The latest headlines about poor RAF bombing accuracy during the Kosovo campaign have resulted in great opportunities for the cartoonists. A desk bound pilot is shown tossing the crumpled report towards his waste paper basket - and missing. What are the real issues? The RAF released some 1011 weapons during the air campaign. Over half of these were cluster bombs which cover an area target and so are not assessed for pinpoint accuracy. Only a quarter were laser guided smart bombs and the remaining 230 were freefall 1000lb bombs of World War 2 design. These bombs are targeted by identifying ground features using radar, and computing a release point based on information about aircraft speed, altitude and position modified for the wind they are expected to experienceduring the descent. Since there is no form of terminal guidance, the accuracy of the bomb decreases as its flight time increases. In other words the higher the release point, the more effect inaccuracies in the release parameters will have on the eventual impact point. Unexpected changes in wind speed and direction alone will cause dispersion around the aiming point. All this is well understood by pilots, who can refer to tables to calculate the probability of particular impact distances from desired aiming point. Some targets, such as fuel storage sites, cover a wide area and a relatively wide dispersion may be acceptable.
The widely quoted 2% accuracy figure for these 1000lb bombs is spurious. The figure reflects the number of dumb bombs that were observed to strike their targets. Since virtually all this type of bombing was done through cloud, nothing can be deduced from the low number of positive observations. Indeed, the wide media misquoting of this figure lends support to the MOD view that such data should not have been released.
For the future what lessons should be learned from this little episode? From the military side, there is nothing new. Some will remember the bombing of Stanley airfield by Vulcans in the Falklands Conflict. Again the media leapt on the fact that only 2 out 21 bombs (the same 1000lb dumb bombs) had hit the runway. Yet the target planners, in allowing for the dispersion effect, had optimised their chance of cutting the runway by attacking at an angle off rather than along the line of the runway. The RAF will use the political embarrassment to push for more and better smart weapons. Even so, there will be times when dumb bombs are useful. The current enthusiasm for the US JDAMS (a bomb guided by satellite navigation) will accelerate work by potential enemies on spoofing or jamming the satellite signals. There is no single answer in warfare; and it is always dangerous to think that there is.
It might also be a salutary reminder not to carried away with rhetoric. The RAF contribution to the Kosovo crisis was politically significant but modest in military effect. A little humility never goes amiss.