We can all understand the immediate appeal to both military and civilian of the thought that it might be possible to provide defences against such an awful prospect as a nuclear or other WMD attack. The US has a long and expensive history of attempting to provide itself with defences against incoming ballistic missile attack. The first attempts of the 60's were abandoned when it became clear that such defences were technically infeasible, and did no more than stimulate the Soviet Union to increase the numbers of its nuclear tipped missiles. The possibility of multiple warhead missiles made defences even less reliable and reduced the stability of deterrence. In a wonderful moment of rationality, the US and the Soviet Union agreed to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 which severely limited the defensive system that each side could deploy. It was a treaty in which both sides benefited from increased security and the world applauded the reduced impetus for a nuclear arms race. As technology improved, industry again offered a vision of providing leakproof missile defences, and President Reagan held out the prospect in a speech in 1983. The Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) spent billions of dollars, but came no closer to providing a reliable defence against a nuclear strikes. When I was asked to join Hugh Beach on the recent trip to Beijing, I went back to some articles I had written about SDI in 1983 and '84 to see whether things had changed since then, and so perhaps I could support the new proposals. My arguments against in the early 80s had been on technical , strategic, military effectiveness, financial and stability grounds.
The new proposals for NMD draw on the SDI technologies but look to a much more limited requirement. The threat to the continental United States is assumed to come from a "rogue state" (sorry now called states of concern). These are normally thought to include North Korea, Iran or Iraq. Each is expected to have very few missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction over intercontinental distances. The technical problems of interception are therefore expected to be much less. There is a strong political consensus among Democrats and Republicans that NMD should go ahead if it is technically possible. The system testing so far has been ambiguous, and the third key interception test has been delayed. Nevertheless, President Clinton is expected to be in a position to make a decision by July. He may decide that more tests are needed and put off the final go ahead for NMD until his successor is in post. So technical capability may be better than it was, but is still uncertain.
The strategic implications are still much the same as they were for SDI, despite the end of the Cold War and the more limited declaratory aims. Many fear that undermining the ABM treaty will unpick all the hard won achievements of arms control over the past 30 years. It can be argued that if the US manages to renegotiate the treaty with the Russians, there would be no such problem. Unfortunately, the elements of the NMD system are not just minor changes to the treaty. The thrust of the ABM treaty is to prohibit a nation-wide defensive system. NMD also requires treaty-banned space-based sensors and radars outside of the United States. The obvious response for declared nuclear powers is to increase the number of nuclear systems they field. For emerging powers they may decide it is better to go less traditional routes with their WMD delivery systems. None of this is helpful in promotion confidence and safety. There are also worries about what the deployment of such a system would mean for NATO. If the US had provided for itself a shield which was not available to the rest of NATO, would this affect the internal alliance relationships adversely? Europeans do not share the US view of how to handle the threat of proliferation in difficult states. Nor do they believe that a missile defensive system protects against the many different types of threat that are now emerging. In some respects the long range missile threat is the least likely and nuclear deterrence remains a sufficient strategy.
The costs of NMD remain very high, and will undoubtedly drain defence resources from other more urgent needs. On military effectiveness, it is difficult to imagine a level of defensive assurance that will change the approach the US takes in its dealing with difficult nations. From a military perspective, the loss of money for other capabilities is likely to be the more important aspect.
Finally a word about the particular policy problem for the UK. Geoff Hoon has been recently reported as being supportive of the US position. Fylingdales radar station and Menwith Hill will both be integral parts of any US NMD system. The necessary upgrades are likely to breach the ABM treaty unless it is renegotiated. The UK has therefore some leverage with the US government. However, it will not be enough to change the push towards deploying an NMD capability. The UK may therefore feel that it can help to broker the best modified ABM treaty that it can. This is not a role which will make many friends in the rest of Europe. It will be seen as another example of the UK being more with the US than with Europe. From a domestic point of view, it may prove difficult to explain why the UK is hosting two key parts of an American defensive system, which provides no extra security to Britain. Indeed in any future war, we might expect these facilities to be high priority for attack.
What should the rest of the world do? After all, every American you talk with says that NMD is a done deal. No politician would speak against it - any more than they would speak against the death penalty. A move which is likely to result in a less safe world in genral, and a less safe Britain in particular, for no advantage is one in which Britain and Europe have a legitimate interest. Perhaps there is now a Common Foreign and Security Policy interest for Europe which is not shared by the United States, and Europe needs to stand up for itself.
The best UK policy option may be to continue arguing in public that there is no need to take a position until the US makes a request about Fylingdales. In private, the UK government should make it clear that it would not welcome such a request, and that an affirmative answer could not be assumed.