By Sir Timothy Garden
Whenever the historians examine past conflict, there is always a claim that intervention at an earlier stage could have saved the day. The British Government has set up a conflict prevention fund to focus MOD,FCO and DfID thinking towards prevention rather than expensive and messy cure. Macedonia was often in the past quoted as a good example of how a small investment in assistance at an early stage could reap big dividends. The UN sponsored military force which was positioned there during the Bosnia troubles, promoted stability and deterred neighbours from precipitate action. Unfortunately that force was withdrawn when the Macedonian Government decided to recognise Taiwan, and the Chinese reacted by removing their support in the UN Security Council. Nevertheless, Macedonia seemed to withstand the pressures during the subsequent Kosovo operation, and provides a very necessary line of communication for NATO forces. We should not therefore be surprised that the UK is in the lead with the latest NATO interventio
The hesitant moves towards deployment of a NATO force underlines the very real worries that there are about the overall strategy and implementation. The civil war between the Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority sounds at first like another Kosovo problem. However, in this case the Albanians are cast in the role of bad guys. Many of the ethnic Albanians insurgents will have picked up their military expertise and equipment from the support that they received during the Kosovo air campaign of 1999. Operation Essential Harvest, as NATO’s deployment is bizarrely known, is designed merely to supervise the handing over of Albanian weapons as part of an agreement between the Macedonian Government and the ethnic Albanian military groups. For its part, Macedonia will pass the necessary legislation to recognise Albanian language and other rights. It all seems so simple that one is moved to wonder why 3500 of the best troops in the world are needed to make it work. The reason is that the Albanians do not t remember NATO as being their saviour in Kosovo. Where does this leave NATO?
Op Essential Harvest is planned as a three phase exercise. The UK will set up an advance HQ with a force of 400 troops. These are virtually all British Army, although security for the deployment is being provided by Czech soldiers. Brigadier Barney White-Spunner, who leads this initial deployment, has made it clear that his role is to assess the feasibility of the full disarming operation, and make recommendations to NATO about the wisdom of the full deployment of a further 3000 troops. NATO has been planning for a 30 day operation in which perhaps 3000 to 6000 weapons might be collected from the Albanians. Having completed the task they would then withdraw from Macedonia.
As with any military campaign, contingency plans need to be made for when things turn out differently. The biggest question to be considered is the likely aims of the two players who have made their ceasefire agreement. The Macedonian Government will doubtless be content to support the NATO operation as currently formulated. It would allow its enemy to be disarmed at little or no risk to its own troops. It would also continue to put it in the right light with the international community. There are however divisions even within the Macedonian Government. While Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski has agreed to the proposals, his motivation may be more economic than philosophical. Certainly many of his Slav nationalist supporters would prefer not to make concessions to the Albanians. There is some question over whether, he will be able to deliver sufficient votes in Parliament for the necessary legislation to accommodate the Albanian demands.
The ethnic Albanians doubtless see the arrival of NATO as promoting their cause, securing their territory and keeping the government forces off their backs. They will almost certainly keep back significant stocks of weapons just in case it all goes wrong. They will also worry that they will become vulnerable to further repressive measures once NATO leaves. Their strategy will therefore be to keep NATO engaged for as long as possible, while consolidating their position. The offer by the OSCE to provide a monitoring force of 200 unarmed observers after NATO withdraws is unlikely to affect their thinking.
Among the NATO allies there seems to be a degree of caution about the commitment. In particular, German support may be difficult to sustain. The US has taken on the role of leading the internal public relations battle in Macedonia, and this may prove to be a role for which it is better suited.
Before the full NATO deployment arrives, it is in the interests of both Macedonian parties to observe the ceasefire. For the 30 days of implementation, both may wish to accuse the other of bad faith. NATO has threatened to withdraw if the ceasefire is not observed, but such a momentous decision would be difficult to make. At the end of the 30 days, which may be October given the ponderous decision and deployment process, winter will be approaching. Not for the first time in the Balkans, OSCE unarmed monitors may be trying to spend a winter preventing regrouping and rearming for a spring offensive. It may be that NATO should decide that a presence for rather longer than a month would be a better conflict prevention measure this time.