It was all going so well. Defence was never seen as a Labour's favourite policy area. Yet George Robertson, as the new government's Defence Secretary, delivered a strategic review, which earned the plaudits of the military, parliament, commentators, NATO and even the Treasury. His analysis was quickly tested by successful combat operations in Iraq and in Kosovo. Respected both at home and abroad, he was a popular choice to move on to the bigger challenge of sorting out NATO. His successor at the Ministry of Defence, Geoff Hoon, must wonder why it all seems to be falling apart now that he is in the hot seat. MoD problems are in the headlines every week. The army report after Kosovo that their rifles jam and their radios are useless. A serving Admiral writes to the newspapers to defend cutbacks in navy activity as normal budget management. The RAF's newly upgraded Tornados are no longer able to drop the precision bombs needed in modern warfare. The National Audit Office is outraged by cost over-runs and delays for new military equipment. The army is so short of recruits that it is looking in the prisons. Air force pilots use the internet to vent their frustrations anonymously. When a real emergency comes in Mozambique, the MoD is portrayed as putting more efforts into securing full costs from the aid budget than getting helicopters to Maputo.
Are the defence forces of the United Kingdom on the point of collapse? How can the string of military successes over the past decade be squared with the current litany of equipment failures, manpower shortages, training cuts and bureaucratic bungling? As Defence is required to become ever more efficient, the margin for error reduces. The difficulty is to judge when a critical capability is cut beyond the point of no return.
Since the end of the Cold War, the British armed forces and their supporting civilians have been reduced by more than a third in size. . Rather than a reduction in commitments with the demise of the Soviet Union, British Forces have never been busier. The costs of military capability rise faster than do retail prices. Even if defence budgets were frozen in real terms, there would be difficult choices to be made each year about spending priorities. Malcolm Rifkind's review of 1994 tried to cut the costs of support for the forces so that he could provide more money for combat capability. George Robertson undertook a comprehensive look at the military capability needed to support foreign policy. Yet, unsurprisingly, his review came up with an answer that kept the defence budget unchanged. He squared the circle of costs by looking to rationalisation between the three Services. With each new policy initiative, the armed forces have less resilience. First a cut in front-line strength, then a transfer of support activities to the civil market, now a squeeze on efficiency by eliminating duplication between different arms. All of this will be familiar to the modern businessman looking for greater productivity and lower overheads. Yet, despite a move to commercial accounting systems, Defence cannot operate as though it were a normal business. A factory can be measured by its output and a chief executive can be ranked by his company's share price. Armed forces, in the end, are tested against unforeseen circumstances where the price of failure is very high. Cutting the margins increases the risk of operational failure.
Every military planner wants to prepare for the worst possible case, and will tend to talk up his requirements. Governments, with many calls on the public purse, have to decide how much risk they are prepared to take. While they will always claim to be matching commitments to resources, events have a way of overtaking such aspirations. The Gulf War was no part of the "Options for Change" planning. Troop cuts did not anticipate future years of commitments in the Balkans. Planning misjudgements can usually be corrected for a price, but not always. When equipment plans fail to live up to expectations, more time and money is often the only answer. This leaves less cash for troops and training, which can lead to much more intractable problems.
The army has only recently managed to achieve recruiting figures which equal the outflow of experienced troops and officers. They have delayed their target date for full manning to 2005 at best. The new recruit will take years to acquire the military expertise of the NCO who leaves early. The RAF is some 95 fast jet pilots short of its requirement for 500. At best, the position will deteriorate by another 40 over the next three years. When the Eurofighter is delivered, will there be the pilots to fly it? Equipment failings steal the headlines. Yet in the end, none of the equipment is of any use without the trained manpower to operate it.
The rash of leaks and doom-laden forecasts from the MoD is not unusual around budget time. Some doubtless hope that this will bring pressure on the government to treat defence more generously. They can rightly claim new commitments: Robin Cook making generous offers to a UN standing force last year, and Tony Blair leading the charge at Helsinki for a better European defence contribution. In the past, the armed forces would have coped with these extra tasks from within their establishments, knowing that they could risk double and triple hatting of forces. Today, with so many real deployments and margins much tighter, it is more difficult. No one can say when, how or if the breaking point will come. Those who reduced the costs of the military medical services in 1994 did not expect a melt down 5 years later. For the military, the test is always an operational one. The UK forces have a very enviable reputation for success. The signs are that they are now living on borrowed time. Trained manpower cannot be delivered quickly.
The next defence review may be forced on a reluctant government rather earlier than it would have wished. Nor will the prospect bring any pleasure to armed forces that are still coping with the fallout of the last three such reviews. Since it will be difficult to reduce commitments or to increase the defence budget significantly, the government may need to look to rationalisation of military capability at the European level for its salvation. The duplication of headquarters, training units and support services between each of the EU member countries is a rich vein to quarry for better defence at lower cost.
Air Marshal Sir Timothy Garden was a defence planner in the MoD from 1987-1994.