The number of high profile stories about Ministry of Defence incompetence, poor management and future prospective cuts has continued unabated by the Summer Recess. The latest "exclusive", shared between the BBC and Jane's, was a leaked internal paper looking at the future aircraft equipment programme. In essence, the paper highlighted a budgetary shortfall of some £1.5bn in the air systems programme over the 10 year planning period, and offered some ways to subsidise the future equipment programme by reducing the day to day running costs of currently deployed air systems. Although the recently restructured financial management system in the MOD was supposed to reduce the amount of interchange between current operating costs and the capital equipment programme, nobody really believed that the two would remain separated for long.
The options offered were hardly novel. There was the possibility of salami slicing across a number of capabilities. Reduce the number of aircraft on every front line squadron, and make the ones that remain work a bit harder. This is always a politically attractive option. It is less obvious to the public, and the senior military can claim to have preserved the historic squadrons of the past.
The other option was to remove one aircraft type from the frontline. This is a much more difficult approach to sell. Squadrons disappear and retired air marshals, celebrating the 60th anniversary of the Battle of Britain, make apocalyptic pronouncements on the media. Yet to make real running cost savings, the reduction of aircraft types will always be a more cost effective approach. Since the end of the Second World War, the number of different types of combat aircraft being operated by all major air forces has been decreasing. The RAF seems set on a path where it will ultimately operate two main types: an air defence fighter and a precision bomber. It may be that advances in stand-off weaponry will allow Eurofighter to fit the bill for both roles, but for now it looks as though the Tornado and its successor will be needed for the bomber task. The UK currently operates the Harrier, the Jaguar and the Tornado in the offensive roles, and a quite different type of Harrier and Tornado for its air defence needs. Operating 5 aircraft types when the aim is to reduce to two suggests an obvious place for economy.
There are arguments to be made for and against selecting any of these for the chop. The Jaguar is arguably the least capable of the three bombers. However, the single pilot operators will need to be kept ready for the Eurofighter as it comes into service. On the air defence side, the Tornado F3 is a relic of the Cold War needs for long range interception of Soviet bombers, and is unsuited to many of the air defence requirements of today. The Sea Harrier is very limited in its operating range, but is all the Royal Navy has to keep a foot in the door for its future carriers. These, and many other, fierce arguments within Services and between Services have been the normal course of putting together the Defence programme.
The tiny uplift in the July Comprehensive Spending Review will have left many such resource problems. The lessons of Kosovo have added new unplanned costs to the future equipment programme. Smart Procurement and the Defence Logistics Organisation will find it difficult to deliver the savings assumed. Whitehall warriors will explore the previously unthinkable in order to deliver advice on the best balance of capability, commitment and resources to Ministers.
The big change now is that the process of exploring options is no longer an internal activity. Whitehall is having to come to terms with the fact that its musings are the common currency of the specialist internet forums. In the past, staff officers from MOD or Command HQ might let slip some unguarded remark in the bar at a flying station they were visiting. Rumours circulated slowly and without focus among the operators. Today, those rumours are posted on the Web, and read avidly by people whose futures depend on policy decisions in Whitehall. In a matter of hours, the overall picture is built up, and the journalists who take an interest will have a story. This makes it very difficult for policy planners in Whitehall. They would prefer to work through their ideas before presenting them to Ministers. However, once the story is leading the morning news, it is Ministers who have to stand in the firing line. Insiders will have been amused to hear Dr Moonie, the junior Defence Minister, describe a paper that had gone to the Air Force Board as "a speculative think piece". Nevertheless, he was right. Ministers would have needed to look at any proposal for high profile squadron cuts, and, even without the media roasting, would probably have gone for a less efficient, more politically acceptable, savings measure such as salami slicing.
The wider availability of policy development information on the Web means that Whitehall will have to change its methods. Ministers will want to be involved much earlier in the process. This may mean worse rather than better decisions.