In one aspect of EU development, the United Kingdom is seen by its European partners as the leading innovator and driving force. The work that has taken place over the past two years on European Defence Policy (EDP) is widely known as the Blair Initiative. No one believes that the enthusiastic adoption of EU defence goals at Helsinki in 1999 would have been possible without the key work by the British government over the preceding year. However, there are now signs that the process is getting bogged down, and that new imaginative proposals are needed. Britain seems surprisingly reluctant to take the lead again.
In the immediate aftermath of the 1997 UK General Election, the new Labour government gave every impression that it would continue the transatlantic focus to defence policy that had been pursued so assiduously by all its post-war predecessors. The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) took this as its foreign policy assumption, and had little to say about Europe. The promotion of the Western European Union (WEU) as a safety valve for any schemes for wider European military ambitions was retained as a policy aim. Yet no sooner was the SDR published than a new approach to European defence was formulated in the inner circles of government. The increasing enthusiasm for producing a better EU defence posture can be tracked through a series of summit meetings. In October 1998 at Pörtschach, Tony Blair indicated that the UK would be prepared to consider military co-operation within the EU. The December 1998 Franco-British summit at 1998 provided the real breakthrough with proposals for improved EU defence capabilities, and the requirement for Europe to have "the capacity for autonomous action".
The last year of the Twentieth Century was momentous in western defence terms. NATO celebrated its 50th birthday by revising its strategic rationale, examining its shortcomings, expanding its membership, and fighting its first war. The Washington summit in April 1999 produced a strategic concept which was in line with the analysis that had been undertaken in Europe about likely future roles. The lack of capabilities, particularly among European members, was identified as an area for action. The air campaign in Kosovo demonstrated in graphic terms the enormous imbalance between US and European capabilities. Decisions over the bombing tactics or ground force options reminded European leaders of their dependence on American policy as well as firepower. Kosovo as a lesson in power politics provided another impetus to the work on EDP. The Cologne Council of June 1999 transformed the various bi-lateral initiatives into an EU process. The leaders decided to set up the necessary institutional arrangements for the EU to deal with defence. This included an agreement to transfer WEU assets to the EU by the end of the following year. The new post of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was agreed and it was filled by the ex NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, in the autumn.
The culmination of all this activity was the Helsinki European Council of 11-12 December 1999. After the important philosophical and institutional groundwork had been done at the previous meetings, Helsinki was to produce concrete military capability proposals. The member states set themselves a "headline goal". They looked to develop an EU force which would be capable of carrying out corps level (about 50-60,000 troops) tasks. These tasks would include the most demanding of peacekeeping, humanitarian and crisis management, but NATO would remain the vehicle for territorial defence requirements. Rightly, the Helsinki goal spells out the supporting requirements for such an independent power projection force. It needs command and control, intelligence, logistics, combat support, and the necessary air and naval elements. It has to be able to be deployed within 60 days and self sustaining for a year. All of this is to be achieved by 2003.
Once the Helsinki aim was agreed, the work has transferred largely from the political process to the bureaucratic. Defence ministries have to look at how they can tailor their capabilities to fit the new requirement. The focus for this effort is the Capabilities Commitment Conference to be hosted by France at the end of November 2000. There is an extraordinary amount of detailed staff work to do. In order to list the capabilities needed, scenarios must be agreed. These include the possibility of having to conduct the separation of warring factions by force, humanitarian assistance and evacuation of civilians, and conflict prevention operations.
Some 144 different capabilities have been identified as requirements, and these in turn have been grouped into seven main categories: C3I (Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence); ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance); deployability and mobility; effective engagement; protection and survivability; sustainability and logistics; general support. Land, sea and air capabilities to fill these requirements must be identified for allocation. The data is being assembled in the Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue.
This staff work is an important part of the process. EU defence officials and military policy makers are having to work together to shape the proposals for this new force and in doing so will learn to co-operate further. However, the time is short and the deficiencies are large. Many countries will wish to allocate overlapping capabilities, whereas none will be able to provide key enablers which are missing. These deficiencies were identified back in April 1999 in the NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative, and nothing has been done to rectify the shortcomings since then. EU nations will have plenty of fighter aircraft to offer, but few reconnaissance drones available. There is no shortage of infantry to double-hat for this force, but there are shortages of secure communication systems for them to talk to one another. There is no possibility that the many expensive shortfalls will be made good by 2003. The EU has no funds to provide the necessary capabilities, and the member states have already committed their declining defence budgets to national needs in the near term.
The current French Presidency was seen as a time of great opportunity for pushing forward EDP. The French have taken a lead with Britain rightly in keeping the focus on capability issues. However, the institutional arrangements are important, and are not yet solved. The WEU seems reluctant to bow out. The lack of congruence between the EU membership and NATO's European membership also remains a potential difficulty. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Turkey, Norway and Iceland have to worry about the EU dealing on their behalf with the US within NATO. Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden may have parallel concerns about their EU forces being drawn in to NATO activities. Nor does France's absence from the NATO integrated military structure make life any easier.
It looks likely that the French Presidency will end with great self congratulation by EU members about how much has been achieved in progress towards the Helsinki requirement. However, the difficult and expensive shortfalls in military capabilities will still not be provided. There will be some bright spots. Germany has been doing some important work on developing proposals to improve mobility. They are working hard to establish an EU airlift capability, which they hope in the longer term to supplement with sealift. This will involve a number of nations contributing to a joint force. As yet, it is too early to say whether this will be more than just another multinational activity. There is no shortage of European multinational forces. Most are less efficient and more expensive than their single nation equivalents. If Europe is to improve its capability, it must look for ways to operate more efficiently. This means that pooling of forces and eliminating duplication of support must be undertaken. This is not an easy road for national politicians, or indeed for national military officers.
NATO operates one capability at the supranational level. The AWACS (Airborne Early Warning and Control System) force is funded through NATO, shared between the nations and manned by many nationalities. It is a good model of how the EU might operate pooled capabilities at much lower costs. Much of the disparity between European and American capabilities is not a question of absolute spending levels (the EU spends about $140 Billion a year on defence), but is about the way it is spent. Each EU member duplicates the others headquarters, training, support and logistics structures. Defence is still nationalised. The German proposals for mobility might produce a greater enthusiasm for shared military resources. However that will not be enough to make European defence viable. John Roper and I have argued that the delivery of Eurofighter to five EU nations from 2002 onwards could provide a unique opportunity to field an effective European pooled capability. However, the time is now very short and there is little prospect of such a force being established. This does not mean that Britain should abandon its lead in promoting a more effective European defence capability.
The UK defence programme includes financial provision for replacing its air-to-air refuelling fleet. It is looking at how this might be done by a private contractor. There are few sovereignty issues with such a capability, particularly as it may be done by contract. Europe is desperately short of this enabling capability. If the contract were let on an EU basis, the unit cost would be reduced, the capability increased and the costs shared. Tony Blair could get his initiative back on the rails by making such a proposal at Nice in December. It would be the start of a European defence budget, which is the key missing link in the current institutional arrangements. Without such leadership, the European defence adventure looks set to end in failure like its many predecessors. Nor can we be sure that the United States will be prepared to fill the gaps as it always has in the past.
Sir Timothy Garden is working on European defence capability at the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London. He is a former defence programmer in the UK Ministry of Defence.