There will be very few tears shed in the White House or Whitehall over the catastrophic failure of the US missile defence test on 7 July. The momentum for a United States National Missile Defence (NMD) system appeared unstoppable. Yet President Clinton was unhappy at the prospect of going down in history as the man who broke the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Now he has an excuse for leaving the critical decisions on deployment to his successor. He may opt to start ground preparations for a radar site on an island off Alaska, given the long lead time that is needed for working in such an inhospitable climate. However, given the uncertainty of the technical development timescale, he would be more sensible to let the building work slip for another year. Either way the decision will have more to do with what the focus groups say than any rational strategic analysis.
In Whitehall, the relief will be considerable. The UK had a special place in the US plans. Fylingdales was set to be upgraded as one of the NMD radars detecting incoming missiles. Menwith Hill was also to be integrated into the system to provide space-based data on missile launches. Both of these upgrades would have been in breach of the current ABM treaty. Even if the US had successfully renegotiated the treaty with the Russians, the UK would have been left with real difficulties. From a British defence aspect, the two establishments would become very attractive targets for any potential attacker, but would not provide any missile defence capability for UK territory. The British government would therefore have been providing added security for the US, while reducing the security of its own citizens. There is also a European dimension. Most of continental Europe has been against deployment of NMD on the grounds that it will not work, but will encourage China and Russia to increase their nuclear weapons. Had the UK been required to decide about Fylingdales, it would again have been making an uncomfortable choice between its relationship with the USA and with its fellow EU members.
Geoff Hoon was sounding ever more unconvincing with his mantra that since the US had made no request, he had no opinion on the matter. In fact, the UK government handling of the affair appears to have been much more astute than it is being given credit for. The "don't ask, don't tell" approach to this policy issue has allowed quiet diplomacy to indicate the UK's concern to the US government. Reports from Washington indicate that the strength of European feeling in the early part of the year on NMD took US officials by surprise, and has resulted in some delay to their timetable for negotiations with the Russians. With luck, Whitehall's NMD policy problem can be filed away for another year. However, it has not gone away forever, and it might be useful to use the time to hammer out a common European policy.