In the same week that the RAF reminds the nation of its triumph in the Battle of Britain 60 years ago, the National Audit Office publishes a detailed and devastating analysis of its current pilot shortage problem. There were 71 Fighter Command squadrons which took part in the Battle of Britain; today the RAF has just 5 air defence squadrons. Of the 2927 airmen, who took part, 544 were killed in the Battle; today the RAF is established for only 540 pilots to cover all the fast jet roles, and yet an 18% shortfall will worsen to 25% by 2003.
Although the report "Training new pilots" only covers the process from recruitment to operational qualification, it shines some light on why there is an acute and worsening pilot manning crisis. The report covers all 3 Services and all types of military pilot. It should be read widely as it shows how a lack of joined-up management can make a bad situation even worse. Efficiency measures ( a favourite MOD activity) translate into local savings which raise costs further down the training machine. Cutbacks in the frontline translate into backlogs in the training machine. It can now take 6 years, rather than the planned 3 years, to train a pilot and cost nearly £5.7 million per person. The NAO even quantify the cost of empty cockpits at another £6 million per year. The current input targets cannot rectify the shortfalls before 2012. The extended training times reduce the amount of useful operational service that each pilot can give. All this means that the few trained pilots must work harder and be on operations more often, with adverse effects on retention. The problem worsens. The report highlights some of the added difficulties resulting from the contractorisation of various aspects of the training system.
Rightly, the NAO has identified the complex interaction of the multitude of factors which influence the output of the pilot training process. There is no single simple solution to the problem. Retention measures will have an important role to play, and in the end will have to be in the form of financial incentives. If each empty cockpit is costed by the NAO at £6 million per year, it should be possible to justify a quite generous progressive retention scheme. The pilot training system will also need greater investment, and most of all will need to return to a more flexible arrangement, which will entail a degree of overprovision.
The Government can take some comfort that what would have made a good press story in Battle of Britain week was just about buried by the fuel crisis. Even so, this is a problem which is not going to go away. British armed forces without pilots will be pretty constrained in what they can do in any future operations.