimes.
We have not perhaps done as much as is desirable to codify this reality by arms control deals and the like. We certainly have not yet got far enough along the road of putting in place internationally dependable, legitimate and authoritative other means of resolving the sort of conflict that used to be settled by the clash of arms. And I do not suggest that we have yet reached the point where the reality I have outlined ñ the virtual cancellation of the all-out-war option among advanced states ñ is deeply enough ingrained for us to dispense swiftly with the actual existence of the armouries which make the absurdity manifest. But there is surely a case that the twenty-first century is hugely unlikely to be scarred by cataclysms like the two world wars.
It will certainly be scarred by other things, as we saw so horrifyingly last month, and we can postulate only too readily appalling things happening in the field not only of terrorism but of international crime, the environment, disease, refugee flows and the like. But I do think that old-fashioned war looks increasingly passe ; and the practical question for security planners such as you and I used to be is whether the instruments and methods that are still dominating resource allocations for international security may need to change, perhaps quite radically.
Before I address these issues, let me also add my tribute to Pat Nairne, who has been a friend and mentor for so many years. His continuing interest in international affairs and the role of the military have sparked many conversations not dissimilar from our gathering this evening.
Michael, in the Summer when we discussed how we might structure our exchange, we could do it without the terror attacks on the US to cloud our vision. We could look back, with a degree perhaps of complacency, on a decade of military force being used by the Western powers to promote peace and stability rather than to acquire empire. The Gulf War of 1991, coming so soon after the end of the Cold War was a salutary reminder that the international system continued to need our close attention. The need for military force to right such a clear violation of international law by Iraq, as it invaded Kuwait, was obvious to all. The United Nations authorised the action, and the United States built and led a coalition to expel the invaders. That a major military campaign could be successful with so few casualties set the tone for western military operations for the rest of the decade.
Military
staff colleges studied the rules of international law, drew up doctrine for
peace keeping, played humanitarian relief instead of war games. Without a
perception of direct threat to their territories, governments reduced their
expenditure on military activities. The "peace dividend" meant that
most European countries cut their combat forces by around 40%. Yet the list of
problems that the military were expected to sort out grew longer and longer.
There were looming humanitarian crises in the Balkans, in Africa and in
Indonesia. The aversion to casualties, particularly in the United States, meant
that some problems could not be solved. Somalia was abandoned when 17 American
soldiers died. The massacres in Central Africa were not stopped, as the
prospect of involving western ground forces was too distasteful. Where
sanitised warfare was possible, action was taken. The doctrine, attributed to
Colin Powell when he was the senior US general, called for the air force to win
wars and ground troops to go in later and administer the post conflict
rebuilding of damaged states. The Europeans tried other means in the early
stages of the break up of Yugoslavia, when they put in troops on the ground to
provide humanitarian aid. But US military power and political sensitivity led them to the use of air power to bring an uneasy peace to Bosnia, and also to solve the situation in Kosovo.
This
high technology American approach
to warfare has caused difficulties in Europe. The USA is the only nation with
such capabilities, and Europe remains fragmented in its approach to defence.
The wars, before September 11, that we have been engaged upon are often
called "wars of choice". As the gap between European and American military capability widens, the choice for European nations may more often be one of non-involvement. This in turn has led to a frustration in America. Already there was little US enthusiasm for the United Nations, and the Kosovo conflict will have shown some that war can be conducted without the explicit approval of the UN. The election of the second President Bush was seen by many as presaging a new more self-interested America. But the signs were already there. The world was already frustrated by US antipathy to arms control, to international agreements, and to its belief in extra-territorial powers. President Bush reinforced this perception with his rejection of the Kyoto agreement on greenhouse gas emissions, his desire for Ballistic missile defences come what may, his rejection of an International Criminal Court and so on.
But
are you right to suggest the end of big wars that characterised the 20th
Century? The Korean peninsular is frozen in time with forces at very high states of readiness. The United States has large forces in place in South Korea. China is even more focused on reclaiming Taiwan, now that its other territories have returned. Would the US allow Taiwan to be swallowed up by military means? The security situation is Israel is very bad now, but has been a concern for years. It is not 11 September which has brought nuclear weapons to Israel, India and Pakistan, and has pushed Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia and North Korea into developing their own weapons of mass destruction. All these things were happening before, and the United States has, up until now, been unwilling to see how the international system could be used to best effect to reduce these real risks of major conflict.
I understand your unease about some aspects of US security posture and behaviour, especially perhaps in the early months of the present Administration. But even before 11 September and the massive re-appraisal which that clearly stands to impose, the evidence of the past several years on what the United States actually does ñ as distinct sometimes from what its various voices say ñ does not really bear out imputations of a narrowly selfish or short-sighted unilateralism. When the chips are down and intolerable things are happening in the international system, the United States is usually there and on the right side ñ or if not usually then surely more often and effectively than almost anyone else; consider the Gulf, Bosnia, Kosovo. And things are kept that way, I suggest, by the facts of what sort of polity the United States is. There is huge diversity of citizen origin, which means that in almost any international crisis there is some section of the electorate that has strong views about what ought to happen; there is massive media spread, which means that atrocities even far away tend to get seen vividly and immediately in American homes; and there is a tradition – I know one can be cynical about this, but I believe it has real influence – of perceiving a moral dimension in international affairs.
Add to that the fact that the United States has an unparalleled capacity to act in almost every dimension of international business ñ political, economic, military, technological, even cultural ñ and a great confidence still, among her people, in her ability to make a difference. In the round, therefore, I share the view which I think Douglas Hurd once expressed – “if there is to be just one global super-power, we are lucky that it is the United States”.
That said, I would indeed like to see US policy attach more importance than it has seemed to of late to the building and entrenchment of international institutions that will in the long run make it less and less necessary for the United States to act, as she often has to, as the de facto steward of the international system. There is a case, which I should like to see argued more often in US debate, that the United States on a long view ought to see this era of unique US power as an era also of opportunity, even of duty, to lead the construction of an international order that will still hold without war against the day, remote though it may now appear, when US power may for whatever reason be less dominant than it is now. And it may be that 11 September and the response to it, with remarkably wide coalition-building attempted and indeed in some degree achieved, is already in a pragmatic if not formal way moving US policy and attitudes in the direction I am suggesting – that is, the establishment of norms and systems of international order that do not depend for their efficacy solely upon the current power of the United States, and which can derive legitimacy from a broader foundation.
But it is surely time that we said something about Europe; so let me start that ball rolling. It is fashionable, most evidently in some US circles but also on this side of the ocean, to speak slightingly of Europe ñ whether Europe in some collective mode or simply the aggregate of European countries ñ as a limp and ineffective actor in the tasks of international order. Now we might argue that even in its own terms this criticism is often overdone ñ Kosovo, for example, was an operation conducted according to US preferences about method in ways that played to distinctive US strengths, and if it had had to move into an altered military phase (as it could well have done) relative military contributions might have begun to look very different. But quite aside from arguments of that kind, some would hold that that the criticism is on the wrong tack. All right, the United States is far better than Europe at the dramatic and photogenic military tasks, but the management of international order requires ñ and increasingly requires ñ much more than that; and in non-military contribution the transatlantic relativities are in large measure reversed. In economic support to the countries of the former Soviet empire Europe has done much more than the United States. Who is nearly at the bottom of the league table of OECD nations in percentage of GDP committed to development aid to the third world? ñ not Europe. Who gives more support to the United Nations ñ and I am talking about hard resource support, not rhetoric? ñ not the United States. So on a wider canvas the picture of comparative burden-sharing takes on a rather different look.
On this argument Europe ought not to be too apologetic; and it ought not to be spending too much credit and effort on things ñ military things ñ which are not its natural field of advantage, which are arguably of declining proportional importance in the international mix (and on which, incidentally, the diversity of historical experience and attitude among its individual countries may make agreement to collective action pretty difficult). Better look for a transatlantic mega-deal, a partnership, in which the United States does what it does best and Europe – whether through the European Union or in other groupings – does what it does best.
Now I have been outlining what the argument might be; I am not myself espousing it unqualified. But it seems to me at least not a trivial or obviously silly argument; and I suspect accordingly that it needs answering. If, as I suspect, you would be minded to oppose it, how would you do so?
There
is a great attraction, particularly to Finance Ministers, in what you suggest.
We let the United States take the lead in military power projection, while
Europe looks after the "soft security" issues of development aid,
good government, environment al issues and support for UN activities.
Unfortunately such a division of tasks is neither practical nor I would argue
desirable. US foreign policy is clear in its aim, which is to support the US national interest. Many would say, is that not the way every country shapes its foreign policy? Perhaps the question is whether the national interest is seen with a short or long time horizon. Thus it may be in the US short term economic interest to fight Kyoto, but it will not be in the world's (and hence the US's ) long term interest to ignore the environment. Support of the International Criminal Court requires some giving up of national sovereignty in the short term, in order to benefit from fewer genocidal despots in the long term. The abrogation of the Anti Ballistic Missile treaty, the failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the ignoring of the landmine convention or the discarding of the Biological Weapons Protocol may all have good national interest justifications in the United States, but the national approach does not contribute to greater global security.
Europe
can try to follow a path towards greater international co-operation and
investment in the developing world to raise standards of education, living and
democracy. When the United States decides to isolate North Korea or Iran as pariah states, Europe can keep the channels open for when they are needed (as they have been just recently with Iran). However this divisive transatlantic approach cannot work. The EU of 15 countries has a GDP as large as the US. It is more populous. It is going to grow to perhaps twice the size over the next two decades. Europe has global interests, and needs all the levers, political diplomatic, economic and military to underpin those interests. The EU has done remarkably well in developing all the structures for being a major world player except in the field of foreign and security policy. The imbalance between US and European military capabilities are seen every day within NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation may appear to some to be a strange hang over from the Cold War. Yet it is the only working military alliance in the world. If the UN wants to conduct a difficult and demanding operation, as it did in the Gulf, and it may need to
If NATO is to thrive, and I would argue we need it more than ever for the global security tasks that are emerging, it cannot be an unequal organisation made up of the US and the also-rans. Europe has a role to play as an equal partner with the United States. By developing its military capability, Europe can make NATO more effective, can promote the wider global agenda in discussions with the US, and can feel that its voice is heard in the decision making process.
None of this is impossible. The amount that the EU nations spend so inefficiently on their defence totals some £120 billion per year. They duplicate everything between them with tiny research establishments, multiple headquarters, under-utilised infrastructure and protected national defence industries. If monetary union was the vision for Europe over the past twenty years, the new vision needs to be a common foreign policy supported by efficient military and diplomatic structures.
The question must now be, whether or not we agree over the future needs for a stronger European component to complement the US military pre-eminence, how will the events since 11 September affect our analysis? Will the advantages of a global approach to terrorism, make the US more internationalist? Will the perception of new threats, make the Europeans more willing to give up sovereignty in order to play a stronger role in security matters? Have we a real opportunity to change the international structure to provide a better and safer world for not just the rich countries?
To tackle all that would need a much larger canvas, and a much longer time, than we have been assigned this evening. But you do by implication bring us back, healthily, to our initial and central question: what sorts of conflict must we prepare for, whether to deal with or (preferably) to deter?
I know that you and I call the odds rather differently in respect of the likelihood of what one might call ìclassicalî wars. But I believe we are at one, are we not? in thinking that this century is not likely to be given its prime shape and structure, as the last one was, by the direct and full-blooded collision of the biggest powers over issues where compromise is ruled out. At the other extreme, we are both sure that there are still going to be serious conflicts in which armed force plays a part. What more can we say about what these encounters will and will not be like? I recognise that we cannot predict in any detail; I donít know about you, but when I was helping to plan the size and shape of forces I completely failed to foresee the Falklands, the Gulf, Bosnia and Kosovo, let alone 11 September and what is flowing from that. I have a theorem that holds that in these matters the expected, precisely because it is expected, is not to be expected. What we foresee we plan and provide for; in doing that we deter; what we deter does not happen. What does happen is what we did not deter, because we did not plan and provide for it, because we did not foresee it – QED.
But perhaps we could attempt some broad assertions which, while still pretty general, might in some degree narrow down the range, or clarify the priorities, of things which our and Patís successors back in Whitehall need to plan and provide for. Here are a few from me.
First, I think that at least for first-world countries like Britain military conflict will be more and more a matter of intervention rather than of repulse ñ it will be concerned with trying to prevent, or more probably to limit and rectify, bad things happening within states, either because the states themselves are doing them or because the states cannot or will not stop them. Second, and flowing from that, legitimacy of action will be more complex and demanding, yet more essential, in both the political and the moral dimension; and I am not sure that we ñ the international community, or the West ñ have yet got adequately mature and up-to-date instruments or even concepts in either of those dimensions. Third, we shall mostly have to get a lot better than we are now at integrating military and non-military instruments, not just in sequence but often side by side ñ there is an interesting example of that on our TV screens now, with strikes against the Taliban and al-Qaida going on at the same time as we are trying to bring relief aid to the Afghan people. And my fourth assertion is that we are going to have to be very skilled – by which I do not mean just very crafty – at persuading our own publics not to give in to boredom or impatience or distaste when things are long-drawn-out and messy and do not neatly or durably fit simplified stereotypes of goodies and baddies and victory and defeat.
I suspect that Europeans, or at least some of them, may actually prove better than the United States at some elements of this. But the converse is likely to be true of many of the assertions we might be minded to make about what the more technical characteristics of the tasks are apt to be. You will be a better judge than I of which such characteristics to look for, and who is going to be best at providing them. What would your list of assertions be, I wonder?
You are of course right to remind us that in our planning days in the MOD, we failed to predict the Falklands, the Gulf War, the fallout from the break –up of Yugoslavia, and now the terror attacks on America. I would add to that list of failures, our surprise at the speed and way in which the Cold War ended. I have some sympathy with your thesis that we must expect to have face surprises, since we reduce the likelihood of those eventualities for which we prepare. But I think there may be another factor that we need to consider. In the dark days of the Cold War, the prospect of a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was so awful that we (the nations of the West) were prepared to field quite significant military forces at considerable cost. In the UK we thought nothing of spending 5% of our gross national product every year on defence. On that scale, we could cope with lesser challenges when they popped up. Now, the situation is very different. We grudge spending even half that proportion of our national
Our
audience may not know, that you pioneered open discussion documents from the
Ministry of Defence, and they were on sensitive topics like the Trident
programme. That initiative has flourished, and one of a series ñ called the Future
Strategic Context for Defence ñ was published by our successors in February
this year. This document concluded that the worst case contingency for the
planners is a British contribution to a war on the scale of the Gulf War. It discounts a direct military threat to the UK. Yet the author cautions that the analysis cannot predict shocks – "low probability events with a dramatic impact". The co-ordinated attacks on Washington and New York with mass casualties and an unseen enemy are presumably just such a shock. We cannot know how events will play out on the international scene as a result of this attack on America. It may be that we have moved back into an era of risk and vulnerability like the one that we lived through in the Cold War. What is clear to me is that the risks of security failure increase as we in Europe allow our military capabilities to atrophy. We are demanding much from our troops today: in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, over Iraq, in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and now over Afghanistan. At home, we turn to them for help in flooding or in foot and mouth. Our own terrorist threat in Ireland still absorbs them (although that now looks more hopeful), and to all of that is added the new terrori
You asked for my assertions. I believe our armed forces remain essential for the security of the nation. I am concerned that the growing number of tasks and the reducing resources will make them unable to deliver what is needed in some future crisis or shock. I worry, as much, that this phenomenon is repeated to a greater or lesser (but mainly greater) extent throughout the rest of Europe. I see the possibility of some relief if Europe can work together in a serious way to produce real usable military capability, but I fear that it won't. I worry for all the reasons that we have discussed this evening about the changing nature of our relationship with the United States. They will rightly expect us to do more as they take on additional burdens. The instabilities which might lead to big wars will need to be addressed.
We share the world with each other as never before. We live in a common environment, where the actions of one state can effect the world. Information is universal and instantaneous. Economies are no longer controlled nationally. We need to develop, reform and use the international institutions of the world. We can use the current opportunity to build a consensus for a Marshall Plan for the Globe; but if we fail to do so we had better batten down the hatches and be prepared for much more spending on security.