By Tim Garden
(Appeared in The Guardian as "Loose Cannons" 9 October 2001)
Everything changes once the first bombs fall. It is now for future generations of historians, with the benefit of hindsight, to assess whether the timing for starting military operations against targets in Afghanistan was the right call. Military planners will have been pressing political leaders for clear strategic aims and for maximum operational flexibility. Neither are likely to have been easy to give. The United States Administration and its allies have shown remarkable patience in refraining from overt action for nearly 4 weeks since so many of their citizens were killed in Washington, New York and Pittsburg. That time has been well spent in building an international consensus against bin Laden and the Taliban. It is to be hoped that it has also been used to good effect in seeking out the many sleeper terrorists around the world, who are in wait for the next opportunity for mass slaughter. The real battle to reduce the risk of terrorism continues to be the unseen campaign conducted by intelligence and security agencies. By their nature, successes in this undercover world cannot be trumpeted to the public. The diplomatic and economic efforts to reduce the support for terrorist organisations is another aspect of the long haul, which provides little in the way of good television. So the world's focus will be on the military action, and what it can deliver.
The passage of time since 11 September has both benefits and drawbacks for the military planner. Forces will have been training for a wide variety of possible missions. Stocks and equipment will have been moved to convenient locations. Intelligence gathering, by all available means, will have built up a much better picture of the important enemy centres, where suitable targets may exist. Yet the passage of time also allows the terrorists and their supporters in Afghanistan to take protective measures of their own. A society which does not depend on the high technology command, control and communications can relocate its operational centres more easily than one dependent on modern armies. The training camps can be abandoned with little loss, and re-established months later elsewhere. This is why ensuring that there is no territory available for their relocation is important. The attacks on Afghanistan will demonstrate that governments who offer sanctuary to al-Qaida will bring great risk of attack on themselves.
To clear Afghanistan of hidden terrorist cells cannot be achieved by cruise missiles and B2 bombers. What can be done is to disrupt their ability to operate in the short term, and attempt to make the conditions in the country better for an extended counter-terrorist operation. This will mean that the international community will need to take a lead in the administration of Afghanistan after the Taliban are toppled. This may prove difficult if too much reliance is placed on the Northern Alliance Afghan forces doing the dirty work on the ground. It is by no means clear that they could run the country in a way which would stem the flow of future trained terrorists.
The inclusion of food aid air drops in the first night offensive is more symbolic than anything else. Air drops are of humanitarian aid are as difficult to target as precision weapons. But it is important symbolism: the humanitarian relief of Afghanistan will do more in the long term to reduce the threat to the West, than particular successes in the military campaign.
Now the die is cast with the opening of a military campaign, it is much more difficult for President Bush to determine the course of events. The possibility of civil war in Pakistan is one unsettling factor in the plans for Afghanistan. The stability of Saudi Arabia is another. The allies may wish in this phase to keep the military operation narrowly focused to government and terrorist targets in Afghanistan. However, they may find themselves drawn into more complex conflict. Trying to manage Israel and Iraq will be a further near term concern.
The priorities for the campaign remain unchanging. Counter-terrorist measures in the US, in Europe and in the Gulf are of key importance. The start of a shooting war in Afghanistan does not, as some suggest, make retaliation more in the West more likely. The terrorist needs no provocation, but will take any opportunity that arises. It would be a mistake to think that the immediate threat at home is changed by attacks on Afghanistan. The military campaign will need to take advantage of the short time of reasonable weather. It is unlikely to result in a quick outcome. Yet, the US has shown that it is ready for prolonged campaigns. Few would have forecast that routine military action over Iraq would still be the order of the day 10 years after the Gulf War. The Afghanistan campaign, both military and humanitarian is unlikely to be finished in a short time.
The UK forces have been used in the first wave of attacks. They are well suited for the opening shots of the campaign with submarine launched cruise missiles. They will also be able to contribute to the reconnaissance and assessment work that will be essential after each attack. If ground forces, of any sort, are to be used, the Bristish soldiers will be a useful asset. Work will be needed to see real commitment from other allies as the campaign develops. There is no better way to keep political leaders focused on the campaign than for them to have their armed forces involved. This is the first round of what is likely to be a campaign with many strands, which will extend into the years ahead.