By Sir Timothy Garden
The latest test of one component of the prospective ballistic missile defence system has been heralded as successful. What does this mean for the technical feasibility of the Bush “Son of Star Wars” project, how is the rest of the world reacting and what does it all mean for UK policy?
Six months into the Bush Presidency, his approach to missile defence is beginning to become a little clearer. There is to be a research phase which will look at virtually every conceivable system for defending against a ballistic missile attack. The test in July was designed to explore the technologies for mid-course interception of an incoming warhead protected by a single dissimilar decoy. In this respect it was almost a repeat experiment of the Clinton final missile test of a year ago when the kill vehicle failed to separate from the rocket carrying it. This time all the missile components appear to have performed correctly. However, the radar which was also being tested became overloaded with data when the interception happened. This gives two causes for concern: first the exact nature of the interception remains uncertain (was the decoy or the warhead or neither hit?); and second can the radar be easily spoofed by chaff? This explains the measured announcements which followed the test, which cost $100 million. It is planned to have a test every month from now onwards. Remembering that this is just one component of a multi-layered system, it is easy to see how the costs will accumulate very rapidly.
The most difficult issue however will be the politics rather than the scientific results of tests. It has become clear that many of the Bush Administration want to dispose of the restraints of the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as soon as possible. This has led to a rather confused policy approach. At times there seems to be a desire to renegotiate a satisfactory revised ABM treaty with the Russians, but as often it appears that the US is going to pull out of the treaty as soon as is can. Current US official thinking is that change will be necessary within the coming “months” rather than years. There also appears to be uncertainty in policy thinking as to what will constitute a clear breach of the treaty. Russia is playing on this uncertainty by announcing that the pouring of concrete to prepare a missile site in Alaska will constitute a breach, whereas some in the US argue that the deployment of an operational capability (either radar or missiles) would be necessary.
The European governments are unenthusiastic about an early breach of an important arms control treaty. Their leaders will have continued to press this point in the margins of the G8 summit in Genoa, and will have been egged on by President Putin. Russia has already reacted to the missile test by signing an accord with China, and also agreeing a large arms sales deal. While it is over fanciful to see Russia and China forming a joint power axis given their long term mutual suspicions, this is nevertheless a less than helpful development. Certainly if Russia feels that it is humiliated by a US abrogation of the ABM treaty, we should expect an end to nuclear build down and perhaps a new focus on military spending in both Russia and China. It will be interesting to see whether anything of importance comes from the surprise announcement of more talks between Russia and the US following the G8 Summit.
There are other problems for US policy makers. It is clear that the Rumsfeld approach to defence planning has alarmed the senior military officers in the Pentagon. Rumsfeld before taking office was an advocate for not just missile defence, but also for the militarisation of space. His early announcements talked about the need to skip a generation of military technology. It seems clear that he has a vision for US defence which is based on projecting military power from safe bases, either in the US or perhaps in space, and leaving the dangerous hand to hand local soldiering to other allies. This has profound implications for the structure of the US armed forces, which are already desperately underfunded for their size. It may be that the military, in wishing to preserve their turf, will be the most difficult problem for the missile defence advocates.
What does all this mean for UK policy? Time may be running out for the British Government wait and see line on missile defences. Tony Blair has been warm but cautious in his support of George Bush. He agrees there is a problem of proliferation, but he has not endorsed the US Star Wars solution. It would be an extraordinary break with post War policy if the UK were to refuse the US facilities at Fylingdales and Menwith Hill as part of a missile defence system. However a large section of the Labour Party are unhappy with the proposals, the Liberal Democrats are against and the rest of Europe is unconvinced. The Foreign Affairs Select Committee in the last government advocated the UK taking a lead to preserve the ABM treaty. Its chairman was reinstated by Parliament after the Government tried to oust him. All this suggests that the issue could become a yet more difficult one for the Prime Minister. He will lose stature in Europe and in the Labour Party if he appears to cave in to US demands yet again. However his inclination and advice from Geoff Hoon at Defence will be to do just that.