It is easy to understand the immediate appeal to both military and civilian of the thought that it might be possible to provide defences against such an awful prospect as a nuclear or other WMD attack. The US has a long and expensive history of attempting to provide itself with defences against incoming ballistic missile attack. The first attempts of the 60's were abandoned when it became clear that such defences were technically infeasible, and did no more than stimulate the Soviet Union to increase the numbers of its nuclear tipped missiles. The possibility of multiple warhead missiles made defences even less reliable and reduced the stability of deterrence. In a wonderful moment of rationality, the US and the Soviet Union agreed to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 which severely limited the defensive system that each side could deploy. It was a treaty in which not only both sides benefited from increased security, but the world at large - and Europe in particular - applauded the reduced impetus for a nuclear arms race. As technology improved, industry again offered a vision of providing leakproof missile defences, and President Reagan held out the prospect in a speech in 1983. The Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) spent billions of dollars, but came no closer to providing a reliable defence against a nuclear strikes. The UK Government then showed interest in the hope of getting a share of the research funds, but was sceptical about feasibility.
The arguments against Star Wars in the early 80s had been on technical , strategic, military effectiveness, financial and stability grounds. The new proposals for NMD draw on the SDI technologies but look to a much more limited requirement. The threat to the continental United States is assumed to come at some time in the future from a "rogue state" (now called states of concern). These are normally thought to include North Korea, Iran or Iraq. Although for the non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction, the CIA has identified up to 20 states that might develop long range missiles, and have interests that are at variance with those of the US. Each is expected to have very few missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction over intercontinental distances. The technical problems of interception are therefore expected to be much less. There is a political consensus among Democrats and Republicans that NMD should go ahead if it is technically possible, and Congress has ensured that there is also a legal requirement. The system testing so far has been ( to put it at its kindest) ambiguous, and the third key interception test failed badly. Europe celebrated President Clinton's decision to put off any decision until his successor is in post. Technical capability may be better than it was, but remains unable to provide an impermeable screen.
The strategic implications are still much the same as they were for SDI, despite the end of the Cold War and the more limited declaratory aims. Some fear that undermining the ABM treaty will unpick all the hard won achievements of arms control over the past 30 years. It is argued by some (and I detect this may become the UK official position) that if the US manages to renegotiate the treaty with the Russians, there would be no such problem. Unfortunately, the elements of the NMD system are not just minor changes to the treaty. The thrust of the ABM treaty is to prohibit a nation-wide defensive system. NMD also requires treaty-banned space-based sensors and radars outside of the United States. The Russians are currently playing hardball. President Putin has made it clear that he wishes to retain the ABM treaty and move to smaller deployments of strategic missiles on both US and Russian soil. This would be a good thing - but I think we must consider whether it is likely to remain the Russian approach for the coming year. They realise that there is little to be gained in the dying days of the Clinton Presidency. If they wish to negotiate, they need to do it with the next administration. They are in a good position to play the ABM treaty long. They may well be prepared to renegotiate given the right incentives, which are as likely to be economic as to to be security based. If an incoming Republican administration decides to unilaterally withdraw from the treaty (as it is legally entitled to do by giving 6 month's notice), then the Russia can take the moral high ground. I think therefore that the rest of the world needs to look carefully at the implications of some form of deal between the US and Russia over the ABM treaty. It is not sufficient to say that this is a bilateral treaty which we are not a party to. We have benefited greatly from the reduction in incentive for increasing warheads over the years, and we will lose out if a new arms race results from an irrelevant ABM treaty. Indeed we ought perhaps be looking to extend the treaty to become multilateral, but that is a different issue.
What might the effect be of the end of an effective ABM treaty? The obvious response for declared nuclear powers is to increase the number of nuclear systems they field to a level where they feel they can still maintain their strategic deterrence requirements. For various reasons, the one nuclear power that is most likley to react initially is China. The US and Russia both still have more than enough strategic nuclear systems. It might affect perceptions about what levels they can downsize towards; but they have plenty of room for manoeuvre. Indeed the Bush team have been saying that an effective NMD system would allow them to come down to 3000 warheads with confidence. It is not clear whether Congress would deliver this promise. Russia might have much more difficulty in implenting a downsizing at a time when the US had withdrawn unilaterally from the ABM treaty. In the past the UK has worried about the effect of missile defences, and the very expensive Chevaline programme for Polaris decoys was about overcoming missile defences. However it has room for increasing within the Trident system, in the unlikely event that it felt that it needed to respond. The French are unlikely to feel that they need to do much about their systems . China is in a different position. It has relatively few strategic missiles. As the IISS Military Balance says:
" China's strategic capability is composed of less than 200 nuclear warheads of which perhaps 20-30 would be operational at any given time. To be sure of over-coming even a limmited missile-defence capability, China would have to spend resources on increasing its strategic weapons and enhancing counter-measures (including using multiple warheads)."
With no mobile land missiles and only one SSBN, China will also have increased worries about pre-emtive nuclear attack, and this of course will have knock on effects on its readiness posture. It is likely to see a greater need for launch on warning type arrangements.
An increase in China's nuclear armoury does not just affect the US/China nuclear elationship. India's main reason for a nuclear capability is China (not Pakistan, which it could easily defeat conventionally. If China goes on to a more offensive nuclear posture, India is likely to follow suit and Pakistan will follow the lead. So we see increased nuclear dangers far remote from the protection of the US continent.
Looking at the postulated threat which NMD is designed to counter raises a number of questions. Iran, Iraq and North Korea are reasonably certain potential proliferators. The CIA report in August 2000 says:
Iran
Iran sought nuclear-related equipment, material and technical expertise from a variety of sources, especially in Russia." Iran is attempting to finish its Bushehr reactor and "establish a complete nuclear fuel cycle." While Tehran claims that these activities are purely for civilian energy applications, the report warns that Iran "continues to seek fissile material and technology for weapons development" and uses civilian entities as part of an "elaborate system" devoted to furthering these efforts.
North Korea
While North Korea has made enough plutonium for one to two nuclear weapons and continues to purchase items that potentially could be used in nuclear weapons production, we do not know of any procurement directly linked to the nuclear weapons program.
Iraq
We do not have any direct evidence that Iraq has used the period since Desert Fox to reconstitute its WMD programs, although given its past behavior, this type of activity must be regarded as likely.
Syria and Libya have become less so in recent times. Given particular circumstances, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan and Egypt might become interested. In terms of missile delivery systems, the only nations either operating or developing capabilities for missiles of over 500km range are: the 5 NWS, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, N Korea, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Taiwan. All of these are in reaction to regional rather than global balances of power, although gaining a nuclear capability would change their status within the international community. Iran is active in its development of both cruise and long range ballistic missiles. Iraq can do little about longer range missiles while UN sanctions continue. Libya has tried unsuccessfully to obtain longer range missile technology. North Korea is actively obtaining such technology from China.
In summary then, the future nuclear threats from states are unlikely to be as severe as they were in the Cold War days. The major problem remains Russia, and that needs to be handled in ways other than militarily.
We need also to consider the threat from other weapons of mass destruction the Chemical and Biological agents. The potential of biological agents as strategic weapons has not been lost on Saddam Hussein in Iraq. While the UNSCOM inspection team have been fairly successful in destroying his nuclear and chemical warfare capacity, they are less certain how well they have done in reducing his ability to manufacture biological weapons. It appears that Iraq is still intent on achieving a strategic capability using weapons of mass destruction, and that it is more likely to be successful through its biological warfare research programmes.
The August 2000 CIA report says:
Iraq may have more CW left over from the Iran-Iraq War then previously anticipated. Iraq has rebuilt a number of facilities destroyed in bombing during the Gulf War and Desert Fox, and is attempting to develop unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used for delivering CW and BW.
Iran possesses a number of CW, including blister, blood, and choking agents and the bombs and artillery shells for delivering them. Iran continues to seek outside assistance in all aspects of chemical weapons development, particularly from Russia and China.
After UN sanctions against it were dropped in April of last year, Libya wasted no time in attempting to obtain chemical weapons components and expertise from other countries, primarily in Western Europe. Libya still wants to establish its own offensive CW capability and continues to pursue an indigenous production capability.
North Korea has both the production capacity and means of delivery for a wide variety of CW and BW
Emerging powers may decide it is better to go less traditional routes with their WMD delivery systems. None of this is helpful in promotion confidence and safety. There are also worries about what the deployment of such a system would mean for NATO. If the US had provided for itself a shield which was not available to the rest of NATO, would this affect the internal alliance relationships adversely? Governor Bush's advisors assure critics that they would provide effective protection for Europe as well. The technical viability of this extended system is even more suspect, the cost enormously greater and there would be a transition period of perhaps years before the system was extended. Europeans do not share the US view of how to handle the threat of proliferation in difficult states. Nor do they believe that a missile defensive system protects against the many different types of threat that are now emerging. In some respects the long range missile threat is the least likely and nuclear deterrence remains a sufficient strategy. Indeed the main sources of concern (North Korea, Iran and Iraq) are currently being addressed in different ways. We need also to look at the range of counter measures, which are available to us and our Allies. These are broadly: regulation, deterrence, offensive operations, defensive measures both passive and active. The regulation regime can be co-operative through arms control, and nonco-operative through export controls of critical material. Arms control sometimes gets a bad press, but I would argue it has been remarkably successful in constraining proliferation. It has roles in nuclear, chemical and biological. Arms control is well structured in the nuclear field with the NPT, START, fissile material cut off, CTBT, nuclear weapon free zones. There are proposals for dealerting and unilateral reductions of weapons from nuclear weapon states. There have been deals to control North Korea programmes. On the much more difficult side of Chemical weapons, the 1993 CWC entered force 1997 with 2/3 of countries of concern signing. 1972 BWC in force 1975 - lacks effective verification regime. Where arms control fails to stop proliferators, the next line of defence is deterrence. In the nuclear field this is well understood, but it is less clear in the case of biological and chemical attack. The ambiguity in the UK's position over the use of nuclear weapons re-inforces the deterrent effect.
Control of availability of dangerous cultures is an obvious recommendation. However, there are many potential killer agents, and also many entirely legitimate uses for them. The need for good intelligence is highlighted, but this will never be the complete answer in a democratic society. These discomforting conclusions mean that limiting the threat may mean expending most effort on preparation for coping with the outbreak of infection in order to minimise loss of life. While, precautionary inoculation against the most likely biological warfare diseases may be possible for military troops who are at direct risk, it is unlikely to be an effective or desirable general approach. The key to defensive measures must be early detection of a release of biological agents. Biotechnology is offering some prospect of fast reacting sensors, which can rapidly identify a wide range of agents. The universal wearing of a relatively inexpensive protective mask is recommended as a way of reducing civilian casualties from aerosol agents, such as anthrax, by several orders of magnitude. Quick response medical teams, who are trained to recognise a biological warfare event are also needed.
Measures to counter the problem are many,complex and need to be tailored to the different risks. One hundred percent saftey is not possible, but the outlook is not hopeless. Careful diplomacy, economic measures, intelligence gathering and defensive and offensive preparations can do much to contain the risks.
The costs of NMD remain very high, and will undoubtedly drain defence resources from other more urgent needs. Some who worry about managing the sorts of conflicts we have been involved in lately worry about the US focusing its defence expenditure on the wrong priority. However in the end, the spending issue is one for the US alone. While the US economy booms, they can easily afford the costs, even if they are in the end wasted again.
On military effectiveness, it is difficult to imagine a level of defensive assurance that will change the approach the US takes in its dealing with difficult nations. No future President would be so confident of the efficacy of an NMD system that he would ignore the potential risk of an NMD strike. From a military perspective, the loss of money for other capabilities is likely to be the more important aspect.
However, despite these doubts, which are shared by a wide body of opinion in and out of government in Europe, what right have we Europeans to interfere in the internal security arrangements of the United States? The answer of course is that we fear that NMD will make the world a more dangerous place, will reduce European security and in the UK give us some internal as well external problems.
The particular policy problem for the UK government is that two installations (Fylingdales radar station and Menwith Hill) may both be integral parts of any US NMD system. The necessary upgrades are likely to breach the ABM treaty unless it is renegotiated or abrogated. The UK has therefore some leverage with any US administration. To preserve that leverage, it has doggedly stuck to a formula that says " since the US has not requested upgrades as yet, we have not addressed the policy". This is has worked well so far, despite criticism of NMD from the Foreign Affairs Committee and other commentators.
Earlier this year, it looked as though the UK felt that its best role might be to help to broker the best modified ABM treaty that it could. This is not a role which would make many friends in the rest of Europe. It would be seen as another example of the UK being more with the US than with Europe. There are also domestic political issues. It may prove difficult to explain why the UK is hosting two key parts of an American defensive system, which in the first instance provides no extra security to Britain. Indeed in any future war, we might expect these facilities to be high priority for attack.
The Conservative party are more sympathetic to US NMD aspirations, and it is another issue in their constant battle against the rest of Europe. They support NMD and want the UK to offer whatever is necessary. The Liberal Democrats want the UK to oppose NMD and look to strengthening ties with Europe and bolstering the arms control regime. We have therefore a potentially divisive political issue if the new administration moves quickly on the UK participation in any NMD scheme. For now the Government has quietly celebrated the failure of the critical test, and President Clinton's deferment of the decision.
What should we and the rest of the international community do? After all, every American you talk with says that NMD is a done deal. No politician would speak against it - any more than they would speak against the death penalty. A move which is likely to result in a less safe world in general, and a less safe Britain in particular, for no advantage is one in which Britain and Europe have a legitimate interest. Perhaps there is now a Common Foreign and Security Policy interest for Europe which is not shared by the United States. The real question is whether we damage our security more by accepting that the US is going to do this anyway, and hoping that the technical difficulties will cause it to take much much longer than forecast, or whether we risk a serious split with the US over this issue. European opinion undoubtedly had an influence earlier this year. There might be merit in supporting a more evolutionary approach toward missile defences for deployed military formations. These would be technically more likely to work, cost less and have a strategic rationale. Some of the NMD technologies are entirely appropriate for more limited theatre missile defences. If agreement were possible on this approach, with a maintenance of the ABM treaty, I think we might look forward to a safer rather more dangerous world. Whatever, we need to continue the dialogue with the new administration in the US, and not lose out doubly by causing a transatlantic security rift and also suffering the reduction in safety implicit in early decisions on NMD deployment.