Readers of this column over the past two years will have followed the record of hard work that the Blair Government has put in to getting European defence moving. The pledging conference in Brussels at the end of November should have been a time for celebration as words began to turn into deeds. Instead, the Government has been cast in the role of selling out to Europe by much of the media. This has been further fuelled by the Conservative opposition enjoying the chance to bash Labour on both Europe and Defence at the same time.
The critics worry about the effect of the new arrangements on NATO in general and on the relationship with the United States in particular. They fear that effort will be wasted over a European force that can do nothing, but duplicates much of the NATO superstructure. They worry about a European Army run from Brussels. They believe that UK forces, already overstretched, cannot take on yet more commitments. These are all legitimate concerns that need to be thought through. The problem is that from the deeply entrenched positions on both sides of the political divide over Europe, it is difficult to find anyone listening to the answers.
It is true to say that in 1998, Tony Blair realised that something had to be done to stop the wasting away of defence capabilities throughout the EU. The public process began with the historic agreement at St Malo in December 1998, when it was agreed that both France and the UK would lead the development of a better European capability to undertake the "Petersberg Tasks". These tasks are those which do not include direct territorial defence, which remains the major task for NATO. They might be peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, disaster relief or rescue of EU citizens from troublespots. The rationale that the United States might not always want to undertake the European's dirty work seems a reasonable one. Where the United States is prepared to take part, then NATO will be the first choice organisation to conduct such operations.
The experience of Kosovo in 1999 underlined the inadequacy of European capability. The operation was conducted in Europe's back yard, and was a relatively minor campaign in the scheme of things. Yet the US had to provide 80% of the useful capability for the air campaign. The assembling of a ground force, even for an unopposed entry into Kosovo, proved to be difficult and extended in time for the Europeans. Yet they field 2 million men under arms and 3000 combat aircraft. EU nations combined spend just over half the amount that the US spends on defence, despite the two regions have virtually equal GDPs. The NATO Washington summit of April 1999 identified a long list of shortfalls in European capabilities, and all the members agreed to rectify these deficiencies. At that summit, NATO welcomed the European Security and Defence Initiative as an important method of getting better capabilities. In concert with the NATO work, the EU pushed on with developing a scheme to produce these necessary capabilities. Through a series of summits and bi-lateral discussions, with the UK playing a leading role, it was finally agreed at Helsinki in December 1999, that the EU would aim to field a deployable force of about 60,000 men by 2003. This force should be able to deploy within two months and stay in theatre for up to a year. Appropriate support from the air and sea would be provided, and the necessary strategic lift, command and control, and other combat support would be fielded.
The event that has caused so much tabloid angst currently is the conference at which each EU nation indicated what it would contribute to this embryo rapid deployment force. For the UK, the British Government has put a sizable offer on the table. The army will provide either an Armoured or Mechanised brigade, each of which could be sustained for at least a year; or an Air Assault brigade which would be deployed for up to six months. Combat Support enabling capabilities such as Artillery, and Short Range Air Defence, and Attack Helicopters could be deployed in addition. The Navy has committed an aircraft carrier, two nuclear powered submarines, four destroyers / frigates, support vessels; and an amphibious task group, including one helicopter landing platform and an amphibious brigade. The aircraft carrier, helicopter landing platform and submarines could not necessarily be sustained continuously for a whole year. In the air, we have offered up to 72 combat aircraft (including Sea Harriers), with associated support aircraft including strategic transport. This number would be available for six months to cover initial theatre entry. For a longer term commitment the total would reduce. As can be seen, the offer has constraints on time that may not fully meet the Helsinki requirement, and other nations will need to be able to fill the gaps. It is not therefore correct to assume this commitment will of itself increase overstretch. It has been carefully calibrated to match availability and sustainability of forces. Overstretch comes from the general undermanning of key areas of all 3 Services.
Geoff Hoon is right to say that the new force proposals are not a recipe for a European Army. The UK has had European force arrangements in a number of areas for many years. However, the real worry remains about how the missing capabilities are to be found. The new force will improve reaction times and ensure forces are trained for the new roles of the post Cold War world. It will not of itself provide the needed airlift, sealift, air-to-air refuelling, intelligence, reconnaissance, command and control, communication, suppression of enemy air defence, precision weapons and the many other bits of kit that Europe needs both for European operations and for use in NATO. The optimist will say that the mechanisms are now in place to start making European defence work. The pessimist will say that the deckchairs have been rearranged on the Titanic, but Europe remains unprepared to pay the price for its security. In either case, the Government seems to be doing its best, and deserves a better press.