The Guardian of 30 March led with the headline "British Role in US star wars shield". This may have come as a surprise to readers on a number of levels. First most would only dimly recall Star Wars missile defences as one of the more lunatic ventures of the Reagan era. Some might wonder why a possible upgrade to the Fylingdales radar site in Yorkshire merited such prominence. In fact, The Guardian has got its news priorities right. The US proposals for a National Missile Defence (NMD) system are posing great policy issues for all European governments, and some more urgent dilemmas in Whitehall.
The US has a long and expensive history of attempting to provide itself with defences against incoming ballistic missile attack. The first attempts of the 60's were abandoned when it became clear that such defences were technically infeasible, and did no more than stimulate the Soviet Union to increase the numbers of its nuclear tipped missiles. The possibility of multiple warhead missiles made defences even less reliable and reduced the stability of deterrence. In a wonderful moment of rationality, the US and the Soviet Union agreed to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 which severely limited the defensive system that each side could deploy. It was a treaty in which both sides benefited from increased security and the world applauded the reduced impetus for a nuclear arms race. As technology improved, industry again offered a vision of providing leakproof missile defences, and President Reagan held out the prospect in a speech in 1983. The Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) spent billions of dollars, but came no closer to providing a reliable defence against a nuclear strikes.
The new proposals for NMD, which would breach the ABM treaty, draw on the SDI technologies but look to a much more limited requirement. The threat to the continental United States is assumed to come from a "rogue state". These are normally thought to include North Korea, Iran or Iraq. Each is expected to have very few missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction over intercontinental distances. The technical problems of interception are therefore expected to be much less. There is a strong political consensus among Democrats and Republicans that NMD should go ahead if it is technically possible. The system testing so far has been ambiguous, and the third key interception test has been delayed. Nevertheless, President Clinton is expected to be in a position to make a decision by July. He may decide that more tests are needed and put off the final go ahead for NMD until his successor is in post.
Why is all this so important in Europe? European governments and elites fear that undermining the ABM treaty will unpick all the hard won achievements of arms control over the past 30 years. It can be argued that if the US manages to renegotiate the treaty with the Russians, there would be no such problem. Unfortunately, the elements of the NMD system are not just minor changes to the treaty. The thrust of the ABM treaty is to prohibit a nation-wide defensive system. NMD also requires treaty-banned space-based sensors and radars outside of the United States. Europeans are torn between trying to defend the treaty status quo, and worrying that Congress may simply withdraw from the ABM treaty. There are also worries about what the deployment of such a system would mean for NATO. If the US had provided for itself a shield which was not available to the rest of NATO, would this affect the internal alliance relationships adversely? Europeans do not share the US view of how to handle the threat of proliferation in difficult states. Nor do they believe that a missile defensive system protects against the many different types of threat that are now emerging. In some respects the long range missile threat is the least likely and nuclear deterrence remains a sufficient strategy. The costs of NMD will undoubtedly drain defence resources from other more urgent needs.
One other country looks at the US proposals with special interest. China, with only about 20 ICBMs, is certain that the real reason for the US NMD programme is to counter its nuclear capability. The Chinese response is likely to be to build up its long range nuclear capability. A new arms race may start.
Finally, for the UK Government there are some urgent policy issues. Geoff Hoon has been recently reported as being supportive of the US position. Fylingdales radar station and Menwith Hill will both be integral parts of any US NMD system. The necessary upgrades are likely to breach the ABM treaty unless it is renegotiated. The UK has therefore some leverage with the US government. However, it will not be enough to change the push towards deploying an NMD capability. The UK may therefore feel that itcan help to broker the best modified ABM treaty that it can. This is not a role which will make many friends in the rest of Europe. It will be seen as another example of the UK being more with the US than with Europe. From a domestic point of view, it may prove difficult to explain why the UK is hosting two key parts of an American defensive system, which provides no extra security to Britain. Indeed in any future war, we might expect these facilities to be high priority for attack.
The Guardian was right to start the debate. It looks as though NMD will contribute towards making the world a more dangerous place, and the UK will find itself in a very uncomfortable position giving practical support to the project.