In looking at whether WMD are a growing threat to the UK, we need to ask a number of questions. The first is about timescales. Today, the UK is at much lower risk of attack by nuclear weapons than it was 20 years ago. The Cold War was a period of very significant risk. NATO's defence strategy depended on an ability to respond quickly to any attack by the Warsaw Pact, and if necessary the use of nuclear weapons to prevent defeat. The mechanisms for escalation to nuclear warfighting were sufficiently credible for deterrence to work, and we survived the Cold War period. However, it might not have been so. If deterrence had failed, there is no certainty that a nuclear exchange could have been prevented. The scale of the nuclear armoury during that period was extraodinary (measured in tens of thousands of warheads). We now know that Biological and Chemical weapons capability continued to be developed in Russia until quite recently. So at one level, I could answer the question set in the title of my talk by saying that in the post Cold War era Weapons of Mass Destruction are a very diminished concern for the UK.
I think however the question posed is more in the context of the post Cold War trend in an uncertain world, where threats come from many directions and in different forms. In that context do we see a future where small states can threaten large states with WMD weapons; where terrorist groups can hold governments to ransom, and where fanatics can promote their creeds with mass killings? To examine these possibilities, I shall take you through the possible countries and groups which may be of concern; look at the types of WMD; consider delivery methods; and then talk about the political, economic, diplomatic and military counter-measures available to the international community. But first what do we mean by WMD?
The grouping together of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical weapons under the collective name of Weapons of Mass Destruction is not of itself very helpful. It mixes the ideas of indiscrimate killing with the horror of the particular ways of death caused by these weapons. The scale of death caused by the three different weapon types can be very large. For a given payload, a nuclear weapon can cause mass immediate casualties (tens of thousands) and perhaps even more delayed deaths. Biological weapons may cause similar numbers of delayed deaths, but simple protective measures can reduce these numbers markedly. Chemical weapons will produce prompt casualties but only within a relatively small population.
The mechanism of each weapon is different, but delivery means may be similar. A nuclear weapon is dependent on advanced engineering processes. While the design of a simple nuclear device is undergraduate physics, the manufacturing process is difficult. In essence to make an atomic bomb, it is necessary to bring together a sufficient mass of a rare isotope of Uranium (235) or of Plutonium for a sufficiently long period to generate a runaway fission reaction. In simple terms an atom of the fissile material radiates a neutron which strikes another atom and stimulates the radiation of 3 neutrons, with the release of energy caused by the change in mass. Those 3 hit 3 more releasing 9 neutrons and so on. All this happens in very short timescales and the energy released becomes the atomic explosion. Even greater energy can be caused by the fusion of atoms. In the Hydrogen bomb, an atomic bomb is used as the energy source to fuse atoms of hydrogen together and release even more energy. The difficulty in making such weapons work is in the design of the mechanics to bring the material together and hold it there long enough for an explosion. You also need to be able to obtain enough of the Uranium 235 or Plutonium to have a critical mass. Naturally occurring Uranium is almost all U238 which, although radioactive, cannot achieve a self sustaining chain reaction. In order to extract the fissile U235, enormous centrifuges are used to progressively separate the two isotopes with such similar molecular weights. Over a period of time the Uranium becomes more enriched with U235 and can be used for weapon production. Plutonium does not occur naturally and has to be produced by a nuclear reactor.
These somewhat brief insights into the manufacture of the warhead material are just to remind you that producing nuclear warhead material from scratch is not an easy task. You need special handling arrangements, vast electric power supplies, high technology scientists and plenty of patience. Having produced the nuclear material in sufficient quantity, you then need to manufacture a system that will keep it subcritical when not needed, but bring it together and hold it together for long enough, when you want your nuclear bang. These days much of this design work can be done by computer simulation, but this is more difficult to calibrate for non nuclear states. This will normally mean that a greater quantity of fissile material will be needed to achieve a level of assurance for a self sustaining reaction. All in all the necessary industrial and scientific capability required makes it reasonably easy to gain intelligence about nuclear aspirations for a state. There is also a considerable time delay bewteen starting work and fielding a nuclear weapon. The only shortcut is if fissile material can be obtained from third parties - and I shall return to that theme.
Biological and chemical weapons are much more easily produced by any state with a pharmaceutical or agrichemical research and industrial base. Nerve agents can be produced by processes that are similar to chenical insecticide preoduction. The incubation of biological agents is not that different from the production of vaccine or yoghurt. Sources of biological agents can be extracted naturally from diseased animals or humans. There needs to be advanced handling facilities to prevent escape of such agents, but all of these are available commercially. Most of the research and production facilities are possible dual peaceful or military use. The facilities are of a moderate size and have fewer externally observable signatures. The more advanced genetically engineered agents are also within the scope of many nations research laboratories.
The warhead is only one part of the system. The other key consideration is the method of delivery. Looking for long range delivery systems, the choices are aircraft, missiles (cruise or ballistic), shi p( like the USS Cole attack) and human (the suitcase bomb or the test tube of anthrax). All of these have advantages and disadvantages depending on the attacking agent, the target and the technical capability of the aggressor. I will deal with these as I look at each of the possible attackers.
There is no doubt that the nuclear aspect of WMD remains the most worrying prospect for the present. Despite the difficulties in becoming nuclear capable, a number of States see a rationale for making the effort. The question is whether, should they gain such a capability, they will represent a threat to the UK or its Allies. Let me deal first with those states that have a nuclear capability today. Aside from ourselves, the other 4 members of the Security Council (US,Russia, China and France) deploy nuclear weapons. Indeed these 5 are the only officially recognised nuclear weapon states in terms of the non-proliferation treaty. Of those, we can discount France and the US as threats to the UK. Russia is a much reduced threat since the end of the Cold War, but still has around 10,000 nuclear warheads in service and has a great quantity of fissile material which needs to be disposed of safely. The indications are that the Russians would be happy to reduce much further, if they were given the necessary resources and if the US also reduced its nuclear stockpile. The START process has a role to play, but there are other deeper and perhaps unilateral cuts possible. China is assessed as having only about 20 strategic nuclear missiles currently. These are seen as giving it a minimum deterrence posture and it would be very unlikely to initiate a nuclear exchange from this limited posture. It has many more tactical nuclear systems, which have implications for Taiwan and its other regional neighbours. In addition, it has said that the deployment by the US of an area missile defence system would force it to increase its long range nuclear armoury. All 5 of the Nuclear Weapon States agreed at the NPT Review conference this year, that they aim to eliminate their nuclear capability. They did not agree a timescale.
Next let us look at those States which have a nuclear capability but are not recognised by the international community as legitimate NWS. First is Israel, which is generally thought to field about 200 weapons. The assumption is that these are weapons of national survival and, whatever their international status, it is difficult to think of them as a threat to the UK. India and Pakistan are the only two other states with operational nuclear weapons. They form a strategic triangle of deterrence with China. This may be dangerous and potentially unstable, but it is not likely to be a threat to the UK.
We then come to the states which are either working on nuclear capability, or may show an interest in developing one. This is inevitably a more subjective assessment. Iran, Iraq and North Korea are reasonably certain potential proliferators. The CIA report in August 2000 says:
Iran sought nuclear-related equipment, material and technical expertise from a variety of sources, especially in Russia. Iran is attempting to finish its Bushehr reactor and establish a complete nuclear fuel cycle. While Tehran claims that these activities are purely for civilian energy applications, the report warns that Iran continues to seek fissile material and technology for weapons development and uses civilian entities as part of an elaborate system devoted to furthering these efforts. While North Korea has made enough plutonium for one to two nuclear weapons and continues to purchase items that potentially could be used in nuclear weapons production, we do not know of any procurement directly linked to the nuclear weapons program. We do not have any direct evidence that Iraq has used the period since Desert Fox to reconstitute its WMD programs, although given its past behavior, this type of activity must be regarded as likely.
Syria and Libya have become less so in recent times. Given particular circumstances, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan and Egypt might become interested. In terms of missile delivery systems, the only nations either operating or developing capabilities for missiles of over 500km range are: the 5 NWS, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, N Korea, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Taiwan. All of these are in reaction to regional rather than global balances of power, although gaining a nuclear capability would change their status within the international community. Iran is active in its development of both cruise and long range ballistic missiles. Iraq can do little about longer range missiles while UN sanctions continue. Libya has tried unsuccessfully to obtain longer range missile technology. North Korea is actively obtaining such technology from China.
In summary then, the future nuclear threats from states are unlikely to be as severe as they were in the Cold War days. The major problem remains Russia, and that needs to be handled in ways other than militarily.
Nuclear terrorism is even more difficult. While there are concerns about leakage of fissile material from Russia, the manufacture and delivery of a nuclear device remains very difficult, and more easily detectable than other weapons of terror. However, it should not be forgotten that the dispersal of nuclear material by conventional explosion can be as effective a terror weapon, and this is potentially much more easily achieved.
CBW are a spectrum. At the left hand side of this spectrum you have the traditional chemical agents such as Cyanide, Phosgene, Mustard and the nerve agents. These are covered by the Chemical Weapons Convention and work by poisoning the body. At the right hand end of the spectrum you have the traditional BW agents such as anthrax and plague, infective (perhaps genetically modified) bacteria and viruses, which are all covered by the Biological Weapons convention. In the middle of this spectrum are the toxins that are the non living chemicals produced by living organisms, ans so are biological agents procucing chemical agents. They are covered by both the CWC and the BWC, whic is more properly the Biological and Toxin Weapons convention.
The delivery methods for BW and CW are also more varied than nuclear. They can of course be weaponsised in missiles and bombs. But they can be dispersed as aerosols from drones, civil aircraft, down air conditioning inlets. They can poison reservoirs. CW needs pretty large quantities to have any mass effect, but BW can be relatively small quantities given infectivity.
In 1979 more than 60 people died of anthrax in Sverdlovsk over a period of 6 weeks. Five years later, 751 people suffered food poisoning from eating from restaurant salad bars in a small town called The Dalles in Oregon. We now know that the deaths in the Soviet Union were caused by a very small accidental release of anthrax spores from a biological weapons plant, while the American salmonella outbreak was caused by deliberate bacterial contamination of food by a religious cult. Biological weapons are not new, but they are becoming more attractive to a number of players on the international security scene. The United States Government is particularly concerned by the potential threat that it faces from a wide range of possible adversaries in this area. Most historical reviews of biological warfare start by citing the use of plague victims' bodies by the Tatars in 1346 as catapult projectiles against the hapless inhabitants of Kaffa. The city was conquered when an outbreak of plague caused the citizens to flee. Whether the infected bodies were the cause of victory is less certain, given that the fleas which transmit plague prefer living bodies. It is more likely that they would have infected the catapult operators than the townspeople of Kaffa. The example highlights the difficulties of effective use of biological agents for warfighting. Disease is never instantaneous in effect, nor is it entirely predictable in its transmission. In 1763, the British used smallpox infected blankets to try to reduce the Native Americans in the Ohio River valley. While there were smallpox epidemics among the tribes people, it is more likely that they were caused by the normal respiratory droplet transmission coupled with the Indian's lack of natural immunity.
As with many mass killing methods, it was not until this century that scientific advances coupled with industrial production techniques made biological warfare a realistic concept. Germany had an ambitious programme running throughout World War I and targeted the mules and horses of the Allies with anthrax. However, chemical warfare was much more favoured because it could incapacitate troops quickly. After the war, bacteriological warfare was grouped with chemical in the international efforts to limit the use of indiscriminate weapons. The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of biological weapons, but did not prohibit research or possession; it was not until 50 years later that the US ratified the Protocol. The experience in World War II was mixed. Hitler had prohibited biological weapons development until 1943, and the Allies continued their own development programmes for retaliatory use if necessary. Only the Japanese carried out both a major development programme and large scale attacks with these novel weapons. Cultures of various bacterial agents were sprayed from aircraft. In one of the more hazardous systems, fleas were bred and allowed to feed on plague infected rats. The fleas were then released from aircraft over Chinese cities. Each attack required the release of 15 million infected fleas which must have made the pilots feel that they deserved equal status with their Kamikaze colleagues. The Japanese suffered some 10,000 casualties and 1700 deaths in 1941 from their own biological weapons.
Despite the confirmation that biological weapons were of dubious military utility, the Cold War accelerated their development. Large scale production was undertaken by the USSR, and the Korean War gave an impetus to production in the US. For those of us engaged in military planning during the Cold War, there never seemed to be any scenario where the use of biological weapons would make any tactical sense. In 1969, Britain made a proposal to the United Nations to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons. The Warsaw Pact nations supported the proposal, with the proviso that the provision for inspections of suspect facilities should be dropped. The 1972 treaty came into force three years later, by which time the United States had destroyed all of its biological arsenal. If UN Conventions were universally observed that should have meant an end to the threat of biological warfare between States. The signatories to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention included the Soviet Union and Iraq. As we now know, both pursued their programmes actively.
The accident in Sverdlovsk is well documented . For a short time on 2 April 1979 some air filters at a biological warfare research facility were accidentally turned off. Anthrax spores escaped and were blown southwards by the wind. Those who were infected and died over the following six weeks were all living or working within a narrow 4 km corridor downwind of the facility. Livestock were infected up to 50 km from the leak. If a minor filtration problem can cause this degree of infection, it is easy to imagine what destruction a deliberate offensive use of anthrax might cause. US Department of Defense mathematical modelling shows that a single drone carrying 6.5 kg of anthrax could produce a cloud over an entire city which would cause deaths of several hundreds of thousands of people within 72 hours. While slower, the total kill rate is higher than that for a single nuclear weapon.
The potential of biological agents as strategic weapons has not been lost on Saddam Hussein in Iraq. While the UNSCOM inspection team have been fairly successful in destroying his nuclear and chemical warfare capacity, they are less certain how well they have done in reducing his ability to manufacture biological weapons. It appears that Iraq is still intent on achieving a strategic capability using weapons of mass destruction, and that it is more likely to be successful through its biological warfare research programmes.
The August 2000 CIA report says:
Iraq may have more CW left over from the Iran-Iraq War than previously anticipated. Iraq has rebuilt a number of facilities destroyed in bombing during the Gulf War and Desert Fox, and is attempting to develop unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used fordelivering CW and BW. Iran possesses a number of CW, including blister, blood, and choking agents and the bombs and artillery shells for delivering them. Iran continues to seek outside assistance in all aspects of chemical weapons development, particularly from Russia and China. After UN sanctions against it were dropped in April of last year, Libya wasted no time in attempting to obtain chemical weapons components and expertise from other countries, primarily in Western Europe. Libya still wants to establish its own offensive CW capability and continues to pursue an indigenous production capability. North Korea has both the production capacity and means of delivery for a wide variety of CW and BW
While the number of potential nuclear weapon states in the world has declined in recent years, the number of states which seem to be developing a capability for the strategic use of biological weapons has been increasing. The biological weapon is sometimes described as the poor man's atom bomb. Certainly its manufacture is far simpler than that of a nuclear weapon. The process can also be hidden more easily, as commercial biomedical factories can be used to produce the pathogens. Delivery systems are required, but given the comparatively small payload weight, they can be concealed more easily. States, like Iraq, see a strategic biological weapon arsenal as a means of standing up to the nuclear powers. As was seen in the Gulf War, this can be a two edged sword. It is now clear that they had weaponised biological agents, but they were deterred from using them by the implicit threat of nuclear retaliation by the US or Israel. Our question remains who is likely to threaten the UK in this way?
The future threat from such weapons is much more likely to be from non-state actors. Biological weapons are relatively easy to produce, cause great fear among the general population, and given the delay caused by the disease incubation period are anonymous. This makes them attractive to terrorists, anti-government groups, fanatics and deranged individuals. In these cases classical deterrence cannot work. Can we determine whether an outbreak of fatal food poisoning is caused by bad hygiene or deliberate contamination? An anthrax epidemic would be suspicious, but a particularly virulent influenza strain would be put down to natural mutation. There have been a surprising number of such cases. The easy availability of pathogen cultures is one of the problems.In one case, a white supremacist who was able to purchase a culture of the organism which is associated with plague.
The mapping of the human genome coupled with the wonders of genetic engineering may offer some very unpleasant opportunities to the biological weapon designer of the next century. Combining the speed and lethality of the Ebola virus with the ease of transmission of influenza would be bad enough. If such agents were then able to target particular gene configurations, ethnic cleansing and genocide could be pursued by dictators, fanatics and the insane in all too efficient ways. Less this seem too fanciful, 40 Aum Shinrikyo cult members went to Zaire to help in the Ebola virus outbreak of 1992. They failed in their aim to collect samples of the deadly virus, and had to content themselves with releasing the nerve agent sarin in the Tokyo subway three years later.
Before we can complete the analysis of WMD threats to the UK, we need also to look at the range of counter measures, which are available to us and our Allies. These are broadly: regulation, deterrence, offensive operations, defensive measures both passive and active.
The regulation regime can be co-operative through arms control, and unco-operative through export controls of critical material. Arms control sometimes gets a bad press, but I would argue it has been remarkably successful in constraining proliferation. It has roles in nuclear, chemical and biological. Arms control is well structured in the nuclear field with the NPT, START, fissile material cut off, CTBT, nuclear weapon free zones. There are proposals for dealerting and unilateral reductions of weapons from nuclear weapon states. There have been deals to control North Korea programmes. On the much more difficult side of Chemical weapons, the 1993 CWC entered force 1997 with 2/3 of countries of concern signing. 1972 BWC in force 1975 - lacks effective verification regime. Where arms control fails to stop proliferators, the next line of defence is deterrence. In the nuclear field this is well understood, but it is less clear in the case of biological and chemical attack. The ambiguity in the UK's position over the use of nuclear weapons re-inforces the deterrent effect.
Control of availability of dangerous cultures is an obvious recommendation. However, there are many potential killer agents, and also many entirely legitimate uses for them. The need for good intelligence is highlighted, but this will never be the complete answer in a democratic society. These discomforting conclusions mean that limiting the threat may mean expending most effort on preparation for coping with the outbreak of infection in order to minimise loss of life. While, precautionary inoculation against the most likely biological warfare diseases may be possible for military troops who are at direct risk, it is unlikely to be an effective or desirable general approach. The key to defensive measures must be early detection of a release of biological agents. Biotechnology is offering some prospect of fast reacting sensors, which can rapidly identify a wide range of agents. The universal wearing of a relatively inexpensive protective mask is recommended as a way of reducing civilian casualties from aerosol agents, such as anthrax, by several orders of magnitude. Quick response medical teams, who are trained to recognise a biological warfare event are also needed.
The more military active measure encompass both pre-emptive -Offensive action and the development of missile defences. These are the subject of a separate talk.
In conclusion, there is no certain increase of the threat to the UK, but there is a range of state and non-state actors who could become of concern. Measures to counter the problem are many,complex and need to be tailored to the different risks. One hundred percent saftey is not possible, but the outlook is not hopeless. Careful diplomacy, economic measures, intelligence gathering and defensive and offensive preparations can do much to contain the risks.