Bruce George, Chairman of the Defence Select Committee, has produced a well researched report on the Kosovo campaign. The MOD has a natural Whitehall reluctance to wash too much of its dirty linen in public, as we have been reminded in a revealing letter by a retired officer in The Times of 30 October. Trying to assess Whitehall decisions depends more and more on the publications from the Defence Committee, and also from the National Audit Office, as MOD White Papers become thinner, glossier and less informative. The relatively late date of publication has allowed the Committee to draw on the many reports that have been published abroad.
It must have been one of the more difficult exercises for the Committee to scope. The nature of this unique undertaking by NATO meant that the inter-relationship between the politics of the 16 (which became 19 during the air campaign) NATO nations were as important as the individual contributions of capabilities which they made. The self imposed aim of the report is to help politicians in any future such operation understand the risks and constraints imposed, and to minimise them. This worthy aim is hardly likely to be achievable. Those politicians, who were involved, are doubtless only too well aware of the problems. From the UK MOD point of view, the usual problems of mobile Ministers mean that only one (John Spellar) with the Kosovo campaign experience still remains. It will be too much to hope doubt that the Cabinet will prepare themselves for the next humanitarian intervention with this report. The publication is much more useful for providing real operational evidence of why forces need to be ready for operations at all times. Deferred capabilities and fixed scenarios may seem the best way of squaring the resource/commitment circle in peacetime, but such an approach can come back and bite you in war.
The Committee decided not to address the question of legitimacy of the operation. It may be that they were unable to achieve an internal consensus on this aspect. They explore the difficulties of maintaining NATO alliance cohesion, but are highly critical of the strategy which discounted the possibility of a ground campaign from the start. In the Sunday Times of 29 October, Air Marshal Sir John Day is quoted as saying that a ground invasion was only a few hours away when Milosevic finally capitulated. This does not answer the criticism of the Committee that the threat should have been made much earlier. Even though the Government will claim that they had to publicly discount the ground option to keep allies (particularly the United States, Germany and Greece) aboard, there were other more subtle approaches that could have been adopted. To have said nothing about the possibility of a ground campaign would have been one. The leaking of call up of key reservists would be another. Moving forces forward in an apparent preparation for a ground entry would be a third. These would all be a part of a Psy Ops strategy.
Space will not allow a full analysis here of all the important issues which the report raises. It has not been well received by the MOD. Many of the equipment problems have already been highlighted by the NAO. New questions which are raised included the balance of investment between air defence and offensive counter air systems. Only 6 Serbian fighters were destroyed in the air, while over 100 were destroyed on the ground. Is the lesson that we should be investing more on bombing capability rather than on fighter equipment? Certainly the more general lack of precision all weather bombing capability is a cause for concern.The Committee also expresses concern over the fact that the majority of UK weapons dropped were cluster bombs, and it looks as though some members may have wanted to say something stronger about their dubious legality. They also highlight the European lack of capability in weapon systems for the suppression of enemy air defences, and believe that this is an urgent area for European co-operation.
The UK used two unmanned systems: the Tomahawk cruise missiles and the Phoenix reconnaissance drones. Both were technically reasonably successful. However, the costs of each is a factor in their utility. Only 20 cruise missiles were fired by the UK in the whole campaign and 17 of these hit their targets. The Phoenix, long overdue into service, suffered an attrition rate of 8%, which at a cost of £300,000 each is an expensive but very useful asset.
While the Committee describes the UK's military contribution as "mixed", it does highlight the very major contribution that the RAF made to Alliance air to air refuelling, with some 85% of fuel transferred to non-UK aircraft. They agree that Europe needs much more capability in this field and wonder why the UK is going it alone on the procurement of a new national capability. It may be that Parliament is beginning to see that there are national as well as NATO advantages to greater European pooled effort in defence. A similar argument can be made about the lack of air transport assets, which they also report on.
Finally, Air Marshal Day is quoted as expressing regret that the Committee did not commend the bravery of those involved in the air campaign. In fact the Report concludes that: "UK pilots and other aircrew and support staff discharged their mission with distinction". It is the strategy and the quality of the equipment which is the focus for the Defence Committee criticism. Those who worry about future operations where equipment shortcomings will result in failure for British forces will take little comfort from this important document.