I have followed the missile defence debate for over 20 years both within government and as an outside commentator. I speak today as a commentator and certainly not giving the British Government's position, but I shall try to describe what I think has been going on in the UK policy debate. We can all understand the immediate appeal to both military and civilian of the thought that it might be possible to provide defences against such an awful prospect as a nuclear or other WMD attack. The US has a long and expensive history of attempting to provide itself with defences against incoming ballistic missile attack. The first attempts of the 60's were abandoned when it became clear that such defences were technically infeasible, and did no more than stimulate the Soviet Union to increase the numbers of its nuclear tipped missiles. The possibility of multiple warhead missiles made defences even less reliable and reduced the stability of deterrence. In a wonderful moment of rationality, the US and the Soviet Union agreed to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 which severely limited the defensive system that each side could deploy. It was a treaty in which not only both sides benefited from increased security, but the world at large - and Europe in particular - applauded the reduced impetus for a nuclear arms race. As technology improved, industry again offered a vision of providing leakproof missile defences, and President Reagan held out the prospect in a speech in 1983. The Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) spent billions of dollars, but came no closer to providing a reliable defence against a nuclear strikes. The UK Government then feigned interest in the hope of getting a share of the research funds, but was very sceptical about feasibility.
When I was invited to Beijing in March of this year to discuss the current proposals, I went back to some articles I had written about SDI in 1983 and '84 to see what aspects had changed since then, and so why I might support the new proposals. My arguments against in the early 80s had been on technical , strategic, military effectiveness, financial and stability grounds.
The new proposals for NMD draw on the SDI technologies but look to a much more limited requirement. The threat to the continental United States is assumed to come from a "rogue state" (sorry now called states of concern). These are normally thought to include North Korea, Iran or Iraq. Each is expected to have very few missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction over intercontinental distances. The technical problems of interception are therefore expected to be much less. There is a strong political consensus among Democrats and Republicans that NMD should go ahead if it is technically possible. The system testing so far has been ambiguous, and the third key interception test failed badly. In Europe we have celebrated President Clinton's decision to put off any decision until his successor is in post. So technical capability may be better than it was, but is still uncertain.
The strategic implications are still much the same as they were for SDI, despite the end of the Cold War and the more limited declaratory aims. Many, and this is particularly true in Europe, fear that undermining the ABM treaty will unpick all the hard won achievements of arms control over the past 30 years. It can be argued that if the US manages to renegotiate the treaty with the Russians, there would be no such problem. Unfortunately, the elements of the NMD system are not just minor changes to the treaty. The thrust of the ABM treaty is to prohibit a nation-wide defensive system. NMD also requires treaty-banned space-based sensors and radars outside of the United States. The obvious response for declared nuclear powers is to increase the number of nuclear systems they field. For emerging powers they may decide it is better to go less traditional routes with their WMD delivery systems. None of this is helpful in promotion confidence and safety. There are also worries about what the deployment of such a system would mean for NATO. If the US had provided for itself a shield which was not available to the rest of NATO, would this affect the internal alliance relationships adversely? Of course we are assured by security advisers to Governor Bush that any Republican scheme would provide effective protection for Europe as well. The technical viability of this extented system is even more suspect, the cost enormously greater and there would be a transition period of perhaps years before the system was extended. Europeans do not share the US view of how to handle the threat of proliferation in difficult states. Nor do they believe that a missile defensive system protects against the many different types of threat that are now emerging. In some respects the long range missile threat is the least likely and nuclear deterrence remains a sufficient strategy.
The costs of NMD remain very high, and will undoubtedly drain defence resources from other more urgent needs. Some who worry about managing the sorts of conflicts we have been involved in lately worry about the US focusing its defence expenditure on the wrong priority. However in the end, the spending issue is one for the US alone. If they wish to throw away more trillions of dollars on a useless capability, that is really their affair. We all do it.
On military effectiveness, it is difficult to imagine a level of defensive assurance that will change the approach the US takes in its dealing with difficult nations. Do we really believe that a future President would be so confident of the efficacy of an NMD system that he would ignore the potential risk of an NMD strike? From a military perspective, the loss of money for other capabilities is likely to be the more important aspect.
However, despite these personal doubts, which are shared by a wide body of opinion in and out of government in Europe, what right have we Europeans to interfere in the internal security arrangements of the United States? The answer of course is that we fear that NMD will make the world a more dangerous place, will reduce European security and in the UK give us some internal as well external problems.
The particular policy problem for the UK government is that two installations (Fylingdales radar station and Menwith Hill) will both be integral parts of any US NMD system. The necessary upgrades are likely to breach the ABM treaty unless it is renegotiated. The UK has therefore some leverage with any US administration. To preserve that leverage, it has doggedly stuck to a formula that says " since the US has not requested upgrades as yet, we have not addressed the policy". This is self-evidently nonsense, but it does indicate the sensitivity of the UK politics that surround NMD. Earlier this year, it looked as though the UK felt that its best role might be to help to broker the best modified ABM treaty that it could. This is not a role which would make many friends in the rest of Europe. It would be seen as another example of the UK being more with the US than with Europe. There are also domestic political issues. It may prove difficult to explain why the UK is hosting two key parts of an American defensive system, which in the first instance provides no extra security to Britain. Indeed in any future war, we might expect these facilities to be high priority for attack. The Conservative party are well represented here today and will doubtless give a more sympathetic view to US NMD aspirations. I see this as a good issue in their constant battle against the rest of Europe. They fully support NMD and want the UK to offer what is necessary. The minority opposition party of the Liberal Democrats want the UK to oppose NMD and look to strengthening ties with Europe and bolstering the arms control regime. We have therefore a potentially divisive poltical issue if the new administration moves quickly on the UK participation in any NMD scheme. For now the Government has quietly celebrated the failure of the critical test, and President Clinton's deferment of the decision.
What should the rest of the world do? After all, every American you talk with says that NMD is a done deal. No politician would speak against it - any more than they would speak against the death penalty. A move which is likely to result in a less safe world in general, and a less safe Britain in particular, for no advantage is one in which Britain and Europe have a legitimate interest. Perhaps there is now a Common Foreign and Security Policy interest for Europe which is not shared by the United States, and Europe needs to stand up for itself. There might be merit in encouraging a more evolutionary approach toward missile defences for deployed military formations. These would be technically more likely to work, cost less and have a reasonable rationale.