by Sir Timothy Garden
There was a slight flurry of interest in defence matters ahead of the General Election when a number of the broadsheets reported that the plans for new Royal Navy aircraft carriers were in jeopardy. Your author must at this stage declare an interest. The press reports were drawn from an article that Sir Michael Alexander, former UK Ambassador to NATO, and I had co-authored about the dire trends in defence budgets throughout Europe. Our analysis for the UK showed that capability was heading for the rocks, and quite soon. Looking at the best possible outlook for defence budgets we said: ” There can be little chance, for instance, that the carriers envisaged in the Strategic Defence Review will ever be built.” This caused some excitement in the defence establishment. It is not clear why it should have done so, and others welcomed the fact that defence policy came into the election debate albeit briefly.
Safely back in parliament, the traditional Friday Foreign Affairs and Defence debate was held to the usual virtually empty House. Just two days’ after the State opening, it was an even blander affair than usual. However, the question of the aircraft carriers could not be avoided, and for once there was total agreement among the three parties. Menzies Campbell announced that he had now shed the Defence portfolio for the Liberal Democrats, but this did not stop him from telling the Defence Secretary that the Strategic Defence Review plans for the aircraft carriers were the centrepiece of the new expeditionary force proposals. The Conservative Defence front bench leapt to the support of this concept, and trusted that the Defence Secretary would confirm that the carriers were safe. Geoff Hoon, probably less than enthused to find himself still Defence Secretary, duly confirmed that plans for the carriers were on course.
This piece of theatre is very curious on two counts. First there is a real question about resources for defence over the next ten years; and second no one seems prepared to ask the question as to what use such carriers might be. On current plans, two aircraft carriers (design and size not yet agreed) with aircraft capable of air defence and bombing (type not yet certain or built) will come into service in 2012 and 2015 respectively. This is a very long time away. No other spending department is able to predict what it will be doing three government terms ahead.
We can make reasonable projections of the funding that might be available over the next ten years. From the late 1980s until just recently, defence budgets everywhere have been falling dramatically. This has been matched by even steeper declines in manpower and combat units. In the UK, our armed forces are now some 40% smaller than they were twenty five years ago despite the fact that we spend nearly as much in real terms each year as we did then. No European government is aiming to do more than keep spending level in real terms (and many will fail to achieve even this). As a result, capability will continue decline as the pay of troops and the cost of equipment both rise faster than domestic inflation. The problem is made more acute by the need to provide new enabling capabilities for EU operations, and also by the diversity of military operations. Trying to keep up with US technological development adds another cost problem; and any attempt to participate in missile defence will make this even worse. Since the end of the Cold War, the UK has had 3 official Defence Reviews (Tom King, Malcolm Rifkind and George Robertson). A major review every four years is about the going rate, which means there could be another 3 before the first aircraft carrier is delivered.
If the funding is problematic, the rationale may also have some holes below the water line. The SDR was less than detailed in making the case for the carriers. It said: “Aircraft carriers will have a wide utility, including for deterrence and coercion.” Yet an examination of the post Cold War tasks for British military forces shows the emphasis elsewhere. The lack of effective UK carrier operations from the Gulf War onwards is blamed on the current generation’s inadequacies; but we managed without them. There was a curious deployment of a carrier during the Kosovo air campaign, but it arrived late and left early. The real desire for aircraft carriers is as a symbol of British defence leadership in both European and US circles. An ability to share risks with the US on international operations is important, but we should not confuse that with useful military capability. Since operations in future will be ones of choice, we can choose those in which aircraft carriers have a role or those, more usually, where they do not. All of this will provide a ready rationale for the Defence Review of 2005/2006 to decide there are better things to do with the money.
In any event, even if the political will remains strong there are a number of real uncertainties over the programme itself. Everyone has fingers crossed that the US will keep development of the Joint Strike Fighter going (with the help of £1.5 billion from the UK). Even so, the more appropriate carrier version is at particular risk. Even if the aircraft comes good on time (and who knows what the prognosis for building the ship hulls will be), there is then the problem of finding pilots to operate them. For all the talk of moves to unmanned systems, pilots seem as much in demand as ever. Royal Navy pilots are in such short supply that they are currently getting a £50,000 bonus to stay on an extra 24 months. What will they cost by 2012?
No one expects the MOD to suddenly backtrack from its commitment to the carriers. However, it might be wise for all parties to think through the programme before the real money starts being committed. It would not be the first time that we have spent a lot on something which was eventually cancelled.